Certain contracts, besides those for necessaries, are held binding upon an infant, as contracts to enlist in the army or navy. (Morrissey, Matter of, 137 U. S. 157; 25 Wis. 390.) The executed contract of marriage after the age of fourteen in males, and twelve in females, is binding. The acts of the corporation will bind infant stockholders, and the contract of apprenticeship made in accordance with the statutes will bind the infant. (Schoul. Dom. Rel., Part V, Ch. 3.)

Sec. 379. SAME SUBJECT INFANT'S NECESSARIES.-The most important class of binding contracts which an infant may make are those for necessaries. But while an infant may bind himself for necessaries it is not to be inferred that he is responsible for everything classed as such supplied him, regardless of whether he is in need of them or not. The infant's necessaries are judged by the same rules laid down in the case of a married woman, and are practically the same with the addition of education.* The infant is not liable for necessaries when he lives with his father who fittingly provides for him. And the tradesman or professional person rendering services to an in

*Examples of necessaries for an infant are: Counsel fees in his business, dentistry, a horse prescribed for exercise, presents to his bride, etc. Following have been held not to be necessaries: A collegiate education, a professional education, betting books, treats while at college, kid gloves, cologne and canes (15 Ark. 137), a bicycle (145 Mass. 588), dinners, suppers, ices, soda water, confectionery, balls and serenades. See Browne's Dom. Rel., 2d ed., 109, 110.

fant in such circumstances does so at his peril; he must have the consent of the parent or show the necessity of the supply or service. (Perrin v. Wilson, 10 Mo. 451.) An infant when away from home, and not under the care of his parent or guardian, is usually liable for his necessaries. (Angel v. McLellan, 16 Mass. 28.)

The term necessaries is an elastic one, and will be construed with reference to the estate, social standing, and age of the infant. So, while food, clothing, medical attendance, lodging, and education are the five leading necessaries for which an infant may bind himself, yet the extent and character of these vary with the circumstances and general situation of the infant. (Breed v. Judd, 1 Gray 458; Met. Contr. 69.)

The doctrine of necessaries does not apply to the contracts of an infant made in the conduct of a business. So, board of horses of an infant hackman is not a necessary. (Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40.) Nor are farm implements, live stock, wagons, and the like to be deemed necessaries when purchased to carry on a farm. (41 Mo. App. 275.)

Education as a necessary, according to Schouler, rests rather upon respectable dicta than precedents. Lord Coke classed as a necessary "good teaching and instruction whereby he may profit himself afterwards." (Co. on Litt. 172a.) And this has become the general rule, as to the ordinary or common school education. It does not extend to a collegiate education. (Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683.) But a board bill contracted to enable attendance at school is held a neces

sary. (Kilgore v. Rich, 83 Me. 305; Schoul. Dom. Rel., Sec. 412.)

Where moneys are advanced to an infant to buy necessaries he is not held liable in a suit at law. (Ellis v. Ellis, 5 Mod. 368.) But in a court of equity he is held liable if he spends it for necessaries. (Smith v. Oliphant, 2 Sanf. 306; Price v. Sanders, 60 Ind. 310.) He is liable at law if the money is advanced to a third person to pay for necessaries furnished the infant. (Swift v. Bennett, 10 Cush. 436.) Formerly the infant's deed for necessaries was binding. But the rule favored now is that the infant's written obligation to pay for necessaries is to be inquired into, and he is bound only to pay the amount of their value to him. If the instrument given as security for payment is such that the consideration cannot be inquired into, it is void, otherwise voidable, and the infant is liable for the true value of the articles furnished. (Reeve Dom. Rel., 229-30; 23 Vt. 378.) So the infant's express contract for necessaries is probably only binding to the extent of the reasonable worth of the goods. (Schoul. Dom. Rel., Sec. 414.)

Sec. 380. INFANT'S VOID CONTRACTS.Certain contracts of an infant are absolutely void. But the rule which held all contracts to his prejudice void has been modified. The rule of Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Bur. 1804, is to the effect that all deeds of an infant which do not take effect by delivery of his hand are void, while such as do take effect by delivery of his hand are voidable. But the reason of this rule is questioned. And

letters of attorney from an infant conveying no present interest are held void (idem). In this country it is held that an infant's power of attorney to sell land is void, and a sale made under it does not confer even an inchoate title. (Philpot v. Bingham, 55 Ala. 435.) But a power of attorney from an infant to sell a note is voidable, and not void. (Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195.) The modern tendency is to treat all contracts of an infant as voidable, unless they are such as would be void if he were an adult. (1 Pars. Contr. 295.) A void contract is a mere nullity, and in legal estimation is incapable of being ratified. Voidable contracts are capable of being subsequently made binding by ratification, or of being avoided by disaffirmance.

Sec. 381. RATIFICATION AND AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACTS.-The disabilities of infancy are personal privileges allowed for his protection against imposition, and no one has the right to avoid the infant's contracts, save himself, his heirs, and legal representatives. So the persons contracting with him are bound, though he is not. No one but the infant can object to the contract. The vendor cannot avoid the infant's purchase; a corporation cannot reject an infant's transfer of stock; nor a stranger impeach the conveyance of an infant. In fine, the defense of infancy is for the benefit and protection of the infant; and other persons may not set it up for their own benefit, at all events if the contract be not void. (Schoul. Dom. Rel., Sec. 402.)*

*"But third persons should be allowed to protect themselves

When the contract is voidable, the infant has his election either to avoid it during his minority, or within a reasonable time after reaching his majority; otherwise, it may be taken to be confirmed, as after majority he is capable and must make his election. (Rice v. Bowers, 108 Ind. 472; 100 Mo. 584.) By statute in Iowa and Kansas, the infant is required to avoid the contract within a reasonable time or it will be considered as affirmed. (Dillon v. Burnham, 43 Kans. 77; 89 Ia. 76.)

The general rule is that the infant need not place the other party in statu quo when he disaffirms his contracts. (99 Mass. 508.) Where he has bought or sold personal property, and receives pay, if he has the consideration he must return it when he disaffirms. But if he has spent, wasted, lost or squandered the consideration he is not obliged to return it, and can repudiate without making tender. (Craig v. Van Bebber, 100 Mo. 584; Raynolds v. McCurry, 100 Ill. 356.) But he may not retain either real or personal property without paying the purchase price. (Kerr v. Bell, 44 Mo. 120.) Money vol

against incurring undue liabilities on an infant's behalf. Thus, an officer selling property at public auction is not bound to accept the bid of an infant. And although infancy is a personal privilege, yet the administrator of the estate of an infant may avail himself of the infancy of his intestate, to avoid or uphold a transaction to which the latter was a party during his life, and which remained voidable at his death. (Turpin v. Turpin, 16 Ohio St. 270.) And as a rule the right of avoidance, with due limitations of time and circumstances, passes to privies in blood entitled to the estate; in short, to his heirs or legal representatives." (Schoul. Dom. Rel., 5th ed., pp. 402, 403.)