greed of sovereigns or the cold calculations of statesmen. After years of heroic struggles the Greeks were now threatened not merely with subjugation, but extinction. And the Liberals of all countries, of France as of England, came together to aid the Hellenes, with money, with arms, with eloquence. One statesman alone seemed fully to sympathise with their cause. And this was Canning. Villèle, drawing to the close of his influence and his career, confessed himself too much harassed to undertake so vast an enterprise. Châteaubriand and the ultras had drawn him into Spanish intervention, the consequences and embarassments of which still weighed upon the government. government. Villèle therefore declined what Canning proposed, which was, that England and France should intervene to save Greece, taking the initiative of the generous act out of the hands of Russia. The French minister failing him, Canning appealed directly to the new Czar, and the First Protest of European diplomacy in favour of Greece was signed in April, 1826, between England and Russia, France joining. A difference had arisen between Spain and Portugal, much more pressing and, for the Western powers, more important. The death of the sovereign of Portugal, had opened the succession of that country to his eldest son, Don Pedro. He already reigned He already reigned in Brazil, and found it impossible to occupy two thrones, one on either side of the Atlantic. He therefore proposed transferring that of Portugal to his daughter, Donna Maria, and at the same time marrying her to his brother, Don Miguel. The latter, however, claimed it for himself exclusively, whilst the partisans of Donna Maria maintained her rights, coupled with the establishment of a constitution granted by Don Pedro. There arose in Portugal the same quarrel between Cortès and absolutism which had prevailed in Spain, and which the French had solved by putting down the Cortès. The government proposed to do the same in Portugal, but CHAP. XLV. CHAP. Canning intervened and despatched 10,000 troops to Lisbon, which proved an insuperable obstacle, not only to Ferdinand, but to the French ultras. Villèle alone admitted that Mr. Canning's conduct was justified by treaties. He was not, like M. de la Bourdonnaye, for following up the crusade against Spain, by a war against England for Portugal. On the contrary, he joined England so far in blaming the conduct of the Spanish government, that the French ambassador was withdrawn from Madrid. Villèle was prepared to go even further than this, and join England in recommending the Spanish government to recognise the independence of its South American colonies. The French minister had passed his youth in these countries, and knew how vain it was for Spain to hope to recover its lost dominion. Spanish statesmen were obstinate, however, and Villèle saw with displeasure England acquire that predominance in South America which Spain, and conjointly with Spain, France, might have acquired. "During the three years," writes M. Guizot, "which elapsed between the accession of Charles the Tenth and his own fall, M. de Villèle did not struggle against the fickle inconsequence of the King but took advantage of it to ward off the blows of his various enemies. Too clear-sighted to hope that Charles would persevere in that line of steady and sagacious moderation which his brother had pursued, he managed that the new king should at least show himself, now and then, moderate and popular, so as not to appear altogether given up to reaction. Clever to seize the proper moment for influencing the monarch, Villèle induced him to abolish at one time, if he re-established at another, the censorship, soften the rigour of the laws, as well as to aggravate them, and to utter phrases that might be considered as liberal, amongst other expressions of his admiration for the bygone state of things. Similar was Villèle's policy before the Chamber. He proposed laws which went to XLV. the address of all parties. The indemnity of the émigrés CHAP. was intended to satisfy the lay Royalists, the recognition of Hayti was a sop to the Liberals; his financial regularity and reforms gratified intelligent men, and especially the functionary class, in France the best able to form a judgment on these matters. The law of entail and right of the eldest son flattered the would-be aristocracy; that of sacrilege, the priesthood; and in the midst of this there was always an effort to do something, if possible, for progress. Villèle flattered himself that this was the wiser policy for the epoch, an epoch which he characterised as the end of revolution." In this he was mistaken, for his prince and his party so worked and so befooled themselves and the nation, that they resuscitated, instead of lulling, the old spirit of revolution, which rose and grew, and at last menaced with such violence as to defy all such timid and one-sided policy as Villèle attempted. That minister was trodden down at last by the united passions and antipathy of the two extreme parties. M. Guizot exaggerates when he represents Villèle as, in the slightest degree, favouring progress. He performed a few acts in that direction at first; but later he was able merely to bring forward those laws which the reactionists dictated, suppressing or moderating some few of their extravagant demands. Amongst his concessions to the Liberals is counted his recognition of the independence of Hayti in 1826. He did this at the price of an indemnity of six millions sterling to be paid by the new republic to the old colonists, and of a tariff, by which French commodities were to pay one-half of those of other countries. It was a measure dictated by the simplest good sense, and one of course fiercely denounced by the Ultra-royalists, who desired to reconquer San Domingo, as well as Spain, France, and the world to monarchy and absolutism. If the recognition of San Domingo, the first measure CHAP. of the session of 1826, was hailed by the Liberals, that which followed it was a move in a far opposite direction. The proposal was to change the law for the equal division of property, at least for those fortunes which paid more than 800 francs territorial impost. Of such properties a large share was to fall to the eldest son, if there was no will to the contrary. Facilities for entail, or substitution, as the French call it, were also given by another clause. No attempt could be more foolish, more unpopular or out of place. In a country where the possession of land, especially to a certain extent, implies political influence, and, with political influence, the power of providing for younger children, the droit d'aînesse may have arguments in its favour. But in France where land brought no more influence than other property, it was idle to attempt to distinguish it, or reconstitute it feudally. M. de Peyronnet, the author and patron of the law, endeavoured to uphold it from the necessity of putting a stop to the subdivision of landed property, which in some Departments deprived the state of all revenue from land-tax. It was not worth collecting from so many and such small holders. But if this was the case, why limit the operations of the law to the highest tax-payers? The true correction to the extensive subdivision of the land was the increase of capital. Economical reasons had, however, little weight. The objection to the measure was that it went to restore the ancien régime, and against this the outcry was loud. The middle class was peculiarly indignant. How such a law could affect the shopkeeper of the rue St. Denis would have been difficult to explain. This class might certainly derive higher profit from selling to an aristocracy than to their equals. But it mattered not, the bourgeoisie were furious at the idea that any class should be considered above them. Not even priestly domination more depopularised the Bourbons, than this peor and futile attempt to preserve the old rustic manoir. XLV. Villèle incurred all the unpopularity merely to please CHAP. the squires, for really what he proposed would have gone a very small way towards reconstituting aristocracy or maintaining squirearchy. The national prejudice ran contrary to the droit d'aînesse, and one of Villèle's published letters bears witness how fully aware he was of the nullity of his legislation, yet he allowed himself to be overborne by Corbière and Peyronnet, the latter of whom, especially, was the chief originator of this attempt to bring back France to the ideas and organisation existing previous to 1789. Strange to say, the great obstacle to the enterprise of restoring feudal aristocracy was found in the constitutional aristocracy of the day, viz. the Chamber of Peers. This was avowedly composed of the highest fortunes and greatest eminence of the country, and it absolutely refused to be feudalised. De Peyronnet's ideas of a landed interest, perpetuated in a class, and gifted with political influence, eagerly favoured and abetted by the small gentry of the Chamber of Deputies, was repudiated by the notability of the country. The principal clause of the law was rejected by the Upper Chamber; that facilitating entail to one generation alone passed; of this Napoleon himself had set the example. Loud and universal was the jubilation throughout every part of the country, not merely for the rejection. of a law subversive as it was considered of the great conquests of the revolution, but at the fact of there having arisen in the Chamber of Peers an unexpected bulwark against the menacing tide of ultra-royalism. This check to Villèle, or rather to the ultra-royalist faction, was the principal event of the session of 1826. If it served as a warning to the minister, it had no such effect upon the King, who appeared more eager than ever to gratify the reactionary zeal of the priesthood. In the same session the petition of M. de Montlosier against the Jesuits came before the Chamber of Peers, |