actas censemus, quæ mundos effecerunt fictitios et scenicos. Neque de his quæ jam habentur, aut etiam de veteribus philosophiis et sectis, tantum loquimur; cum complures aliæ ejusmodi fabulæ componi et concinnari possint; quandoquidem errorum prorsus diversorum causæ sint nihilominus fere communes. Neque rursus de philosophiis universalibus tantum hoc intelligimus, sed etiam de principiis et axiomatibus compluribus scientiarum, quæ ex traditione et fide et neglectu invaluerunt. Verum de singulis istis generibus idolorum fusius et distinctius dicendum est, ut intellectui humano cautum sit.

XLV.1

Intellectus humanus ex proprietate sua 2 facile supponit majorem ordinem et æqualitatem in rebus quam invenit; et cum multa sint in natura monodica3 et plena imparitatis, tamen affingit parallela et correspondentia et relativa quæ non sunt. Hinc commenta illa, in cœlestibus omnia moveri per circulos perfectos, lineis spiralibus et draconibus (nisi nomine tenus)

4

1 Here, according to the tripartite distribution of the "Pars Destruens" mentioned in the 115th aphorism, begins the first Redargutio — Redargutio Rationis Humanæ Nativæ. -J. S.

2 That is "in accordance with the homogeneity of its own substance," or as Bacon expresses it in § 52., "ex æqualitate substantiæ spiritus humani."

8 The word which Bacon intends to use is, of course, "monadica; " but throughout his writings he has fallen into the error of which the text affords an instance.

4 It does not appear in what sense Bacon uses the word "draco." In its ordinary acceptation in old astronomy, it denoted the great circle which is approximately the projection on the sphere of the moon's orbit. The ascending node was called the caput draconis, and the descending the cauda draconis. The same terms were occasionally applied to the nodes of the planetary orbits. It is not improbable that Bacon intended to complain of the rejection of spirals of double curvature, or helices, which traced on the

prorsus rejectis. Hinc elementum ignis cum orbe suo introductum est, ad constituendam quaternionem cum reliquis tribus, quæ subjiciuntur sensui.1 Etiam elementis (quæ vocant) imponitur ad placitum decupla proportio excessus in raritate ad invicem :2 et hujusmodi somnia. Neque vanitas ista tantum valet in dogmatibus, verum etiam in notionibus simplicibus.

XLVI.

Intellectus humanus, in iis quæ semel placuerunt (aut quia recepta sunt et credita, aut quia delectant), alia etiam omnia trahit ad suffragationem et consensum cum illis; et licet major sit instantiarum vis et copia quæ occurrunt in contrarium, tamen eas aut non observat aut contemnit aut distinguendo summovet et rejicit, non sine magno et pernicioso præjudicio, quo

surface of the sphere might represent inequalities in latitude. Compare (Nov. Org. II. 48.) what is said of the variations of which the "motus rotationis spontaneus" admits.

Siccum

Terra

Ignis

Calidum

Aer

1 The orb of the element of fire was supposed to lie above that of the element of air, and therefore might be said "non subjici sensui." The quaternion of elements follows directly from the quaternion of elementary qualities; namely, hot, cold, moist, dry. For these may be combined two and two in six different ways; two of these combinations are rejected as simply contradictory (viz. hot and cold, moist and dry); and to each of the other combinations corresponds one of the four elements. The diagram will illustrate.

Frigidum

Humidum

Aqua

2 This doctrine of the decupla ratio of density of the elements was suggested by a passage in Aristotle [De Gen. et Cor. ii. 6.]. It is found in all books of medieval physics. Cf. the Margarita Philosophiæ, ix. c. 4., or Alsted's Encyclopædia, where it is thus expressed: "Proportio elementorum ad se invicem ratione transmutationis est decupla, ratione magnitudinis non satis explorata." The transmutability of one element into another is an essential part of the Peripatetic doctrine of elements. It is found also in the Timæus.

prioribus illis syllepsibus authoritas maneat inviolata. Itaque recte respondit ille, qui, cum suspensa tabula in templo ei monstraretur eorum qui vota solverant quod naufragii periculo elapsi sint, atque interrogando premeretur anne tum quidem deorum numen agnosceret, quæsivit denuo, At ubi sint illi depicti qui post vota nuncupata perierint?1 Eadem ratio est fere omnis superstitionis, ut in astrologicis, in somniis, omnibus, nemesibus, et hujusmodi; in quibus homines delectati hujusmodi vanitatibus advertunt eventus ubi implentur, ast ubi fallunt (licet multo frequentius) tamen negligunt et prætereunt. At longe subtilius serpit hoc malum in philosophiis et scientiis; in quibus quod semel placuit reliqua (licet multo firmiora et potiora) inficit et in ordinem redigit. Quinetiam licet abfuerit ea quam diximus delectatio et vanitas, is tamen humano intellectui error est proprius et perpetuus, ut magis moveatur et excitetur affirmativis quam negativis; cum rite et ordine æquum se utrique præbere debeat; quin contra, in omni axiomate vero constituendo, major est vis instantiæ negativæ.

XLVII.

Intellectus humanus illis quæ simul et subito mentem ferire et subire possunt maxime movetur; a quibus phantasia impleri et inflari consuevit; reliqua vero modo quodam, licet imperceptibili, ita se habere fingit et supponit, quomodo se habent pauca illa quibus mens obsidetur; ad illum vero transcursum ad instantias remotas et heterogeneas, per quas axiomata tanquam igne probantur, tardus omnino intellectus est et inhab

1 This story is told of Diagoras by Cicero, De Nat. Deor. III., and of Diogenes the Cynic by Diogenes Laertius.

ilis, nisi hoc illi per duras leges et violentum imperium imponatur.

XLVIII.

Gliscit intellectus humanus, neque consistere aut acquiescere potis est, sed ulterius petit; at frustra. Itaque incogitabile est ut sit aliquid extremum aut extimum mundi, sed semper quasi necessario occurrit ut sit aliquid ulterius:1 neque rursus cogitari potest quomodo æternitas defluxerit ad hunc diem; cum distinctio illa quæ recipi consuevit, quod sit infinitum a parte ante et a parte post, nullo modo constare possit; quia inde sequeretur, quod sit unum infinitum alio infinito majus, atque ut consumatur infinitum, et vergat ad finitum. Similis est subtilitas de lineis semper divisibilibus,2 ex impotentia cogitationis. At majore cum pernicie intervenit hæc impotentia mentis in inventione causarum: nam cum maxime universalia in natura positiva esse debeant, quemadmodum inveniuntur, neque sunt revera causabilia; tamen intellectus humanus, nescius acquiescere, adhuc appetit notiora. Tum vero ad ulteriora tendens ad proximiora recidit, videlicet ad causas finales, quæ sunt plane ex natura hominis potius quam universi; atque ex hoc fonte philosophiam miris

1 Thus Leibnitz derived from the principle of sufficient reason a proof of the infinite extent of the universe, alleging that if it were of finite dimensions no reason could be given for its occupying any one region of space rather than any other.

2 In the phrase "subtilitas de lineis semper divisibilibus," reference is made to Aristotle, who in several places in his writings (particularly in the tract περὶ ἀτόμων γραμμάτων) maintains that in theory every magnitude is divisible sine limite.

8 This censure appears to be expressed without sufficient limitation; for it is difficult to assent to the assertion that the notion of the final cause, considered generally, is more ex naturâ hominis than that of the efficient. The subject is one of which it is difficult to speak accurately; but it may be said that wherever we think that we recognise a tendency towards a

modis corruperunt. Est autem æque imperiti et leviter philosophantis, in maxime universalibus causam requirere, ac in subordinatis et subalternis causam non desiderare.1

XLIX.

Intellectus humanus luminis sicci non est; 2 sed recipit infusionem a voluntate et affectibus, id quod generat Ad quod vult scientias. Quod enim mavult homo verum esse, id potius credit. Rejicit itaque difficilia, ob inquirendi impatientiam; sobria, quia coarctant spem; altiora naturæ, propter superstitionem; lumen experientiæ, propter arrogantiam et fastum, ne videatur mens versari in vilibus et fluxis; paradoxa, propter opinionem vulgi; denique innumeris modis, iisque in

fulfilment or realisation of an idea, there the notion of the final cause comes in. It can only be from inadvertence that Professor Owen has set the doctrine of the final cause as it were in antithesis to that of the unity of type: by the former he means the doctrine that the suitability of an animal to its mode of life is the one thing aimed at or intended in its structure. It cannot be doubted that Aristotle would have recognised the preservation of the type as not less truly a final cause than the preservation of the species or than the well-being of the individual. The final cause connects itself with what in the language of modern German philosophy is expressed by the phrase "the Idea in Nature."

1 ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γιγνώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ, ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ ἂν βαδίζοι· ὥστε μήδ' οὕτως εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. — Metaph., iii. 4.

2 Heraclitus apud Plut., De Esu Carnium. This doctrine of Idols is spoken of with great disrespect by Spinoza. He asserts that neither Des Cartes nor Bacon ever perceived the true source of error, and adds: "De Bacone parum dicam, qui de hâc re admodum confuse loquitur, et fere nihil probat, sed tantum narrat:" and concludes by saying, "quas adhuc alias causas adsignat (he has just enumerated three of the Idols of the Tribe) facile omnes ad unicam Cartesii reduci possunt; scilicet quia voluntas humana est libera et latior intellectu; sive, ut ipse Verulamius magis confuse loquitur, quia intellectus luminis sicci non est, sed recipit infusionem a voluntate." See Spinoza to Oldenburg, ep. 2. vol. ii. p. 146. of Bruder's edition.