his predecessor in this also, that with him the spiritus is more a physiological and less a psychological hypothesis than with Telesius-it is at least less enwrapped in a psychological system than we find it in the De Rerum Naturâ.

On the other hand, he has not, I think, recognised so distinctly as Telesius or Campanella the principle that to the rational soul alone is to be referred the idea of moral responsibility; and the fine passage on the contrast of public and private good in the seventh book of the De Augmentis seems to show (if Bacon meant that the analogy on which it is based should be accepted as anything more than an illustration) that he conceived that something akin to the distinction of right and wrong is to be traced in the workings, conscious or unconscious, of all nature.

(16.) We are here led to mention another subject, on which again the views of Telesius appear to have influenced those of Bacon. That all bodies are animated, that a principle of life pervades the whole universe, and that each portion, beside its participation in the life of the world, has also its proper vital principle, are doctrines to which in the time of Bacon the majority of philosophical reformers were at least strongly inclined. The most celebrated work in which they are set forth is perhaps the De Sensu Rerum of Campanella. The share which it had in producing the misfortunes of his life is well known, and need not here be noticed.

In one of his letters to Thomasius,1 Leibnitz points out how easy the transition is from the language which the schoolmen held touching substantial forms and the workings of nature to that of Campanella: "Ita reditur

1 P. 48. of Erdmann's edition of his philosophical works.

ad tot deunculos quot formas substantiales et Gentilem prope polytheismum. Et certe omnes qui de substantiis illis incorporalibus corporum loquuntur non possunt mentem suam explicare nisi translatione a Mentibus sumptâ. Hinc enim attributus illis appetitus vel instinctus ille naturalis ex quo et sequitur cognitio naturalis, hinc illud axioma: Natura nihil facit frustra, omnis res fugit sui destructionem, similia similibus gaudent, materia appetit formam nobiliorem, et alia id genus. Quum tamen reverâ in naturâ nulla sit sapientia, nullus appetitus, ordo vero pulcher ex eo oriatur, quia est horologium Dei." To the censure implied in these remarks Aristotle is himself in some measure liable, seeing that he ascribed the various changes which go on around us to the half-conscious or unconscious workings of an indwelling power which pervades all things, and to which he gives the name of Nature. Nature does nothing in vain and of things possible realises the best, but she does not act with conscious prevision. She is, so to speak, the instinct of the uni

verse.

It is on account of these views that Bacon charges Aristotle with having set aside the doctrine of a providence, by putting Nature in the place of God. Nevertheless Bacon himself thought it possible to explain large classes of phenomena by referring them, not certainly to the workings of Nature, but to the instincts and appetites of individual bodies. His whole doctrine of simple motions is full of expressions which it is very difficult to understand without supposing that Bacon had for the time adopted the notion of universally dif fused sensation. Thus the "motus nexûs" is that in

1 De Aug. iii. 4.

virtue of which bodies, as delighting in mutual contact, will not suffer themselves to be separated. All bodies, we are told, abhor a solution of continuity, and the rising of cream is to be explained by the desire of homogeneous elements for one another.

The distinction which Bacon has elsewhere taken between sensation and perception, which corresponds to Leibnitz's distinction between apperception and perception, does not appear to accord with these expressions. He there asserts that inanimate bodies have perception without sensation. But such words as desire and horror imply not only a change worked in the body to which they are applied in virtue of the presence of another, but also a sense of that presence, that is, in Bacon's language, not only perception but sensation.

The contrast between the expressions I have quoted and those of which he made use in other parts of his writings, is remarkable. In stating the doctrine of simple motions, he speaks as if all phenomena were to be explained by means of the desires and instincts of matter, every portion of which is more or less consciously sentient. But in other passages we find what at first appears to be a wholly different view, namely that phenomena are to be explained by the site, form, and configuration of atoms or ultimate particles, capable neither of desire nor fear, and in all their motions simply fulfilling the primary law impressed on them by Providence.

Nevertheless there is here no real inconsistency. For Bacon, following Telesius, ascribed all the phenomena of animal life to the spiritus, which, though it is the subtlest portion of the body which it animates, is notwithstanding as truly material as any other part. In

every body, whether animated or not, dwells a portion of spirit, and it was natural therefore to ascribe to it some share of the powers which the more finely constituted spirits of animals were supposed to possess. How far however this analogy between animate and inanimate bodies ought to be carried, was a doubtful question; and we need not be surprised to find that Bacon sometimes denies and sometimes appears to admit that the latter as well as the former are, to a certain extent at least, consciously sentient. But in all cases he proposed to explain the phenomena of animal life by means of the ultimate constitution of matter. Thus such phenomena as the rising of cream, the subsidence of the lees of wine, the clinging of gold leaf round the finger, &c., were to be explained in the first instance by the instincts and appetites of portions of matter, and afterwards to receive a deeper and more fundamental explanation when these instincts and appetites were themselves shown to result from the site, form, and configuration of the ultimate particles of which all bodies are composed.

To the doctrine of universally diffused sensation, so far as he adopted it, Bacon was led by the writings of many of his contemporaries, and in particular by those of Telesius. Brucker has remarked, and with perfect truth, that this doctrine is stated as distinctly, though not so conspicuously, by Telesius as by Campanella. Added to which this doctrine serves to explain phenomena of which, without it, no explanation could readily be given. Thus Bacon is much disposed to ridicule Gilbert for the pains he had bestowed on the subject of electrical attraction, affirming that it is merely the result of the power which friction possesses to excite

the appetite of bodies for contact. This appetite "aerem non bene tolerat, sed aliud tangibile mavult."

"1

(17.) Bacon's opinion as to Final Causes has often been discussed. It seems however scarcely necessary to refute the interpretation which on no just grounds has been given to the phrase, "causarum finalium inquisitio tanquam virgo Deo consecrata nihil parit.' Nihil parit, as the context plainly shows, [means simply non parit opera].2 Bacon is speaking of the classification of physics and metaphysics-the one being the science of the material and efficient cause, and the other containing two parts, namely the doctrine of forms and the doctrine of final causes. To physics corresponds in practical application mechanica or mechanics to metaphysics, magia or natural magic. But magia corresponds to metaphysique because the latter contains the doctrine of Forms; that of final causes admitting from its nature of no practical application. It is this idea which Bacon has expressed by saying that the doctrine in question is, as it were, a consecrated virgin.

It is not sufficiently remarked that final causes have often been spoken of without any reference to a benevolent intention. When it is said that the final cause of a stone's falling is "locus deorsum," the remark is at least but remotely connected with the doctrine of an intelligent providence. We are to remember that Bacon has expressly censured Aristotle for having made use of final causes without referring to the fountain

1 De Augm. iii. 5. See note on the place.-J. S.

2 I have supplied these words to complete the sentence, which ends abruptly at the bottom of a page, a fresh page having apparently been substituted for that which originally followed.-J. S.