Opinion of the Court, per RUGER, Ch. J. v. McCormick, 28 N. Y. 318; James v. Gurley, 48 id. 163.) A variance between the amount of an execution and the judgment will not vitiate the execution. (Borland v. Stewart, 4 Wend. 568; Jackson v. Page, id. 587.) The want of a seal thereto, although required by law, does not render it void. (People v. Dunning, 1 Wend. 16; Dominick v. Eacker, supra.) If any sum whatever be due upon a judgment an execution issued thereon which claims too much is not void. (Peck v. Tiffany, 2 N. Y. 451.) An execution which gives unauthorized directions as to its return is not void, as the law prescribes the sheriff's duty in making returns, and he is not controlled by such directions. (Hutchinson v. Brand, 9 N. Y. 208; see, also, Cutler v. Rathbone, 1 Hill, 204.) The amount named in the execution may be amended so as to make it conform with the amount of the judgment. (Oakley v. Becker, 2 Cow. 454.) Errors in the description of the court where judgment was obtained, and the place where the judgment-roll was filed, have been held amendable. (Abels v. Westervelt, supra.) Where an execution issued upon a justice's judgment and filed in the county clerk's office, was not signed by the clerk, held sufficient to protect the officer executing it, although the statute required the signature of the clerk to such execution. (Hill v. Haynes, 54 N. Y. 153.) An omission in an execution of a teste, in the name of a judge of the court, or of a direction as to the time of its return, is amendable. (§ 57, chap. 280, Laws of 1847; Douglas v. Haberstro, 88 N. Y. 611.) We think that all of the essential facts necessary for the direction and protection of the sheriff in executing this process were either stated in the execution or were plainly inferable from other facts therein stated. The execution was entitled on the outside "N. Y. Superior Court. J. E. Arnold vs. Elbert Nostrand." It was directed to the sheriff of the county of New York, and stated in the body thereof, among other things, that judgment was rendered on the 2d day of March, 1874, in an action in the Superior Court, in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, as appeared by the judgment Opinion of the Court, per RUGER, Ch. J. roll filed in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court; that said judgment was docketed in the county of New York, and that there was, on the 4th day of March, 1874, the sum of $604.95 actually due thereon. It directed the sheriff to collect the same from the property of the defendant in the judgment. We think it was fairly inferable by the officer receiving this process, from the title on the execution, the residence of the attorneys who issued it, and of the party against whom it was to be executed, and the notice of its docket in New York county, that the judgment therein described was rendered by the Superior Court of the city of New York, and that the judgment-roll therein was filed in the office of the clerk of that court, which by law was located in that city. The amount for which judgment was rendered was fairly inferable from the statement of the amount which was asserted to be due thereon, and the direction to collect that amount with interest from the day judgment was rendered. Whether this be so or not, we think that each of the defects pointed out in this execution was amendable, and did not render the process void. It is quite clear that the official return of the officer upon this execution, as well as others, proved in the case, that the defendant therein had no property out of which he could satisfy the executions, furnishes sufficient evidence of the exhaustion of legal remedies against the debtor to authorize the institution of a suit to reach other property possessed by him. The defendants do not attempt to assail the existence or validity of the several judgments under which the plaintiff was appointed receiver; and when we have arrived at the conclusion that the execution upon the Arnold judgment was a valid process, the jurisdictional facts upon which the authority of the officer depends to make the appointment of a receiver of the property of the judgment debtor seem to be affirmatively established. The reasons given for holding the first execution valid apply with still greater force to the executions issued upon the Loaners' Bank and Poppenhusen judgments for the reason SICKELS-VOL. XLIX. 7 Opinion of the Court, per RUGER, Ch. J. that the defects in those executions were of an unimportant character and plainly amendable. It was held by the court below that the order appointing the plaintiff receiver under the Loaners' Bank judgment was invalid for the reason that the bank had ceased to be a corporation by virtue of the appointment of a receiver of its effects under proceedings in bankruptcy, subsequent to the recovery of its judgment against Nostrand. In this we think the court erred. It was competent for the receiver of the bank to institute proceedings in the name of the insolvent corporation to collect any debts or judgments owing to it; and to procure or sanction the appointment of a receiver of the assets of such debtor and we must assume that he procured such appointment. (Chap. 295, Laws of 1832; McCulloch v. Norwood, 58 N. Y. 566.) Force was denied by the court below to the appointment of the receiver under the Poppenhusen judgment on account of the lapse of time intervening between the institution of supplementary proceedings, and the final appointment of a receiver therein (from April, 1875, to February, 1878), upon the ground that a presumption arises that such proceedings had failed, for the reason that it was not shown that they had been regularly adjourned from time to time. It was said that jurisdiction was lost by the judge entertaining them through an omission to cause them to be regularly adjourned. As we have seen, the order of the judge making the appointment furnishes conclusive evidence, in all collateral inquiries, of the regularity of the proceedings in which such order was made. We also think the court erred in holding that a failure to adjourn such proceedings regularly caused a loss of his jurisdiction by the judge entertaining them. The contrary has been held in some cases, and that would seem to be the necessary deduction from the character of the jurisdiction which the court and officers have in these proceedings as we have herein before seen. (Underwood v. Sutcliffe, supra; Edmonston v. McLoud, 16 N. Y. 543; Wegman v. Childs, supra; Pitt v. Davison, supra.) Statement of case. The appointment of assignees in bankruptcy for the individual members of a firm does not authorize such assignees to take the firm property. By virtue of such an appointment they become entitled only to the divisible share of the member whom they represent in the assets of such firm after the partnership debts are all paid, and the equities between the individual members are settled. The proof, therefore, of the insolvency of three out of the four members, composing the firm of Poppenhusen & Co. produced no legal effect upon the ownership of the Poppenhusen judgment. It follows as the necessary result of our views that the order of the General Term should be reversed, and the judgment rendered at the Special Term affirmed. All concur. Order reversed and judgment affirmed. 94 51 109 308 94 51 RUDOLPH BERGMANN, Respondent, v. GEORGE JONES, Appellant. On trial of an action for libel, where the alleged libelous publication contained charges injurious to plaintiff's character and to his business, and the complaint averred that by reason of the libel plaintiff had had been greatly injured in his business, by the loss of good-will and patronage, plaintiff was permitted to testify as a witness that immediately after the publication his business fell off, and to state the amount of his daily sales up to and immediately after such publication. Held, no error. These questions were objected to generally. Held, defendant could not object on appeal that the complaint was not specific enough to authorize proof of special damage. Shipman v. Burrows, (1 Hall, 442), Hallock v. Miller, (2 Barb. 630), Tobias v Harland, (4 Wend. 537), Linden v. Graham, (1 Duer, 670), distinguished. Where evidence is received under a general objection, the ruling will not be held erroneous unless there are grounds of objection, which could not have been obviated had they been specified, or unless the evidence in its essential nature is incompetent. Also held, that the evidence was sufficient to justify the submission of the question of special damage to the jury. Also held, the fact that other persons had published the same libel, and 114 498 94 51 121 467 94 51 127 661 94 51 132 184 94 51 134 474 134 563 94 51 135 455 Statement of case. that similar reports had been in circulation, in regard to plaintiff, did not affect his right to have the question so submitted. Also held, that it was not error to allow plaintiff to testify to the efforts made by him to regain his business and to the hindrance he met with on account of the libel. Where a publication is libelous per se, and is proved to be false, this is evidence sufficient to require the submission of the question of malice to the jury, and to warrant the allowance of exemplary damage; and this, although defendant give evidence tending to prove no actual malice. Such evidence is to be considered by the jury, and it is for them to determine, in view of all the evidence, whether punitive damages should be allowed or not. It is not a ground for a motion to dismiss the complaint in an action for libel that the innuendoes therein are ambiguous or uncertain; any question as to their meaning may be submitted, upon proper requests, to the consideration of the jury. Where the libelous article will bear the construction put upon it in the innuendo no other proof is necessary to show that defendant intended to make the charge against plaintiff imputed to him. A publication, containing statements holding a person up to scorn or ridicule, and which degrade or disgrace him in the eyes of men, is libelous per se. (Argued October 10, 1883; decided November 20, 1883.) APPEAL from judgment of the General Term of the Court of Common Pleas in and for the city and county of New York, entered upon an order made at the December term, 1881, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon a verdict. This was an action for libel. The material averments of the complaint are as follows: "Third. That on the said 12th day of March, the defendant, being the editor and publisher of said New York Times, a newspaper having a large circulation in the States of New York and New Jersey, and throughout the United States, as this plaintiff is informed and believes, maliciously composed and published of and concerning this plaintiff, in said newspaper, the false and defamatory article and matter following, to-wit: The gossips of Guttenberg, N. J., are excited over a mystery which has developed in their midst. The scene of the mystery is a little two-story frame building on Fifth street near Herman |