partment or the CIA or what have you, that should be reworded. I do not think that the language of the bill as proposed-I did not interpret it as final. I imagined that if the Congress accepted, let us say, the philosophy which inspired the bill, it would then be able to work out the details so that the bill would be the right kind.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am not trying to put you in a spot.

Mr. JACKSON. I understand, and I am not trying to evade. I just do not know.

Mr. SOURWINE. The sponsors of the bill are frank to say they do not think it would be the be-all and end-all, and I am trying to get for the record your own particular feeling about this phase as an operating agency, just how much authority should be given to the Commission in that field. We all know that, if you create an agency and give it authority, it is going to exercise the authority and probably expand it as time goes on. I wondered if you could give us just your own view as to whether the Congress should be careful in limiting that or leave it open. What should be the policy in that one respect?

Mr. JACKSON. Well, I assume that the reason for setting up this double-barreled arrangement, the Commission and then the Academy, was to find a way by which the Academy would not be niched into an operating branch of the Government. In other words, not an administrative offshoot of the State Department or CIA or the White House, or something like that. It was a device. I think that the Commissioners are given very broad powers in here, and if the Commissioners were the right kind of Commissioners, I am sure that the more freedom they were given, the better the Academy would be.

Mr. SOURWINE. There is one more point I should like to ask you about, sir. It has been suggested the creation of a joint congressional committee as a sort of watchdog over this whole affair involves a threat to the jurisdiction of existing congressional committees, in both the House and the Senate, in that the new committee might take over functions of existing separate committees. The sponsors of the bill say that there was no intention to do that. Without any effort to put you on the spot, I should like to ask you, is this something that you would favor-that is, the coordination of the work in a single joint committee or do you feel that the existing committees should continue, and if there is to be a joint committee, it should be made clear that its function has entirely to do with the Freedom Commission and the Freedom Academy?

Mr. JACKSON. Oh, absolutely the latter. I think it would be inconceivable that the joint committee for this Academy should have any thought of moving into the existing committees. They are in business for totally different reasons, and it would be very bad if that were an overt or a covert purpose behind this. This joint committee should be concerned with the Academy, period.

Mr. SOURWINE. If there is to be a joint committee, do you think it needs broad investigating powers, subpena powers?

Mr. JACKSON. I just do not know the answer to that. Again, it read as though this were standard language for committees. Senator DODD. I think that is true.

Mr. SOURWINE. Perhaps I have overstressed, Mr. Chairman, the threat to existing committees in this particular field. It would seem

rather clear that the joint committee's authority as the bill is now drafted would impinge on the jurisdiction of various other committees in the Senate and House-Foreign Relations, possibly Armed Services, surely Government Operations, and possibly Interstate and Foreign Commerce, at least. It is in this whole area that I am inquiring. Senator DODD. I think something could be worked out satisfactorily so that we could make rather clear the jurisdictional lines.

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator DODD. Once again, Mr. Jackson, we are very grateful to you. You have been very helpful to us. I have my own views about this, and think we all do and I thought when you were testifying that, if this did nothing else, it would put an end to the apology that has been made for so many years that we did not know about the Communists. It would be worthwhile for that reason if for no other. There are many other, better reasons, of course.

Mr. JACKSON. Well, actually, Mr. Chairman, not to butter you up, but you made a fine speech last year on political warfare with respect to Eastern European satellite countries. Now, if there had been, if this Academy had been in existence for 5 years, I do not think you would have had to make that speech, because that would have been in operation.

Senator DODD. That would have been a misfortune for me.

Well, we are very grateful to you, and thank you again.
Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Senator DODD. Our next witness is Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer.

TESTIMONY OF DR. GERHART NIEMEYER, SOUTH BEND, IND.

Senator DODD. Good morning, Dr. Niemeyer. We are grateful to you for coming here. I know that you are a member of the faculty at Notre Dame University. You are also on the faculty of the War College?

Mr. NIEMEYER. Right.

Senator DODD. We are grateful to you for being here this morning. Would you give your name and address for the record, please? Mr. NIEMEYER. My address is 1126 Helmen Drive, South Bend, Ind. I am very grateful to you for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. I submitted to you a statement the day before yesterday, and I would like to ask your permission to insert that statement into the record and to summarize its contents.

Senator DODD. That will be fine. I have read your statement, and I must say that it is an excellent one.

Mr. NIEMEYER. Thank you.

Senator DODD. It will be printed in the record at this point, and I think it would be helpful to us if you did summarize it.

(The complete statement of Dr. Niemeyer follows:)

STATEMENT BY DR. GERHART NIEMEYER

In the forces of Soviet communism, we are facing an enemy who has for half a century perfected his capabilities in political wafare. The Communists ultimately rely on the ruthless and destructive use of force. But in order to get into a position where they can use force with impunity and without restraint, they prefer political methods when seizing power. In coming to power,

the Communists have used force sparingly and have, where possible, manipulated their enemies into political submission. They did this in Russia in 1917. More recent examples are East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, and Iraq. For East Germany, Wolfgang Leonhard in his "Child of the Revolution" has told how German cadres were trained in special schools in the Urals, thrown into Berlin in the first days of the occupation, and used to maneuver all potential political groups into a Communist controlled single party. Czechoslovakia was taken over by gradual steps, from one small position of power to another. Gradual infiltration into the Guatemalan Government put that country under Communist control before any one really knew what was going on, and it took a revolution to dislodge the Reds there. Regarding Iraq, we have the recent report of a Soviet writer who boasts that the Communists, in Iraq, are controlling a youth union, a women's league, an organization of "peace supporters," and a peasants' union, the latter with 200,000 members, in addition to 34 trade unions. The same writer noted that Iraq now has "units of the people's home guards" which were recently armed. Here we see political warfare at work.

What are the Communist capabilities in political warfare? There is no mystery about this: The Soviets in numerous schools train thousands in the skills of political action in specific countries. Basically, the Communists have capabilities in political warfare because they have long been aware that political warfare can be planned, taught, and learned. They have put to work as teachers veterans of political warfare or others who have studied the veterans' experience. The experts have developed courses through which they teach their knowledge to dedicated students. The students emerging from the numerous Communist schools swarm all over the world. They are deeply motivated to fight and win. They have full and detailed knowledge of their victims as well as of their own party and its goals. They are skilled in the tricks of their trade, including writing, speaking, organization, and subversion. They can turn a passing mood into a lasting organizational gain. They can develop allegiance out of an ideal. They can maneuver their opponents from the places of control. They can skin their enemy with his own consent. Such people need force only at the margin of their operations. They are trained to conquer totally, but, if possible, bloodlessly.

Communist capabilities of political warfare are becoming more important, as the atomic stalemate inhibits both sides from the risk of a military showdown. Under the umbrella of the universal atomic deterrent, any territory the Commuinsts conquer by political warfare drops behind the Iron Curtain for keeps, unless we succeed in winning it back by similar methods.

Moreover, in a number of countries we are now witnessing a process called polarization in which the Communist Party becomes the sole available alternative to the governing party. This is already the case in Greece, India, and Indonesia, and a similar situation may well develop in other countries, for instance South Africa and even France. Once the political forces of a country split into two camps, one of which is Communist, that country's fate will be decided not by foreign policies but by internal political warfare. Czechoslovakia may well be repeated.

How well are we equipped for political warfare? There can be no doubt that our present capabilities in this field are utterly inadequate. USIA, which is certainly one of our main instruments of political warfare, may serve as an illustration. As of a year ago, the personnel in USIA posts abroad numbered less than 1,000, who were distributed over more than 80 posts. This number includes those serving in administrative functions. The rest handicapped by the fact that they are Americans, officially employed by the U.S. Government, and moreover rotated from post to post in 2-year intervals so that they are never able to develop firm contacts in any country. Apart from all that, however, the capability of USIA is confined to the spreading of information. It does not give us any capability to organize, lead, maneuver, counteract.

How about our capability to learn about the enemy, and to train great numbers of people in this vital knowledge? Our universities have a number of centers of area studies. A number of students are educated there in foreign languages, the history and the institutions of foreign countries. But these students are not equipped for political warfare. In the first place, their training does not motivate them to engage in that kind of warfare. Secondly, they are not taught how to put their knowledge to use in the world conflict, to engage in intellectual contest, to argue with conviction for our cause, to find the enemy's weakness.

Among the citizens of other countries, we have even less capability. Nowhere is there anything that could be called an "American Party," or even a "Freedom Party," in the sense in which the Soviets dispose of a worldwide Communist party. Those citizens of other countries who stand ready to argue, debate, organize, and fight on our side find that they have no place to turn to. There is no unit, no organization, no set of leaders whom they could readily identify as their proper rallying points. What is worse, these people often find that we have not even provided them with telling intellectual arguments with which they could enter the fray on our behalf. Paraphrasing a word from the Bible, one could say: In many free countries the laborers are ready, but no one hires them to gather the harvest.

The proposed Freedom Academy will cost very little, compared with the costs of even a single missile. Yet this one lonely Freedom Academy, mobilizing and gathering people, facts, and thoughts at the expense of a few million dollars, can without exaggeration be called a potential major weapon of the free world. Its effect will be a multiple of the effort that needs to be put into it. For a few people, well trained, organized, and disciplined, are a truly powerful force. In South Africa at present, a fast advancing tide of Communist influence is threatening. This influence actually comes from no more than 30 to 40 Commuinsts, nearly all of them foreigners trained in Soviet schools, who are engaged in systematic and disciplined political warfare. The seeds of a future Communist control of South Africa does not cost the Soviets more than a few hundred thousand dollars.

There is no reason why, for a proportionally equally small sum, we could not do as much for freedom as the Communists do for their goal of world rule. The very existence of a place where competent and dedicated people gather and disseminate knowledge of the enemy and are prepared to teach it to those who have resolved to counteract Communist infiltration, the very existence of such a place will be an inspiration to the entire free world. A member of a friendly embassy, commenting on the present bill, said to me: "This bill, if adopted, would be a major breakthrough."

It has frequently been said we are ill suited to the business of political warfare. Those who say this must really mean: we are ill suited to use lies, subterfuge, distortions, blackmail, and fraud to gain our ends. This is the way of the Communists. But political warfare can be waged in different ways, and we can and will wage it with methods worthy of freemen. Others say: Our good cause will prevail by its merit. To have a good cause does not mean that one should not fight for it. If political warfare threatens the cause of human freedom, the defenders of freedom then must become past masters at the art of political warfare, and do it without in the process of losing the values we protect. What is more, it is a mistake to believe that our culture dooms us to a secondrate performance in this field. In the first place, we have working for us what might be called the natural preference of men: religion, morality, love of native country and of national independence, and, at least in the West, political tradition. Those are mighty allies, and they have so powerfully wrought on our side that even without developing special capabilities for political warfare, we have by and large held our own against a massive Soviet onslaught.

In the second place, there are several examples of highly successful political warfare in the West. The unions, once alarmed and alerted, have recaptured from the Communists the bulk of the positions they had lost to them not only in this country, but, to some extent, also in Europe. In Germany, the Government is running a college at which groups of leading citizens are educated in the knowledge of communism. This Ostkolleg in Cologne, together with other measures of political warfare against German Communists, are conducted in the spirit and the methods of democracy, even though inspired by a hardhitting determination to crush, politically, the totalitarian threat to freedom. Political warfare is not a field that we need to concede to the enemy. Once we begin to develop its methods and skills, once we give deliberate thought to its strategy, it will enable us not only to hold our own but to go on the offensive against communism. The Freedom Academy is an institution that will immeasurably help to accomplish this.

Dr. NIEMEYER. Let me give you a few details about my past experience, which may or may not be germane to this testimony.

I am a native of Germany, and I have lived through the Nazi dictatorship there, as well as through the beginnings of the civil war

in Spain. I came to this country in 1937 and have, since then, taught at various universities-Princeton, Yale, Columbia, Oglethorpe.

I have been in the State Department for 3 years as a planning adviser, and with the Council on Foreign Relations for 2 years. I am now professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, where it is one of my responsibilities to teach a full year graduate course on Communist ideology from the original source materials.

The main impression, of course, which has been created by Mr. C. D. Jackson's very able testimony, which I would like to underscore, is the very strong capabilities of the Soviet Union in political warfare, capabilities which have existed because the Soviets have been aware that one can teach political warfare in courses, and they have developed the courses, they have developed the teachers, they have selected the students, they have sent them out, motivated, informed, skilled, and organized.

These students swarm all over the world, and instances of which all of us are aware bear testimony to the effectiveness of this situation. For example, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, at present, of course, Iraq, which is still in the balance. Compared with this, our own capability is woefully inadequate.

We have, of course, organizations which do dedicate themselves to political warfare, but to some extent these organizations are handicapped by the fact that their members are official Government employees of the United States. What we need, in other words, are people who are private persons, particularly in other countries, but also in this country.

In that respect, our universities, which could teach private persons, simply are not set up to teach about political warfare. Those who do teach about Soviet affairs teach about the geography and history of the Soviet Union, but they do not dedicate their teaching and orient their teaching toward the purposes and needs of political warfare.

In our exchange program, where also we get foreign students who are trained in this country, there is certainly no attempt to indoctrinate these students for this particular purpose, or even to indoctrinate them for the West. We all know of the painful experience of these exchange students going back to their countries and going back, not as advocates of the Western cause, the cause of freedom, but as advocates of, or as cannon fodder for the Communist machine.

I would like to say that, in my contacts with military people, which I have maintained during this past year, of the National War College, I have found no one who did not feel that special training for political warfare was needed. I found it particularly true in the military missions which I visited during the field trip of the National War College, that the very important people who are there as part of our military mission are selected for their military competence, because they are good commanders, good leaders of troops, and so on, but not because they are adequately qualified for the role of political warfare which they are playing, whether they want to or not.

So I would say, together with Mr. C. D. Jackson, that the very existence of an Academy of this kind would be a very important step, and I should like to mention what a diplomat, a high ranking diplomat of a friendly embassy, said to me when I discussed this bill with