Opinion of the Court, per RUGER, Ch. J. the same as that attempted to be reached by a judgment in this action. (Bostwick v. Menck, 40 N. Y. 383; Chautauque Co. Bank v. Risley, 19 id. 369.) It was competent for the receiver to have instituted either one of two actions in this case: He could have brought his action to set aside and annul the alleged fraudulent conveyance and demanded as his relief that the property so fraudulently conveyed should be reconveyed to him by the alleged fraudulent grantees; or he could bring the action which he has as the simple representative of the judgment creditors. In the former case he would have been obliged, in order to maintain his action, to show such proceedings relating to his appointment as receiver, as would have vested in him the title of the judgment debtor's real estate. In this action it is unnecessary to show compliance with the provisions of sections 159 and 160 of chapter 86 of the Laws of 1813; or the closing paragraph of section 298 of the Code of Procedure. Section 298 authorizes the judge, by order, to appoint a receiver of the property of the judgment debtor in the same manner and with the like authority as if the appointment was made by the court. And it further provides, that upon the appointment, by an order of the judge, of a person as receiver, it shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the county where the judgment-roll in the action is filed, and that the clerk shall record the same in a book to be called a "book of orders appointing receivers of judgment debtors," and that the receiver so appointed shall be vested with the property and effects of the judgment debtor from the time of the filing and recording of the order aforesaid. It is then specially provided, that before he shall be vested with any real property of such debtor, the order shall also be filed and recorded in the office of the clerk of the county where the real estate is situated, and also in the office of the clerk of the county in which the judgment debtor resides. It is thus quite apparent, from the reading of this section, that in a case where only personal property is concerned, or where the receiver is seeking simply to enforce the collection of a chose in action, it is not essential to show com Opinion of the Court, per RUGER, Ch. J. pliance with those requirements which are made the conditions of the transfer to the receiver of the title of the debtor's real estate. It required no interest in the debtor's property to authorize the receiver, any more than the judgment creditors, to maintain an action to collect a judgment from the debtor therein. The receiver is here seeking to enforce the collection of a debt due and owing to the creditors whom he represents, and upon recovering judgment herein he becomes entitled to sell upon execution such property of the debtor as is thus subject to the lien of the judgments which he represents. (Bostwick v. Menck, supra.) The title to the property upon such a sale would not in any event pass through or depend upon any right therein possessed by the receiver, but would pass by a conveyance executed by the sheriff to the purchaser on such sale. It is thus seen that the only interest which the defendants have, so far as this action is concerned, in the question of the regularity of the appointment of the plaintiff as receiver of the several judgments described in the complaint, is to see that he rightfully represents such plaintiffs, in order that they may not be subjected to other actions for the same cause, by other persons holding a superior right to that of the plaintiff. If the judgment in this case be determined to be a bar, as between the defendants herein, and any and all persons claiming an interest in the judgments, which are the basis of this action, then the defendants have secured all the protection to which they are entitled, as against the action of the plaintiff, so far as his right to institute it is concerned. This protection seems to have been secured to them, by the order of the court authorizing the prosecution thereof, made upon the application of the several judgment creditors, or those legally representing them, in each of the judgments described in the complaint, requesting that such action be prosecuted for their benefit. There can be no doubt but that such creditors would be estopped by an adjudication in this action. While it is essential in any action brought by a receiver, that he should show an appointment as such receiver, from a Opinion of the Court, per RUGER, Ch. J. court or judge having jurisdiction to make it, it is yet not open to the party in a collateral proceeding, to raise every question relating to the validity of such appointment. (Oakley v. Becker, 2 Cow. 454; Bacon v. Cropsey, 7 N. Y. 195; Dobson v. Pearce, 12 id. 164.) The defendant, in an action wherein the receiver was appointed, has been held to have waived, by his acquiescence in such appointment, any objections thereto founded upon irregularities in making the same. (Tyler v. Willis, 33 Barb. 328.) It was also held in the same case that it did not lie in the mouth of a third person, upon proceedings taken against him by such receiver, to collect a debt owing to the judgment debtor, to dispute the regularity of such receiver's appointment. To the same effect is the case of Underwood v. Sutcliffe (10 Hun, 453), Morgan v. Potter (17 id. 403). The production and proof of an order, made by a court or judge authorized by law to make it, in proceedings supplementary to execution, reciting the facts necessary to give such court or judge jurisdiction to act in the proceedings, furnishes conclusive evidence of the regularity of such order, when questioned collaterally, and prima facie evidence of the existence of the facts necessary to confer jurisdiction. (Rugg v. Spencer, 59 Barb. 383; Potter v. Merchants' Bank, 28 N. Y. 652.) It was held in the case of Wegman v. Childs (41 N. Y. 159) that an action was pending in the court, wherein it was brought, until after the satisfaction of judgment therein; and that proceedings supplemental to execution and the appointment of a receiver were proceedings in the action. (See, also, Pitt v. Davison, 37 N. Y. 236, and Gould v. Torrance, 19 How. Pr. 560.) It was said in Underwood v. Sutcliffe (supra), that such proceedings were in the nature of an action, and although this may be so in some respects, it would seem to conform more with the meaning and intent of the statute to hold, as was decided in the cases above cited, that they are in the nature of new remedies or equitable rights, arising by force of the statute, in the actions in which the judgments were obtained. This proceeding cannot, therefore, be termed a special statu Opinion of the Court, per RUGER, Ch. J. tory proceeding before a court or officer of limited jurisdiction in the sense that the facts conferring jurisdiction of the matter must be affirmatively proved, whenever questioned in a collateral proceeding; but it is simply a new remedy in an action in which the court is possessed of general jurisdiction, and where the acts of the officers named are entitled to all the presumptions of regularity which belong to the proceedings of courts of general jurisdiction. (Lounsbury v. Purdy, 18 N. Y. 519.) It seems to us, therefore, that the orders of a court or judge authorized by law to act in such a proceeding must be presumed to be regular until annulled in a direct proceeding to review or set them aside; and that such orders, so far as they recite the facts necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the court or judge to move in the proceedings, furnish prima facie evidence of the existence of such facts. (Foot v. Stevens, 17 Wend. 483; Chemung Canal Bank v. Judson, 8 N. Y. 258; Potter v. Merchants' Bank, supra.) The cases cited by the counsel for the respondent do not conflict with this view. Rockwell v. Merwin (45 N. Y. 166) held upon a demurrer to the complaint that the allegation therein that the plaintiff was duly appointed a receiver in supplemental proceedings was sufficient, and authorized proof on the trial of all the facts conferring jurisdiction. The method by which such proof was to be made was not considered or decided. In Dubois v. Cassidy (75 N. Y. 298) it was held that a receiver appointed in supplemental proceedings, before he could assert title to the real estate of the judgment debtor, must show a compliance with the provisions of section 298 of the Code of Procedure, which are expressly made conditions upon which his right to take title to real estate depends. Sackett v. Newton (10 How. Pr. 561) involved simply the question as to whether the issue and return of an execution nulla bona was a condition to the maintenance of a creditor's bill by a receiver. Considered in the light of the views we have expressed we think the several orders appointing the plaintiff as receiver of the property of Elbert Nostrand under each of the several Opinion of the Court, per RUGER, Ch. J. judgments described in the complaint sufficiently proved the regularity of such appointment, and the authority of the officer making them, to entitle the plaintiff to maintain this action. No question is raised but that these orders were each regularly recorded with the clerk of the county of New York, as required by section 298 of the Code of Procedure, nor but that such receiver executed all of the security required by either of such orders. It nevertheless remains true that the jurisdiction of these officers may be subverted by affirmative proof of the non-existence of those facts which were necessary to confer jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings in question. (Chemung Canal Bank v. Judson, supra; Dobson v. Pearce, supra.) It is alleged by the defendants that the issue and return nulla bona of an execution upon the Arnold judgment, which is undoubtedly essential to the validity of an order in supplemental proceedings, as well as the right to institute and maintain an action to reach the equitable assets of a judgment debtor, have not been complied with in this case. It is argued by appellant's counsel that the execution issued on that judgment was so defective in many respects that it was entirely void, and that the sheriff could make no valid return thereon. It remains nevertheless true that the sheriff did treat that execution as a valid execution imposing a duty upon him, and did make a return thereon that he could find no property of the defendant out of which to satisfy the same. We are of the opinion that the execution in question, although extremely defective, and subject to be vacated and set aside on motion, for informality, was yet not so defective that it can be treated as void when questioned in a collateral proceeding. Most of the defects appearing in the execution have been held to be amendable, and defects of that character can only be taken advantage of by the defendant in the execution in a direct proceeding to set it aside. (Abels v. Westervelt, 15 Abb. Pr. 230; Kimball v. Munger, 2 Hill, 364; Dominick v. Eacker, 3 Barb. 18; Berry v. Riley, 2 id.. 308; Kelly |