Hearings, Reports and Prints of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary

The fact that certain U.S. officials in Germany intentionally or inadvertently defeated the best American interests in Germany by playing into Soviet hands further caused the Soviets and Communists to assume that the U.S. Government would not take drastic action to insist on its announced policies being carried out in spite of Soviet objections or lack of cooperation. Such American officials as the former head of the OMGUS (Office of Military Government, U.S.) radio branch and his deputy, having been members of the Communist Party before, took actions shortly after the Soviet blockade of Berlin seriously affecting the personnel and effectiveness of broadcasts by RIAS (U.S. sponsored radio in Berlin). Through their decisions a powerful transmitter was not used in Berlin as originally planned, ardent and popular supporters of official American policies and interests in Europe such as the excellent commentators Von Varady and Eugen Hartmann, were not only fired without notice or due cause but were even prevented from gaining other employment, and radio commentators were selected who, openly as well as secretly, supported leftist and SPD interests strongly opposing Western military preparedness, such as NATO, and efforts to contain or combat Soviet aggression. Other independent RIAS commentators, such as Ernst Tillich, who also stanchly backed U.S. policy, were dropped as well at a later date. This lack of understanding by certain American officials abroad (in this case, Berlin), regarding the importance of fostering and constantly helping the true local friends of America, was greatly responsible for resentment, despair, and doubt in the wisdom of openly endorsing U.S. interests in the face of constant Communist intrigues, infiltration, and frequent acts of violence, against which many once eager friends of the United States were not even adequately protected. Although the aforementioned OMGUS officials finally resigned in 1953 (shortly before a planned loyalty investigation and about the time OMGUS ceased to exist anyway), the radio branch chief, while still claiming to represent U.S. interests at the Copenhagen International Broadcasting Conference in 1947, permitted the Soviets to obtain the best possible radio frequencies for East German stations which then broadcast strong Communist propaganda throughout Germany.

Another serious drawback preventing effective protective action against abductions and similar transgressions in Western territory was the inadequate patroling by Western police and security forces at the Soviet Zone and sector borders. After a particularly alarming series of abductions in West Berlin, I recommended to the then responsible American public safety officer, Major Bond, that patrols and checks of vehicles at the sector borders be increased to permit closer examination of suspicious cars and persons and to record license plates for ready counterintelligence reference.

He agreed that such measures would be excellent but pointed out that top level political aims and diplomatic considerations were strongly opposed to such action, as "the Soviets could capitalize on such steps to accuse the Americans of sabotaging German reunification and intensifying the separation of Germany." The latter remarks were more or less those of leading U.S. officials who feared such consequences. Freedom of interzonal movement was strongly demanded by the highest American officials and then actually established in spite of continued Soviet travel restrictions which are still in force. This

policy may have been sincerely considered by the Americans as a way to provide the desired freedom of movement for all Germans, but it certainly permitted the Soviets to infiltrate the West with increased ease and effort while still preventing Western powers equal and proper access to East Germany in return.

My urgent recommendations are that the U.S. intelligence and security agencies be built up and expanded to become more effective and to constitute a true deterrent to further Soviet and Communist aggression and subversion; that operational needs in this respect are not disregarded or inadequately met within, for instance, military intelligence and security organizations, for the sake of overriding administrative or budgetary policy considerations; that the intelligence and foreign area specialists of the U.S. Government and Armed Forces are not lost to the security effort because of strict adherence to such "fearful or cautious" regulations as any recent foreign nationality, foreign spouses, or unwillingness to grant necessary waivers for their utilization and retention under unusual circumstances.

As long as it was possible, shortly after World War II, to use to really great national advantage such onetime enemies and currently truly loyal Americans as Wernher von Braun, then the utilization of valuable and capable individuals in the fields of intelligence and security at the present state of "peace" with the Soviets should be just as important, if not more essential, to winning the running battle of the cold war. Inadequate funds, antiquated measures for the sake of not taking chances on any foreign-born individuals, the neglect of operational requirements for the benefit of increased administrative activities, and the failure to coordinate all agencies efficiently on all levels in an all-out national security and, above all, active propaganda effort, should all be overcome in future measures and plans by the U.S. Government regarding really adequate endeavors to combat Communist aggression and subversion.

Senator JOHNSTON. Any questions?

Mr. SOURWINE. I have no additional questions.

Senator JOHNSTON. I want to thank you, Mr. Hans, for coming here and giving this testimony as to what has taken place in West Germany and what is taking place in East Germany, too-West Berlin and East Berlin. It is only those who are really there and know what is going on that can tell us people back here exactly what is taking place. Another thing is that so many people, I think, are being misled at this time. They do not know what the Communists really stand for and how they handle matters. If they could be imprisoned or be subjected to a police grilling for a while, I think a lot of these people who are thinking pretty well of the Communist system at the present time would change their minds.

Therefore, your first-hand information is a great help to us, and to all of the people who need to know what is going on in the world. We certainly thank you for coming here today.

Mr. HANS. All right, sir.

Senator JOHNSTON. I will recess the subcommittee, then, to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the subcommittee stood in recess, subject to call of the Chair.)

INDEX

NOTE. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to
the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization
in this index.