CHAP. guards, and schools should march in array. XLVII. This was forthwith announced in a kind of manifesto, which secured the sanction of M. Barrot without that gentleman bestowing upon it much attention. When ministers heard of the manifesto, which they did on the 20th, they exclaimed especially against that part of it which called the National Guard to march in procession to the banquet. M. de Morny was summoned and told that this was considered to break off the agreement. Eager for peace, that gentleman hastened to Barrot and his friends, and represented the fears and objections of ministers. Barrot himself regretted these arrangements, but he could not counter-order them. Still he offered to publish a note explaining that if the National Guards came it was the simple act of each, and that there was no convocation or preparations made except for the sake of securing order.* Hurrying back with this note, De Morny found the ministry no longer disposed to accept it. The King was hostile to any such concession, M. Guizot equally so, M. Duchâtel was obliged to submit. "In that case," exclaimed M. de Morny, "a collision is unavoidable. But recollect if the govern ment sheds a drop of blood, it perishes. Are you sure of the army? Do you think that the National Guard will support you?" The ominous warning was thrown away, and a proclamation from the prefect of police forbade procession as well as banquet. In order to prevent any serious insurrection, the government ordered the occupation of the principal posts of Paris on the morning of the banquet, the 22nd of February, according to a plan laid down by Marshal Gérard. Moreover, orders of arrest were issued against twenty-two of the principal movers to the banquet. But at the threat of the police to disperse banquet and procession, how was the opposition to meet † Ibid. *Garnier Pagès. + Guizot. it? M. Barrot and his friends resolved to abstain and give up the feast, replacing it by the very ineffectual means of impeaching M. Guizot before the Chamber of Deputies. When the accusation, signed by fifty-two members, was laid on the bureau, the minister went up, read it, and laid it down with a contemptuous smile. If the Dynastic Left was satisfied with this, no other portion of opposition was so. Lamartine represented the case as a to be or not to be for the patriotic party. If an insurrection threatened on one side, disgrace and suicide threatened the whole party on the other. In consequence of such arguments it was resolved to have the procession and a muster at any rate. But all were against pushing it to an insurrection. The members of the Dynastic Left, assembled at the Siècle office, were not alone of this opinion. M. Marrast, of the National, chief of the moderate Republicans, equally deprecated it. He preferred to see the Liberal deputies resign and quit the Chamber. Nor were the ultra-Republicans of the Réforme more animated or determined to push matters to a violent struggle. Ledru-Rollin declared that any such attempt would fail; Louis Blanc said he would cover his face with black crape if it was attempted. More determined fellows, such as Caussidière, said: "Let us wait, and watch events." None, however, counselled an émeute or open resistance to the government. This unaminity in the adoption of extreme prudence on the part of the enemies of the government and dynasty worked it more harm than if they had decided upon open defiance. Word was brought of all these pacific resolves to the government, and so struck was it by this unanimity that the home minister Duchâtel, ever anxious for peace, sent round counterorders to the troops and forbade that military occupation of Paris on the morning of the 22nd which had been arranged, and which, if persisted in, might have prevented the worst that followed, It was too late to CHAP. XLVII. XLVII. call a council, but Jacqueminot and Tiburce Sebastiani, the commanders of the National Guard and of the regular troops, insisting on it, the King was consulted, and it was approved of by him.* Paris was thereby left to itself at a moment when the chiefs indeed had resolved to maintain tranquillity, but while the people, the students, and the multitude of those who had meanwhile probably promised themselves a political holiday were but too ready for disturbance. The workers of the faubourgs began to throng the Boulevards early in the day. The more ardent of the students did the same, to the number, it is calculated, of 3,000. Dense as was the crowd around the Madeleine in the forenoon of the 22nd, there was little menace of revolution. It was only the young who were ardent and mischievous. The students, for example, or the more violent of them, made an incursion against the Chamber of Deputies, penetrated within its railings, and alarmed members and the huissiers, but were half persuaded, half driven off, from their purpose. A juvenile group accomplished more mischief. Some hundreds of gamins de Paris, choosing the most open spaces in the capital for their gambols, attacked a little guard-house of the municipal soldiers in the Place Louis-Quinze with stones. Some cavalry could have easily dispersed these ragamuffins. But there was none, and the municipal guards, shutting themselves up in their little station, the gamins clambered on the roof and set fire to it. This and a similar kind of attack on the Hôtel des Affaires étrangères on the Boulevards were the only émeutes of the 22nd. Where were the men of the vaunted secret societies, the Republican conspirators? The prefect of police, Delessert, questioned on the subject, declared that secret societies existed no longer. This was in some measure * Guizot. true. The new Société des Saisons existed, but without action or purpose. It had depended on the group of journalists in the Réforme. But the Réforme itself was expiring for want of funds, and the society depending on it was expiring from the same cause. It had not even hope to keep it alive, for M. Ledru-Rollin had told its chiefs that there was no chance or possibility of a successful insurrection. There were 200 or 300 daredevils, however, who were not to be kept down and balked of their natural prey by the overprudent such as Ledru. They constituted what they called the Société dissidente, and were prepared to get up an émeute on their own account, if on no one else's bidding. They had stirred up the workmen and brought them to the Madeleine, and they were the first to try their hands at a few barricades. Those at first attempted near the Place Louis-Quinze were, however, soon destroyed, and the small band of émeutiers withdrew to the central streets and the Rue St. Denis, and then commenced skirmishing with whatever troops or police showed themselves.* These disorders were sufficient to warrant the summoning of the National Guard to arms. They mustered few, and those who did come were many of them Republicans, determining to excite, not put down, insurrection. The more conservative of the guards, disgusted, did not attend the summons. The watchword was given by the editor of the Réforme, Flocon, who bade all his friends don the National Guard uniform. These citizen soldiers were, however, of themselves more favourable to the insurrection than to order. government had long shown its mistrust of them, the King not venturing to review them. Jacqueminot, their commander in chief, had attempted to sift the guards and make a corps of those in favour of ministers. This gave * Caussidière, De la Hodde, &c. The CHAP. XLVII. XLVII. CHAP. great offence. And amidst the panic, the National Guards on duty at the Tuileries found that the soldiers of the line had ball-cartridges whilst they had none. The regiments of the former force accordingly, on the morning of the 23rd, showed favour to the insurrectionists, and instead of putting them down cried out "La Réforme !" with them. This took place under the very windows of the Tuileries. At the Place des Petits-Pères, the municipals about to charge the mob were met by the National Guard, who crossed bayonets with them to protect the people. The troops of the line, which had been brought on the morning of the 23rd to occupy different posts by order of Sebastiani, showed hesitation when they saw the Citizensoldiers fraternising with the people. Several witnesses of these startling facts hastened to the Tuileries to communicate them. The King was at first incredulous, but the royal family, and especially the Queen, saw their true import. About two o'clock, M. Duchâtel having come to the Tuileries on his way to the Chamber, the Queen observed to him that M. Guizot ought to resign, his unpopularity endangering the monarchy. Duchâtel hastened to the Chamber, and acquainted M. Guizot with what had been said. The latter repaired to the palace about half-past two. Whereupon the King asked, was he certain of being able to master the émeute? Had the minister taken upon himself to answer "Yes," he might have continued his purpose of resistance; but M. Guizot said he could not answer for events, and even to maintain resistance was impossible if the crown withdrew its confidence. Such a colloquy necessarily ended in the two ministers resigning.* The King sent for Count Molé, whilst Guizot hastened to the Chamber to announce his resignation. Meantime the insurrection grew strong. The line and dragoons were * M. Guizot writes that from the first moment of his interview, and first words with the King, it was evi dent that the latter had already made up his mind to dismiss his ministers. |