Senate Joint Resolution 29 would obviously eliminate constitutional and statutory provisions requiring payment of a poll tax for voting for Federal officers, including presidential electors, in either the primary or general election in 5 Southern States. The 5 States are: Alabama, $1.50 (Const., art. VIII, sec. 178). Arkansas, $1 (Const., art. III, sec. 1; amdt. No. 8). Virginia, $1.50 (Const., art. II, sec. 21). The States which have in recent years repealed laws making payment of a poll tax prerequisite for voting are: North Carolina (Laws 1920 (ex.), ch. 93). Pennsylvania (Const., art. VIII, aindt. Nov. 7, 1933; Laws 1933, No. 855). Louisiana (Laws 1934, No. 230). Florida (Laws 1937, ch. 18061; Laws 1941, ch. 20986). Georgia (Laws 1945, No. 43). South Carolina (Laws 1949, p. 773; Laws 1951, p. 24; amdt. adopted Nov. 1950). Tennessee (amendment adopted Nov. 1953). The States of Texas and Virginia recently rejected, by a vote of the people of those States, proposals to eliminate the tax. The proposed amendment would also nullify a permissive poll-tax provision in Florida's constitution, even though the legislature of this State has repealed the levy. The proposed amendment would possibly require new legislation in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont where the laws relating to registration and voting are closely integrated with poll-tax assessments or collections. Rhode Island constitutional and statutory provisions reducing the length of residence required for persons owning real estate would also be eliminated. Such a provision discriminates in favor of property owners, disqualifying nonproperty owners for a year. A provision in South Carolina's constitution permitting a person to qualify either through ownership of property or meeting the educational requirements would be nullified. Several of the States have constitutional provisions disqualifying for voting "Indians not taxed" or "persons under guardianship." Indians have been granted citizenship by an act of Congress, and, though that does not grant them the right to vote, through State court decisions Indians are generally no longer disqualified from voting. Nevertheless, those provisions relating to "Indians not taxed" and such provisions relating to "persons under guardianship" when construed to mean "Indians not taxed" would violate the proposed amendment. Economic (tax or property) disqualifications for voting seemingly eliminated by S. J. Res. 29, 84th Cong. [Citations to constitutional provisions unless otherwise indicated] If not taxed: The Exclusion of Indians from Voting Maine (Art. II, sec. 1-Amendment to delete now pending for ratificationLaws 1953 p. 927) New Mexico (Art. VII, sec. 1; but see unreported State court decisions) Washington (Art. VI, sec. 1) Under guardianship, as applied to Indians not taxed: Arizona (Art. VII sec. 2; but see Harrison v. Laveen (1948), 67 Ariz. 337) Massachusetts (Amd. III) North Dakota (Art. V, sec. 127) Rhode Island (Art. II, sec. 4) South Dakota (Art. VII, sec. 8; Code (1939) sec. 65.0801; but see State v. Nimrod (1912), 30 S. D. 239) Senator HOLLAND. I call attention to five details in this proposed amendment as follows: First, that it is applicable to primaries and other elections in which Federal officials are nominated or elected, namely, Presidential electors, Senators, and Representatives to Congress. Mr. Chairman, I digress from my prepared statement at this point to recite that when I referred the proposed amendment to the Library of Congress and also to the Office of the Legislative Counsel of the Senate, they called my attention to the fact that if we excluded property qualifications in general terms, such as I proposed in the amendment, that we might run into opposition from States which have either in their constitutions or statutes provisions which prohibit participation in elections by paupers, or persons who are inhabitants of public institutions and charges upon the general public. Í therefore added these words that appear here in the resolution to meet that point. And I wish to file for the record the statement made by the Library of Congress on that point showing the number of States which have that kind of provision and the fact that it is impossible to allow for those State provisions except by general language which I have incorporated here, because they differ among themselves generally. The brief of the able lawyer who handled that question for me and whose name is signed to the statement calls attention to the fact that various States have adopted such procedures because it had been found that corruption in the State elections had resulted from efforts to dominate the voting of inhabitants of poorhouses and institutions of that kind to the degree that they felt that it was important as a State policy to prohibit either by constitutional amendment, as is found in some Sates, or by statute, the voting of public charges of that kind. On that point, Mr. Chairman, I will not go into detail at this time, but I will simply say this, that if it is the judgment of the subcommittee and the committee that that kind of exception should not be made, I would, of course, be agreeable to the committee cutting out the last words of my proposed amendment which read as follows: SEC. 2. Nothing in this article shall be construed to invalidate any provision of law denying the right to vote to paupers or persons supported at public expense or by charitable institutions. It is my hope that those words will be included as an exception to property qualifications, and I hope that part of my proposed amendment dealing with property qualifications will not be stricken. I strongly desire to include the ban of the requirement of property qualification, because in so many States, and even to dates as recent as 1933, the property qualification has been imposed-in that case by the State of Pennsylvania-as a limitation of the right to vote, which was knocked out by that great State in 1933. And it would be available as a similar method of limitation of participation in the elections which I would not want to see available to be resorted to to take the place of poll tax or other property tax requirements. Senator KEFAUVER. At this point we will include in the record the memorandum of December 7, 1950, from the Library of Congress relating to poll taxes as levied in New England States. (The memorandum referred to is as follows:) To: Hon. Spessard L. Holland. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Washington, D. C., December 7, 1950. From: American Law Section, Legislative Reference Service. Subject: Analysis of legal sufficiency of Senate Joint Resolution 34, 81st Congress, 1st session. The constitutions and statutes of the various States have been examined to determine the nature of such economic barriers to qualify for voting as are now exercised in the States. These economic qualifications imposed by the States have been examined in the light of Senate Joint Resolution 34, introduced on January 13, 1950, proposing to amend the Federal Constitution. The proposal is designed to eliminate any requirement that a tax be paid or property be owned in order to qualify for voting for Presidential electors, United States Senators, or Representatives in Congress. The amendment would apply to both primaries and general elections. Each State generally exacts the same qualifications requisite for voting in the primary as in the general election and for voting for State as for national officers. A table indicating States wherein constitutional or statutory provisions would be affected by Senate Joint Resolution 34 is attached. Senate Joint Resolution 34 would obviously eliminate constitutional and statutory provisions requiring payment of a poll tax for voting for Federal officers, including Presidential electors, in either the primary or general election in seven Southern States. The proposed amendment would also nullify a permissive polltax provision in Florida's constitutio, even though the legislature of this State has repealed the levy. The proposed amendment would possibly require new legislation in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont where the laws relating to registration and voting are closely integrated with polltax assessments or collections. Rhode Island constitutional and statutory provisions reducing the length of residence required for persons owning real estate would also be eliminated. Such a provision discriminates in favor of property owners, disqualifying nonproperty owners for a year. A provision in South Carolina's constitution permitting a person to qualify either through ownership of property or meeting the educational requirements would be nullified. Also nullified would be a similar alternative requirement in Alabama whereby a person who cannot meet the educational and employment tests may qualify if he owns property. Several of the States have constitutional provisions disqualifying for voting "Indians not taxed" or "persons under guardianship." Indians have been granted citizenship by an act of Congress, and, though that does not grant them the right to vote, yet through State court decisions Indians are generally no longer disqualified from voting. Nevertheless, those provisions relating to "Indians not taxed" and such provisions relating to "persons under guardianship" when construed to mean “Indian not taxed” would violate the proposed amendment. In several States paupers are denied the right to vote. This disqualification of paupers appeared in article IV of the Articles of Conferation and the early constitutions of many of the States. The reason for such disqualification was to purify elections. (See the Law Journal, vol. 11, pp. 664-665.) Corrupt politicians had been charged with distributing public funds to large groups of persons in exchange for their votes. Charges were also made that persons kept at poorhouses or other asylums at public expense were forced to vote for certain elective officials. To remedy this many of the States disqualified paupers or persons in public institutions at public expense from voting. (See Kirk H. Porter, A History of Suffrage in the United States, p. 147.) The disqualification of paupers is an economic disqualification but the definition of the term "pauper" varies in the several States imposing the disqualification. For instance in Rhode Island the poor debtor's oath requires the deponent to swear or affirm that he has no real or personal estate over $10 (Rhode Island General Laws (1938) ch. 563, sec. 5). In many of the States a person receiving public assistance is not deemed a pauper simply by reason thereof. For instance, see Rhode Island Laws 1944 (ch. 1505 sec. 21); West Virginia, Code (1949) (sec. 626). Being without money or property does not necessarily constitute one a pauper (Lee Co. v. Lackie, 30 Ark. 764, 768) but having property or money does generally preclude a person from being a pauper (Hartford Hospital v. Town of Berlin, 114 Conn. 233; Town of Ludlow v. Town of Weathersfield, 18 Vt. 39; Town of Cabot v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 94 Vt. 311; Inhabitants of Sturbridge v. Inhabitants of Holland, 28 Mass. 459). It might be said that failure to own property constitutes one of the grounds necessary for declaring any person a pauper; that by reason of this failure to own property he is declared a pauper, and by reason of being a pauper he is disqualified for voting. Where such a state of law exists, it is contrary to the proposed amendment. SAMUEL H. STILL, Jr. Economic (tax or properly) disqualifications for voting seemingly eliminated by Senate Joint Resolution 84 (Citations to constitutional provisions unless otherwise indicated) Payment required, constitutional Alabama, art. 8, sec. 178. |