CHAP. had simply referred Caulaincourt to the Austrian plenipotentiary. The hopes of the allies were centred in Austria, which declined to declare for them till it had tried mediation. These statesmen were convinced that Austria's offer would be rejected by that hardest and least yielding of men, Napoleon, and therefore they consented to an armistice to give Austria full opportunity to try the experiment. The numerical weakness of Russo-Prussian arms was, however, the principal cause.* Napoleon consented to the armistice, which was concluded at Poischwitz, leaving Breslau neutral between the armies. Of all the powers, the one really desirous of immediate peace, was Austria. Russia and Prussia, who were receiving their 5,000,000l. sterling from England,† merely wanted time to employ them, to strengthen their armies and bring up reserves. Wellington had just routed the French armies at Vittoria, and liberated Spain. They hoped to do as much by Germany. Napoleon entertained views equally warlike, and expected to double his forces, and especially augment his cavalry, in which his army was weak, during the armistice. In consequence of the suspension of hostilities, Prince Metternich himself came to Dresden, in order to communicate personally with Napoleon. In this critical interview, the French Emperor showed himself more actuated by hurt pride than by any rational policy. He was ready to give up Spain to England, Poland to Russia, Illyria to Austria; but he could not stomach the restoration of Prussia to its pristine importance. And for this cause he would not yield either the Hanseatic towns or the Confederation of the Rhine. It is almost incredible that Napoleon, for the sake of Hamburg, Lubeck, and Frankfort, should have * Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart to Lord Castlereagh, June 28, 1813. † Russia and Prussia concluded Treaties at Reichenbach on the 14th and 15th of June, with England, by which they obtained subsidies, and stipulated not to make peace without England. risked the loss of the friendship and alliance of Austria. And it may be pleaded for him, that yielding up these, he necessarily gave up Westphalia also and Germany. Perhaps, indeed, this was but too apparent in the famous conversation, for the nature and particulars of which M. Thiers was indebted to Prince Metternich's own relation.* It was, however, not so much the conditions of the peace, as the evidence that they were imposed on him, that displeased Napoleon. He had beaten Russia and Prussia, and he hoped to beat Russia, Prussia, and Austria in the field. This hope amounted to conviction, and indeed sufficed to baffle all the Austrian endeavours for an accommodation. Caulaincourt, as well as Narbonne, went as French negotiators to the Congress of Prague; but they were instructed to higgle about forms, and chicane, not negotiate. And Austria, perceiving a rupture inevitable, came to conditional terms. with the allies, was informed of their military plans, joined in them, and agreed to accept a subsidy from England to enable her to take immediate part in the war. All this was no doubt conditional upon Napoleon's persisting in the refusal of the Austrian terms. At the last hour, or rather past it, Caulaincourt received powers and instructions to yield the greater part of Metternich's demands. But Metternich, as the armistice expired, converted at once his contingent convention into a permanent alliance. Austria was thus no longer in a position to impose any condition, and her new allies refused the offers of Caulaincourt. It is admitted, that what most influenced Austria at this time to hold firm against Napoleon, and the Emperor of Russia to break up the Congress, was the account received of Wellington's victories. The failure and retreat of Massena from the lines of Torres Vedras, The German historians deny that Metternich insisted on terms so favourable to Germany, as those that Thiers indicates. See Springer, CHAP. XLIII. СНАР. has been described. Lion-like, he was formidable as he withdrew. And the battle of Fuentes d'Onores, which he fought early in May, 1811, to preserve Almeida, was one of the most fiercely disputed of Wellington's victories, and that in which his fortune and his skill were most at stake. A battle still more bloody and more critical took place soon after at Albuera, between Soult and Beresford, one in which the respective stamina of the soldiers was put to the proof more than the skill of either general. It was a hand-to-hand fight, and Soult was not victorious. He came to prevent the siege of Badajos but was obliged to retire without effecting his object. Notwithstanding the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, the British generals seemed as little able in 1811 and 1812 to take permanent footing in Spain, as the French were in holding any ground in Portugal. A British advance, always rendered possible by the separation and misunderstanding of the French marshals, was sure to terminate in their meeting, and then the English had but to retreat before their superior forces. This was the case in the summer of 1812, when the French marshal who was in front, Marmont, considered that because the English were retreating they could easily be beaten. And this he undertook to accomplish without waiting for his colleagues. On the 21st of July 1812 the English occupied one of the rocky hills near Salamanca, which the French call the Areopyles. Marmont attempted to dislodge them, but in directing the assault did not display the carefulness of Soult. A more than ordinary or prudent interval between his divisions allowed the English general to direct a portion of his army between them, and thus put them to the rout. Marmont, at the moment, lost his arm by a cannon-shot. Clausel took the command, and very nearly succeeded in baffling the English, as they were pouring down to overwhelm Marmont, so great was the disadvantage to attack, and so comparatively easy the defence, on such hilly and rocky ground. Finally, however, the English were completely victorious. What was as important as the victory, was the several proofs of it in some thousands of prisoners, guns and eagles. The rest of the campaign, however, did not answer the promise of such a victory. The British advanced to Burgos, but failed in the siege, and were obliged to terminate the year by a retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo and the Portuguese frontier. The momentous reverses of fortune which Napoleon experienced in the winter of 1812-1813 could not but have its influence upon the Spaniards and their auxiliaries. Lord Wellington himself went to Cadiz to communicate with the Spanish authorities there, and having matured his plans he began to march from Ciudad Rodrigo, through Spain towards the Ebro, about the time when Napoleon triumphed at Bautzen. His advance, at the head of 70,000 men, was the signal for the French king and principal functionaries to abandon Madrid. It was Napoleon's orders to Joseph to make Valladolid his head-quarters. But Biscay was in insurrection, and to keep open communication with France, he found it necessary to retreat upon Vittoria. Instead of the large armies which the French marshals had so lately mustered, Joseph could not collect more than between 60,000 or 70,000 before Vittoria. Soult had gone to join the Emperor. The British commander seemed fully aware that he had no skilful or powerful opponent to deal with, for whilst the French were concentrated around Vittoria, he disposed his divisions so as to attack them on all sides. General Graham was despatched by a circuit to come down upon and behind Vittoria from the north, so as to occupy their line of retreat. This daring manœuvre was crowned with complete success. Though defended in front by a river, passable but over a few bridges, the French were unable to make resistance even upon the high road. CHAP. XLIII. XLIII. CHAP. They were driven back upon Vittoria, and only reached it to learn that Graham was in their rear, and that the great road to France was already lost. The mere intelligence was tantamount to a rout. Whatever of the army escaped, did so by the road along the Ebro to Pampeluna, artillery, ammunition, baggage, the spoils of Madrid, Joseph's crown, Jourdan's bâton, all taken. The disastrous scene of the retreat from Moscow was re-enacted at Vittoria. It was not merely the discomfiture of an army, but the wreck of an empire. Tidings of this great triumph or terrible catastrophe, from whichever side it was viewed, reached the belligerents in Germany at the end of June, that is, when the armistice of Poischwitz had about half expired. Before that period, Metternich had stated his demands in the personal interview with Napoleon, and had come to the conviction that they would not be accepted. The consequence, as we have already stated, was the final junction of the court of Vienna with those of London, St. Petersburg, and Berlin. Austria now entered the field against Napoleon with 300,000 men. Russia had brought up its reserves, Prussia raised fresh legions. Bernadotte joined the contest with his Swedes, and was proclaimed viceroy as a recompense. He commanded an army of 150,000 men, which descended from the Baltic towards the Elbe. Blucher advanced from Silesia with as many. Whilst the Russians and Austrians, united under Schwarzenburg, threatened to emerge from Bohemia to the number of 250,000. Napoleon, at the resumption of the campaign, had not more than two-thirds of this number, which from Dresden as a centre he was able to launch at any one of his enemies. These, however, were wary, and had agreed to retreat whenever Napoleon in person attacked, the others assailing his lieutenants whenever he himself was absent. He has been accused of disseminating his forces, of despatching a portion to |