all. There was definite dissatisfaction among youth in the outbursts during Hungarian revolution and immediately after. For instance, there were disturbances in Moscow University. I know exactly as my father's close friend is a dean of physics-mathematical faculty in Moscow University, and immediately after Hungarian revolution approximately 1,000-I don't know exact number, perhaps between 600 and 1,000 students of that faculty held a Komsomol meeting at which they adopted a unanimous resolution which was sent to central committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. In that resolution they demanded stopping of jamming of foreign broadcasts, free distribution of foreign press, and the most significant, the introduction of a two-party system. In effect, it was demand to liquidate Communist one-party dictatorship in the Soviet Union. That resolution was sent to central committee, and I know that Khrushchev personally spent the whole week in Moscow University leading the investigation on how it was organized and who organized it. As there were some 1,000 students, it was evident that so many could not adopt such a resolution spontaneously. It was organized. I know that approximately the same resolution with the same demands was adopted at Komsomol meeting in High Technical School of Bauman. I had an uncle who works at that institute. He told me. At the same time there were in Leningrad, open student demonstrations on the street. Student disturbances were all over Soviet Union, in many cities and in many universities. I think that that was very clear indication of dissatisfaction. I have had my own personal experience in showing this dissatisfaction. In 1956 I was still at International Relations Institute, and I have to say that in this institute students are recruited 50 percent from party members and officers of Soviet intelligence. Other 50, they are trusted Komsomol members or very active Komsomol members and the children of top-ranking people in Government. Another thing that a student can enter this institute only by recommendation of a regional party committee, not even Komosomol committee. This institute is closed. Even at that institute during the Hungarian revolution some sort of demonstration took place. I was myself present at a Komosomol meeting with approximately 400 or 500 students, at which a group of Hungarian students asked permission to make a statement. They were allowed and their representative before this hall of students read the written statement, which told that while sitting in this hall Soviet tanks crashed through Budapest streets, killed women, children, youth, workers, and suppressed Hungarian freedom. It was very short statement. There were several party leaders were present at that meeting. They tried to stop these Hungarian students speaking, but what was significant, the whole hall, all these 400 or 500 students-you should remember who they were they kept silent for 4 or 5 minutes. It was dead silence. It was completely definite that it was silent demonstration. It was silent demonstration, and it was recognized not only by students but was recognized also by party Komsomol committee. It was closed for several days after this. There was not an investigation because nobody made open demonstration, but it was silent demonstration even at that institute. Mr. SOURWINE. What languages do you speak besides Russian and English? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I speak Burmese. Formerly I started Chinese but I have not used it since approximately 1955. I stopped studying and using Chinese, so I have practically forgotten it. Mr. SOURWINE. You studied both Chinese and English at the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No; I beg your pardon. That institute I studied in, was not Oriental Institute of Academy of Sciences. There are two institutes. One institute belongs to Ministry of Higher Education. The Oriental Institute. It was closed, liquidated in 1954, but there is another institute, Oriental Institute of Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. are headed by Gafurov, member of central committee. Mr. SOURWINE. To make this clear, the Oriental Institute was closed in 1953. Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. 1954. Mr. SOURWINE. In 1954. Half, the upper half of the Oriental Institute student body was transferred to the International Relations Institute in 1953. Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No. One-fourth of students in that Oriental Institute were transferred to International Relations Institute. Mr. SOURWINE. In 1953? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. In 1954. But this institute experienced some sort of purges. Fifty percent of students were expelled from this institute in 1953, but in 1954 again one-half of students were expelled and half were transferred to International Relations Institute. Mr. SOURWINE. So that your study of the Burmese language was at the International Relations Institute, the eastern department of the International Relations Institute? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. Did you thereafter take a state examination and receive a diploma as a specialist in eastern affairs? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. That was in September of 1956? Mr. SOURWINE. When did you first go to Burma? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I first went to Burma in March 1957. Mr. SOURWINE. You went there to complete your language and area training? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. You went as an information officer attached to the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon ? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. Did you while there work on the compilation of a Burmese-Russian dictionary? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. Have you had substantial experience in editing translations from Russian and to Burmese? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. 48853-59-2 Mr. SOURWINE. How about translations from Burmese to Russian? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. During that period of 6 months, when I was assigned to improve my knowledge of Burma and Burmese language, I made some translations for the Embassy. Mr. SOURWINE. How long were you in Burma? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I was in Burma from March 1957 practically up to June 1959. Mr. SOURWINE. You were on your language and area study program from March to December of 1957; were you not? March to September? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I had the first part of my assignment to Burma from March up to September. Then I returned to Moscow and I was in Moscow from end of September up to beginning of December 1957. Mr. SOURWINE. When you went back to Burma? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. And remained there until June of 1959? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. During November of 1957 did you travel to various parts of the Soviet Union? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes; I traveled during November and beginning of December. We had a Burmese Government delegation. Mr. SOURWINE. You were interpreter-guide for a Burmese Government delegation? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I was not exactly interpreter-guide. I was assigned to that delegation to help them-first to get acquainted with members of the delegation as my first task. The second, to listen to their talk, private talks in Burmese as they suspected that there were no Burmese around them, and to report these talks. Mr. SOURWINE. To report? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No; my knowledge of Burmese wasn't so good at that time, and I couldn't do this. Mr. SOURWINE. Who headed that Burmese delegation? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. That delegation was headed by former Deputy Prime Minister of Burma U Kayaw Nyein. Mr. SOURWINE. Now in what capacity did you go back to Burma in late 1957? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. In late 1957 I went to Burma in capacity of information officer. Mr. SOURWINE. For the foreign office? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. For foreign office. I have to say here that this title, information officer, is not completely equivalent to title of information officer used in your system. Information officer in Soviet Embassy is the smallest, lowest diplomatic rank. It has nothing in common with press. Mr. SOURWINE. When were you recruited to work for Soviet intelligence? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I was recruited beginning of December, just 1 day before my departure from Moscow. Mr. SOURWINE. What were your duties as an intelligence agent? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. My duties were stated to me at the day of exactly the process of my recruitment. I was assigned first of all to translate from Burmese into Russian the documents and all material obtained by Soviet intelligence in Burma, and if needed, to translate from Russian to Burmese. The second of my duties was to get acquainted with politicians, with representatives of different political parties in Burma in order to get valuable information about Government offices, about political parties. The third to promote my friendship, to choose the most valuable, the most interesting from point of view of Soviet intelligence, politicians, to promote my friendship with them in order to convert them into paid Soviet agents. The third was to get acquainted with foreigners in Burma. Members of foreign missions and embassies in Rangoon in order to gather information about work of foreign embassies and to penetrate the embassies. First mentioned was the U.S. Embassy, U.S. personnel in Rangoon. My last task was to look at behavior and morality of other Soviet citizens in Burma and report on them. Mr. SOURWINE. Did Soviet officials other than your intelligence contacts know of your connection with Soviet intelligence? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No; nobody knows. Mr. SOURWINE. Were you told not to reveal your intelligence activities even to other Soviet officials. Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I was ordered not to reveal my participation in work for Soviet intelligence to other members of Soviet Embassy, even to Ambassador himself. Mr. SOURWINE. So you had two jobs. One was your cover job as a lower grade diplomat. Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. And the other was your job as an intelligence agent. Did you make many friends in Burma? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. I made many frends in Burma. Mr. SOURWINE. Did you report to Soviet intelligence on all of the friends you made in Burma? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I report to Soviet intelligence about material I gathered from my friends, but I report names of my acquaintances. I never report names of my friends. Mr. SOURWINE. That would seem to indicate that even at that time you had in your own mind broken with Soviet intelligence. You were not serving them wholeheartedly. Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I was not serving them wholeheartedly. First of all, I was not participating in that organization wholeheartedly. In Moscow I was recruited by former first secretary of Soviet Embassy and chief of Soviet intelligence in Burma Vladimirus. He invited me to get acquainted with my future colleague. He invited me to Hotel Moscow, and introduced me to Boris Antolievich Galashin. Galashin told me "We are from political intelligence service. We choose you to work for us." And then he made me it was not proposal, it was an order. There was no way for me to refuse. He just acknowledged to me that I was chosen because of my good knowledge of Burma and Burmese language. Then I was given paper to sign which was an oath that I would keep dead silence about all secrets given to me; that I would do my best to fulfill obligations assigned to me. And, the paper finished, with the sentence that if I willingly or unwillingly revealed state secrets, I should be ready to meet any sort of punishment, including death penalty. That recruitment wasn't voluntary. Nobody asked me whether I wanted it or not. I was just ordered to participate in this organi zation. Mr. SOURWINE. You were drafted for the job? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. So when I arrived in Burma I was immediately contacted by my future boss in Intelligence Service, and I fulfilled his orders. There was no way for me to avoid fulfilling his orders. In the main, my obligation was translation of documents, secret intelligence documents from Burmese into Russian. Another obligation was getting connections with politicians in order to get information. I was all the time pressed to do this. And I had to do this in order to get my freedom. If I stopped getting this information, giving this information. I would definitely be violating my oath, sent back to Moscow, and be deprived of the relative freedom I had in Burma. Mr. SOURWINE. You mentioned your chief in intelligence in Burma. Who was that? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. He was Ivan Vozniy, he was a colonel of state security, and first secretary of the Soviet Embassy. Mr. SOURWINE. His cover job was first secretary? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. When you defected, Mr. Kasnakheyev, why did you defect to the United States rather than to the Burmese? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Honestly, at first my intention-after I decided to defect, at the end of 1958 and up to February, I had idea that my defection will be valuable and personally my interests would be met if I defected to Burmese Government. Then I started understudying and getting the idea that my defection could be only valuable if I defected to the U.S. Government and asked asylum. My step couldn't be effective if handled by Burmese Government. Mr. SOURWINE. Did you consider the United States the world leader in the fight against communism? Mr. KASNANHEYEV. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. You felt then that this was the logical place for you? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. Mr. SOURWINE. Have the Far East and the Near East been divided into spheres of influence between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I never seen any written document about this division, and somehow I think that such document in reality doesn't exist. But I have many facts I gathered during my work that says there is a recognized division of sphere of influence in southeast Asia between China and Soviet Union. Mr. SOURWINE. What areas are in the U.S.S.R. sphere? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. More or less accurately I can guess that India, Afghanistan and all countries Mr. SOURWINE. The Arabic States? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes; Arab. Mr. SOURWINE. Africa? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I don't know about Africa. |