distinction between the physical and the moral and political sciences. The conclusions of the former apply in every case, while those of the latter apply only in the majority of cases. The principles which determine the production and accumulation of wealth are inherent in our nature, and exert a powerful, though not always the same degree of influence over the conduct of every individual; and the theorist must, therefore, satisfy himself with framing rules to explain their operation in the majority of instances, leaving it to the sagacity of the observer to modify them so as to suit individual cases. Thus it is an admitted principle in Morals, as well as in Political Economy, that by far the largest portion of mankind have a clearer view of what is conducive to their own interests, than it is at all likely any other man or select number of men should have; and, consequently, that it is sound policy to allow each individual to follow the bent of his inclination, and to conduct his affairs in any way he may think proper. This is the general theorem; and it is one which is established on the most comprehensive experience. It is not, however, like the laws which regulate the motions of the planetary system; it will hold in nineteen out of twenty instances, but the twentieth may be an exception. But it is not required of the economist, that his theories should square with the peculiarities of particular persons. His conclusions are drawn from observing the principles which are found to determine the conduct of mankind, as presented on the large scale of nations and empires.

He has to deal with man in the aggregate; with states, and not with families; with the passions and propensities which actuate the bulk of the human race, and not with those which are occasionally found to influence a solitary individual.

It should always be borne in mind, that it is never any part of the business of the economist to inquire into the means by which the fortunes of individuals have been increased or diminished, except to ascertain in how far they have affected the public interests. These should always form the exclusive objects of his attention. He is not to frame systems, and devise schemes, for increasing the wealth and enjoyments of particular classes; but to apply himself to discover the sources of national wealth and universal prosperity, and the means by which they may be rendered most productive.

Nothing, indeed, is more common than to hear it objected to some of the best established truths in political and economical science, that they are at variance with certain facts, and that therefore they must be rejected. Most frequently, however, these objections originate in an entire misapprehension of the nature of the science. It would be easy to produce thousands of instances of individuals who have been enriched by monopolies, as they are sometimes by robbery and plunder; though it would be not a little rash thence to conclude, without further inquiry, that the community may be enriched by such means! This, however, is the single consideration to which the economist has to attend. The question never is,

whether a greater or smaller number of persons may be enriched by the adoption of a particular measure, or by a particular institution, but whether its tendency be to enrich the public. Admitting that monopolies and restrictive regulations frequently enable individuals to accumulate ample fortunes, instead of this being, as is often contended, any proof of their real advantageousness, it is quite the reverse. It has been demonstrated over and over again, that if monopolies and exclusive privileges enrich the few, they must, to the same extent, impoverish the many; and are, therefore, as destructive of that NATIONAL WEALTH, to promote which should be the principal object of every institution, as they are of the freedom of industry.

To arrive at a well-founded conclusion in this science, it is not, therefore, enough to observe results in particular cases, or as they affect particular individuals; we must further inquire whether these results be constant and universally applicable, and whether the same circumstances which have given rise to them in one instance, would in every instance, and in every state of society, be productive of the same or similar results. A theory which is inconsistent with a uniform and constant fact must be erroneous; but the observation of a particular result at variance with our customary experience, especially if we have not had the means of discriminating the circumstances attending it, should not induce us hastily to modify or reject a principle which accounts satisfactorily for the greater number of appearances.

C

The example of the few arbitrary princes who have been equitable, humane, and generous, is not enough to overthrow the principle which teaches, that it is the nature of irresponsible power to debauch and vitiate its possessors to render them haughty, cruel, and suspicious: nor is the example of those who, attentive only to present enjoyment, and careless of the future, lavish their fortunes in boisterous dissipation or vain expense, sufficient to invalidate the conclusion, that the passion for accumulation is infinitely stronger and more universally operative than the passion for expense. Had this not been the case, mankind could never have emerged from the condition of savages. The multiplied and stupendous improvements made in different ages and nations the forests that have been cut down-the marshes and lakes that have been drained and subjected to cultivation - the harbours, roads, and bridges, that have been constructed-the cities and edifices that have been raised-are all consequences of a saving of income; and establish, despite a thousand instances of prodigality, the vast ascendency and superior force of the accumulating principle.

The want of attention to these considerations has occasioned much of the error and misapprehension with which this science has been infected. Almost all the absurd theories and opinions that have successively appeared, have been supported by an appeal to facts. But a knowledge of facts, without a knowledge of their mutual relation, without being able to show why the one is a cause and the other

an effect, is, to use the illustration of M. Say, really no better than the undigested erudition of an almanack-maker, and can afford no means of judging of the truth or falsehood of a principle.

Neither should it be forgotten, that the alleged facts so frequently brought forward to show the fallacy of general principles, are, in most cases, so carelessly observed, and the circumstances under which they have taken place so indistinctly defined, as to be altogether unworthy of attention. To observe accurately, requires a degree of intelligence and acuteness, a freedom from prejudice, and a patience of investigation, belonging to a few only. "There is," to borrow the words of Dr. Cullen, "a variety of circumstances tending to vitiate the statements dignified with the name of experience. The simplest narrative of a case almost always involves some theories. It has been supposed that a statement is more likely to consist of unsophisticated facts, when reported by a person of no education; but it will be found an invariable rule, that the lower you descend in the medical profession, the more hypothetical are the prevailing notions. Again, how seldom is it possible for any case, however minutely related, to include all the circumstances with which the event was connected! Indeed, in what is commonly called · experience, we have only a rule transferred from a case imperfectly known, to one of which we are equally ignorant. Hence, that most fertile source of error, the applying deductions drawn from the result of one case to another case, the circumstances