But this is not all that is to be considered. The employes are at present demanding that, unless the government substantially reduces the cost of living, advances in wages shall be made which have been estimated by the director gen eral of railroads at $800,000,000 a year. Do you have the slightest doubt that if the Plumb plan were adopted they would at once give to themselves these advances in wages which they now say the government should give them? If these advances in wages were made the railways would start under the Plumb plan with a deficit exceeding one billion dollars a year.

The railways now pay about $200,000,000 a year in taxes. Some of this goes to the federal government, but most of it goes to the states. If they should continue to pay this amount under the Plumb plan the deficit would be increased by another $200,000,000. But it is not contemplated by the Plumb plan that under employes' management the railroads shall continue to pay taxes. Under that scheme all the taxes now received by the states from the railroads, which constitute a very large part of their total annual revenues, would be wiped out and the burden of these taxes would have to be transferred elsewhere. I should think the people of the United States would be interested to learn that after they have bought the railroads and turned them over to the employes to manage the employes intend to have the public not only pay in taxes whatever deficit may be incurred in the operation of the railroads, but also entirely to remove the railroads from the class of property which can be taxed to maintain the

state.

Since the advocates of the Plumb plan advertise that under their plan they would -effect enormous economies, consistency requires that they shall show those who pay

freight and passenger rates how some of the benefits of these vast economies will be given to them. Therefore, in a pamphlet which has been distributed throughout the country the Plumb Plan League says: "Under this plan passenger rates of 11⁄2 cents and lower and the reduction of freight rates by 40 per cent would be reasonable."

We have already shown that if the advances in wages the employes are now demanding were made, as under the Plumb plan they doubtless would be, the government after paying interest on its investment in the railroads, would have a deficit of at least $1,000,000,000 to $1,200,000,000 a year. A reduction of passenger rates to 11⁄2 cents a mile and of freight rates by 40 per cent would reduce the present earnings of the railroads to the extent of about $1,800,000,000 a year, and this added to the deficit already incurred, would make a total deficit of about $2,800,000,000 a year. The total earnings of the railroads after these reductions in rates had been made would be about $3,200,000,000 a year. The wages of the employes are now running at the rate of at least $2,750,000,000 a year, and if they should be increased by the $800,000,000 which the employes are now demanding, total wages of employes would be at least $3,350,000,000 a year. Therefore, after the advances in wages for which the employes are now asking and the reductions in rates which Mr. Plumb has intimated would be made under his plan, the earnings of the railroads would be $300,000,000 a year less than the amount necessary merely to pay the wages of the employes, leaving nothing to cover the cost of fuel, the cost of materials and supplies and interest on the investment of the public in the railroads!

It seems so obvious that the claims made as to what could be accomplished under the Plumb plan are preposterous that I confess

I cannot understand how there can be found men of intelligence to seriously make them.

Why are the railroad labor organizations opposing a return to private operation of railroads and advocating the Plumb plan? Their spokesmen say, and we suppose many of the employes believe, that private management has resulted badly for them. because it has given opportunity to the rich capitalists, who are supposed to own the railroads, to make huge profits at the expense of the employes and the public. Now, what are the facts about this? In the last ten years of private operation the property investment account of the railroads increased 38 per cent. Every dollar which reaches the security owners of the railroads must be paid out of operating income, and in that same ten years the increase in operating income was less than 41 per cent. Meantime, the number of railroad employes increased only 3.6 per cent, and the total compensation paid to them annually increased 62 per cent. Surely there is nothing in these figures to indicate that during this period the employes were being unjustly exploited. Meantime, both the average passenger rate and the average freight rate declined. It would appear, therefore, that the public was not being seriously exploited.

The guaranteed return being paid to the railroad companies under government operation is less than the operating income that they actually earned in 1917. On the other hand, in less than two years of government operation the number of railway employes has increased about 7 per cent and the total annual wages paid them has increased about 63 per cent. Chiefly in order to pay this large increase in wages it has been necessary to make large advances in rates.

When we look back over the entire period from 1900 to 1919 we find that the

much-abused railroad property investment account has increased 80 per cent and that the number of railroad employes has increased 82 per cent. Meantime, the amount of operating income, from which all interest and dividends on the investment in railroads must be paid, has increased less than 99 per cent and the annual compensation of railroad employes has increased 391 per cent. Surely with an increase of only 81 per cent in the number of employes in the last 19 years, and an increase of 391 per cent in the annual wages paid to them, there is no reason for believing that railroad employes cannot get fair treatment without the adoption of the Plumb plan.

The most specious argument made in favor of the Plumb plan is that it would be the application of "industrial democracy" to the railroads. It is said that we now have political democracy and that we ought to have democracy in our industries. I am in favor of industrial democracy, and one of the principal reasons why I am opposed to the Plumb plan is that it would apply industrial autocracy and not industrial democracy to the railroads. Where is the democracy in a plan under which the 110,000,000 people of the United States are to buy the railroads and assume complete responsibility for their operating expenses and fixed charges and are then to turn them over to less than one-fiftieth of the people to manage as they see fit? True industrial democracy would involve the purchase of the railroads by the employes with their own money and not with other people's money. It can be demonstrated by a very simple calculation that if the employes would save only one-fifth of their present annual wages and buy railroad stock with their savings and with the dividends on their stocks they would in five years be the owners of a majority of the present stock of all the railroads of the United States

and in nine years they would own all the stock now outstanding. It would be democratic, it would be American and it would be sound economically for the employes to acquire control of the management of the railroads by becoming the owners of a majority of their securities. It would be perfectly safe to entrust the management of the railroads to them if they had acquired ownership of them by the investment of their own savings and knew that they stood to lose if the properties were inefficiently managed as well as to gain if they were efficiently managed. They would then have every incentive that the present owners have to put and keep the ablest men available in direct charge of the management and to oppose every method which might reduce the efficiency of operation or unduly increase expenses.

The Plumb plan would not be American because American institutions are founded upon private property. The Plumb plan would not be democratic because it would involve the management by 2,000,000 people of property belonging to 110,000,000 people without any responsibility on the part of those who managed the property to those who owned it for results. The Plumb plan would be absolutely unsound economically because no property ever was or ever will be efficiently managed which is not managed either by the owners of it or by persons who have and feel a sense of responsibility to the owners and who can be ejected from the management by the owners at any time they are found to be incompetent or to be abusing their trust. When the true character of the Plumb plan becomes generally understood it will not only be rejected by an overwhelming public sentiment but among those who will oppose it will be the intelligent and conservative railroad employes of this country.

Chicago, Ill.

SAMUEL O. DUNN.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - DISABILITY OF INFANCY.

HENDERSON et al. v. FIELDER et al.

215 S. W. 187.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Oct. 24, 1919.

Where the 15-year statute of limitations on actions to recover real property (Ky. St. § 2505), began to run in favor of an adverse occupancy during the lifetime of plaintiffs' ancestor, the minority of plaintiffs after her death did not arrest it; the bar of the statute being as complete as if she had lived through the whole time of the statutory period.

QUIN, J. Appellants (plaintiffs below) are the children and heirs at law of Orthernile Henderson, and as such they alleged they were entitled to a one-fifth interest in the real estate owned by their grandmother, Eleanor Henderson, at the time of her death in 1900. It is alleged that other children of Eleanor Henderson sold their interests to defendants, and therefore the parties are joint owners of the land in question. Defendants denied that plaintiffs had any interest in the land, and affirmatively alleged they were the sole owners of said land, alleging in an amended answer that on January 19, 1897, Eleanor Henderson sold and conveyed the land in contest to her son, Joshua T. Henderson, by deed recorded in November, 1900. A demurrer to this answer having been overruled, the plaintiffs replied that the deed from their grandmother to Joshua T. Henderson was procured through fraud and undue influence, was without consideration, and because of these facts and the infirmities of old age said instrument was not the act and deed of their grandmother, and passed no title to the land. It is also alleged that after the grandmother's death, suit was filed by some of the children to set aside the deed; but this suit was later dismissed, and the children, other than the father of plaintiffs, joined in a deed to Joshua T. Henderson. The 10 and 15 year statutes of limitations are relied upon by defendants. The lower court dismissed the petition, and we think this judgment is correct for two reasons:

1. It is well settled, subject to few exceptions, that when limitation begins to run against the right to enforce a cause of action, the running of the statute is not interrupted by reason of any subsequent event or condition, and the death of the ancestor will not stop the running of the statute. This suit was not filed until July 9, 1912, more than 15 years after

January 19, 1897, when the deed was executed. Section 2505, Ky. Stat., provides:

"An action for the recovery of real property can only be brought within fifteen years after the right to institute it first accrued to the plaintiff, or to the person through whom be claims."

The cause of action, if any, accrued during the lifetime of Eleanor Henderson, and the statute having commenced to run upon the execution of the deed, her death did not suspend or interrupt the running of the statute. The minority of the children or other heirs will not arrest it; the bar being just as complete as if the grandmother had lived through the whole time of the statutory period of limitations, plaintiffs had no greater rights than if Eleanor Henderson had lived. By the descent cast, the heirs were placed exactly in the shoes of their ancestor, and, the statute having commenced running as to her in her lifetime, it continued to run without let or intermission.

The accrual of a cause of action means the right to institute and maintain a suit, and, whenever one person may sue another, a cause of action has accrued, and the statute begins to run. 25 Cyc. 1066. Any cause of action to set aside the deed in question, having accrued January 19, 1897, and no suit having been brought within 15 years thereafter the action was barred.

2. It is sought to set aside the deed on the ground of fraud, and here again we find the statute puts an absolute bar to the maintenance of this action. Section 2519 of the Ky. Stat. provides:

"In actions for relief for fraud or mistake, or damages for either, the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud or mistake; but no such action shall be brought ten years after the time of making the contract or the perpetration of the fraud."

There is no escaping the conclusiveness of the statute. Limitation runs from the time of the execution of the conveyance, or the perpetration of the alleged fraud. Dorsey v. Phillips, 84 Ky. 420, 1 S. W. 667, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 405. Death of the grandmother did not interrupt the running of the statute. Castro v. Geil, 110 Cal. 292, 42 Pac. 804, 52 Am. St. Rep. 84. Besides more than 10 years elapsed between the grandmother's death and the filing of the petition.

Haddix's Heirs v. Davison, 3 T. B. Mon. 39, is a case similar to the present one. This was an attempt to set aside a deed on the ground of fraud; and there, as here, it was shown by the heirs that at the time of their ancestor's death they were infants of tender years, and had not arrived at full age before the commencement of

the suit In discussing the point in question the court says:

"But according to the statements contained in their bill, their right to relief, if any they had, must have accrued to their ancestor in his lifetime, and of course the limitations of time must have commenced running against him, and, having commenced running in his lifetime, it must necessarily have continued to run after his death, notwithstanding the subsequent disability of the heirs."

To the same effect see Langford's Adm'rs v. Gentry, 4 Bibb. 468; Clark's Ex'r v. Trail's Adm'rs, 1 Metc. 35; Salve v. Ewing, 1 Duv. 271; Fox v. Hudson's Ex'x, 150 Ky. 115, 150 S. W. 49, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 832.

It is not disputed that in January, 1897, Orthernile Henderson, father of appellants, was dead, and that his widow and children were living and free from any disability, except that some of the daughters were married and some of the children were infants. The deed was recorded in November, 1900, more than 10 years prior to the institution of this suit. The children of Orthernile Henderson unquestionably took as a class, and when limitation began to run against some of them it began to run against all. In Moore v. Calvert, 6 Bush 356, it is said:

"By a long line of adjudication it was determined, under said act of 1796, that where the right of entry descended to heirs who were all within the exception, they had the time allowed after the disabilities were removed from all to begin their action; in other words, if at the death of the ancestor all his heirs were under disabilities, they would have the time allowed after the removal of such disabilities from all to make their entry or bring their suit; but if one of the heirs labored under no disability at the ancestor's death, the disability of the other heirs did not prevent the statute from running, nor bring any of them within its saving. And this principle pertained alike to joint tenants and coparceners."

This case has been followed in a number of subsequent opinions, notably May v. C. & O. Ry. Co., 184 Ky. 493, 212 S. W. 131, wherein the court cites practically all the cases in this state on the question.

For the further reason that, as certain heirs and beneficiaries of Eleanor Henderson were joint tenants with the appellants, and were not laboring under any disability when cause of action accrued in 1897, the action is barred.

Finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is affirmed.

NOTE-Disability of Infancy Interrupting Running of Statute of Limitations.-The broad principle stated by the instant case, that being a case of intervening infancy, has, we believe, many exceptions. Thus, under the limitations act of 1623, which is the pattern of most, if not all, of

American limitations acts, provides that re-entry into lands may be made within twenty years after right of entry shall have accrued, feme coverts and persons non compos mentis and those imprisoned or beyond the seas being enlarged beyond that time. 21 Jac. 1, Ch. 16.

In Stowel v. Zouch (1797), 1 Plowd. 353, the rule stated in the instant case was applied. And in Garner v. Wingrove (1905), 2 Ch. 253, 74 L. J. Ch. N. S. 545, 93 L. T. N. S. 131, 3 B. R. 737, it was said that "the protection afforded by the statute is for those to whom the right or title first accrues." Many American cases support this rule. E. G. Oates v. Beckworth (1895), 112 Ala. 356, 20 So. 399; Bender v. Bean (1889), 52 Ark. 132, 12 S. W. 241; Castio v. Geil (1895), 110 Cal. 292, 42 Pac. 804, 52 Am. St. R. 84; Doe and Jem. Lynch v. Roe (1886), 7 Houst. (Del.) 386, 32 Atl. 391; Futch v. Parslow (1912), 64 Fla. 279, 60 So. 343; Dawson v. Edwards (1901), 189 Ill. 60, 59 N. E. 590; Grether v. Clark (1888), 75 Iowa 383, 39 N. W. 655, 9 Am. St. R. 491; Robinson v. Allison (1905), 192 Mo. 366, 91 S. W. 115; Lyons v. Carr (1906), 77 Neb. 883, 110 N. W. 705; Munroe v. Wilson (1896), 68 N. H. 580, 41 Atl. 240; Chancey v. Powell, 103 N. C. 159, 9 S. E.; Fore v. Berry (1913), 94 S. C. 71, 78 S. E. 706; Patton v. Dixon (1900), 105 Tenn. 97, 58 S. W. 299; Pickens v. Stout (1910), 67 W. Va. 422, 68 S. E. 354; Swearingen v. Robertson (1876), 39 Wis. 462, and Harris v. McGovern, 99 U. S. 161, 25 L. Ed. 317. But it was ruled in Meiggs v. Hoagland (1902), 74 N. Y. Supp. 234, 68 App. Div. 182, that if a person is under 21 years when he becomes entitled to sue as successor to original owner, the statute will not begin to run until he attains his majority. The court said: "John F. Cleu died in August, 1866. Marie, one of his daughters, Marie Philomerca, the mother of Anita, became of full age February 1, 1884. Allowing ten years for the statute to run against her, it would have run out in 1894. She, however, died in 1891, leaving Anita, her infant daughter, then about three years of age. Of course, the statute will not begin to run against her until she becomes of age. Code Civ. Proc., § 375." This evidently

is based on a statutory provision. At an early day in South Carolina, it was held under statutory construction that infancy of an heir would interrupt the statute upon the death of the ancestor against whom it had begun to run. Rose v. Daniel (1814), 3 Brev. 438. Overruled in Faysoux v. Prather (1818). 1 Nott & McC, 296, 9 Am. Dec. 691. See also Fore v. Berry (1913), 94 S. C. 71, 78 S. E. 706. In Fore v. Berry supra the brief of appellant cites Rose v. Daniel supra and several cases of State Supreme Court thereafter down to Sutton v. Clark, 59 S. C. 440. But in that case it was expressly held that "when the statute has commenced to run, no subsequent disability will arrest it."

In Everett v. Whitfield (1859), 27 Ga. 133, the statute specifically provided, that when the statute begins to run it shall not so operate as to defeat interests acquired by infants after its commencement, but the time of their disability shall not be counted. Later it was said that if prescription against ancestor is not complete and his estate is not represented by an administrator sufficiently long to complete it, the infant heir may have additional time to sue. Buchan v. Williamson (1908), 131 Ga. 501, 62 S. E. 815.

Since the ruling in Meiggs v. Hoagland supra, statute provides for raising the rights of infants as to title descending to them during infancy when their rights are extended. Scallon v. Manhattan R. Co. (1906), 185 N. Y. 359, 78 N. E. 284, 7 Am. Cas. 168. This also has been decided to be the rule in Massachusetts. Melvin v. Whiting (1832), 13 Pick. 184. And so in Louisiana, Cousins v. Kelsey (1881), 33 La. Ann. 880.

We think it to be true by the great weight of authority, both English and American, that for a limitation statute to be interrupted after once it has begun to run, the statute must specifically so provide. This is a principle taken 'from our common law, which would have to be negatived, if statutory language would authorize its being recognized. A statute of limitations does no more than provide a rest, and it must C. be pleaded.

A man was brought into court recently under the new anti-loafing law. The judge looked at him for a moment and then asked: "What is your occupation?"

"I am a musician, your honor," was the reply. "In that case I'll have to find you guilty of loafing."

"But, your honor," protested the man, "I'm regularly employed by the Methodist Church as an organist."

"That only confirms my opinion," said the judge. "The law requires every man to work, but your occupation requires you to play."— Cartoons Magazine.