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Mr. SOURWINE. Now is there directly liaison between the Soviet Communists, the Moscow headquarters and the Burmese insurgents? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I don't think so.

Mr. SOURWINE. Is there direct liaison between the insurgents and the Red Chinese Embassy?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I also don't think so, because officially those Soviet Government and Chinese Government try to keep officially good relations with legal Burmese Government. Soviet Government was interested in friendly neutrality of Burmese Government, legal Burmese Government, so we try to avoid open interference.

Mr. SOURWINE. I didn't mean open liaison but I meant actual liaison. There must be actually liaison between the Red Chinese and the Burmese insurgents if they are supplying them with money and arms and medicaments and instructions and orders.

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I don't know about this. I don't know whether there may be hidden liaison that exists between the Chinese Embassy and insurgents. There is no need for this open violation, because there are many, many more easier ways of communication between the Burmese Communists and Peking. Quite recently one leader of Burmese Communists surrendered to the Burmese Government. He just returned from China.

As for Soviet Embassy, I stress that Soviet Embassy tried to avoid any open interference to Burmese affairs. Indirectly, there was, of course, the supply of means. For instance, through newspapers, publishing houses, and so forth.

Mr. SOURWINE. What can you tell us of the Sino-Soviet use of the Burmese press?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. One of my assignments with the Intelligence Service was the work with usage of Burmese press for Communist aims. Soviet Intelligence regularly published in different Burmese publications provocative anti-American and anti-West articles. These articles were fabricated in Moscow, in KGB headquarters, sent to Burma on microfilms, then developed in Soviet Embassy.

One intelligence officer was translating the text from Russian into English. Another officer was planting this material in Burmese press. Mr. SOURWINE. When you say translated into English

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. From Russian into English. I know this because sometimes

Mr. SOURWINE. Is the Burmese press printed in English?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No. They translate-when these articles were given to KGB-controlled Burmese press, they translated them from English into Burmese. In the next stage, when this article appeared in Burmese newspaper, it was my duty to check the Burmese text against Russian text, and then my corrections and corrected text were sent back to Moscow through TASS agency. Then it was distributed. Then TASS agency distributed this material now as true story, published in press throughout the world, especially in countries of special interest.

Mr. SOURWINE. This propaganda material was prepared in Moscow?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And microfilmed?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The microfilm was sent to Burma?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. There was translated not directly into Burmese?
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. But first into English?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. First into English.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then translated from the English into Burmese? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. By the newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. By the newspapers?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes; because newspapers can give some small variations and adopt, make their own style.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now you were competent to have translated directly from Russian into Burmese. You could have done that?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No; I was not so competent.

Mr. SOURWINE. You were not?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I was not. In several cases my work was also to translate from Russian into English, where this officer was ill or was absent. So I know that it is microfilmed, that it is photocopied, that it is translated from Russian into English.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were you the only person in the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon who was thoroughly conversant with the Burmese language? Mr. Kasnakheyev, this seems at variance with the usual Soviet policy of having competent language officers in their embassies. Why was it different in Burma, because of the difficulty of learning the language?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes; because of difficulty of the language. First of all in the field of language, knowledge of language, native languages, there were many people in Soviet Embassy that studied Burmese, but after they finished their term of 2 or 3 years assignment to Burma they were transferred to other countries. So they lost their knowledge. Second, they were not encouraged in studying Burmese, as all Soviet embassies work through English. There is no necessity for studying Burmese.

Mr. SOURWINE. Does the Soviet international organization support or manipulate any of the newspapers in Rangoon?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. How many?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I know directly that Soviet intelligence manipulated such newspapers as the Mirror, the Vanguard, the New Path, People's Journal, and Dagon Publishing House.

Mr. SOURWINE. Those five publications were manipulated by Soviet intelligence?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Are they so manipulated today?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No; they are not so manipulated today as all these newspapers and publishing houses have been closed by present Burmese Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. How did the Soviet intelligence subvert these Burmese newspapers? How did they accomplish this subversion?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I think that Soviet intelligence had its agents among the staffs of those newspapers.

Mr. SOURWINE. They actually infiltrated-
Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. The staffs?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. This is standard Soviet Communist technique; it is not?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. With the press?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. By the way, all these publications and this publishing house were controlled by Burmese Communists or had very close ties with them. So it is a fact that the agents Soviet intelligence recruited in these newspapers and publishing houses were then transferred to the Communist Party.

Mr. SOURWINE. Did Soviet intelligence spend money on these Burmese newspapers or on newspaper people in Burma?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I heard a fact that one anti-American book was published in this Dagon Publishing House. It consisted of approximately 25 or 30 articles previously published in the People's Journal. The Chief of Soviet Intelligence, discussed with me whether this article should be published as a separate book, and what effect it can have. I told him that these articles were very poor and gave no facts, and were built on sand.

But he told me that these articles cost too much already, it was better than nothing, and so we have to publish this material.

Mr. SOURWINE. Then to summarize what you have said about the subversion of the Burmese press, there were three different methods used, were there not, money, ideological subversion, and actual infiltration of the newspapers.

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you name any Communists who work on Burmese newspapers?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No, I can't.

Mr. SOURWINE. How do the Soviets utilize their control and influence over Burmese newspapers and other publications?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. They publish articles. This is articles published in Burma. It is part of an international net.

Mr. SOURWINE. I hoped we might get an expansion. It seemed to me from the story you told us there were at least two different objectives. One was the printing in Burma of propaganda directed at the Burmese people, and the other was the planting in Burmese newspapers of stories that could then be picked up by TASS and sent around the world as anti-American propaganda?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. They had both of these objectives?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Can you tell us about the handling of the forgery that came to be known as the Admiral Frost letter?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us about that.

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. These exactly were articles that I translated from microfilm into English and then when they were published in Burmese newspaper Mirror, I checked it against Russian text.

Mr. SOURWINE. Now what was the Admiral Frost letter?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. It stated that it was during international rebellion, and it stated-it was forgery of letter promising support to international rebels and asking them not to surrender.

Mr. SOURWINE. This was a forged letter purporting to have been written by a U.S. admiral.

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Offering support?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. To the Indonesian rebels?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And this was prepared in Moscow ?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Microfilmed?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Sent to Burma?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Translated?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Retranslated?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Published in the Burmese newspapers?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Then it was sent back to Moscow and through TASS, through other Soviet propaganda organizations, and also through official diplomatic channels it was distributed around the world.

Then it was republished in Indonesian press.

Mr. SOURWINE. Not as something that originated in Moscow ? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. No.

Mr. SOURWINE. But as something that originated in Burma? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. In Burma this article was published from our Djakarta correspondent and published in Burmese press.

It was sent from our Djakarta correspondent to Moscow and from Moscow to our embassy in Rangoon. In Rangoon we planted it in the Mirror. It was then replayed in Indonesian press and attributed to the Mirror.

Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know of any other outstanding instances of this?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes. The most interesting one was an article about Indian Finance Minister Desai. It stated that the Indian Finance Minister on his visit to the United States in the fall of 1958 got a bribe from the United States amounting to 2 or 3 million American dollars, in order to promote subversion of Indian neutrality and bring down Nehru government.

That article was published-I don't remember exact date-that article was published at the end of 1958 in the newspaper Vanguard. By the way, at the same time Soviet intelligence published the same article in another country. For instance, in India I know they used such newspapers as Blitz and New Delhi Times. For instance, in New Delhi Times Soviet intelligence published an article that accused-that was signed by the Delhi Times nonexistent Rangoon correspondent--and accused three Burmese newspapers, the Nation, the Reporter, and the Guardian, of working for the American Embassy, and accused one newspaper, the Nation, of getting a bribe from American Embassy in Rangoon in amount of 34,000 American dollars for reporting, for making propaganda against Burmese policy of neutrality.

Mr. SOURWINE. You say this charge was fabricated in Moscow ?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. And handled as you have explained?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes; and it was published in New Delhi Times. Then from New Delhi Times it was through TASS transferred to Burma and TASS representative in Burma. Kovtunenko his name was. He republished this article in his official TASS bulletin. Here definitely the channel of distribution was found not very proper, the Burmese newspapers charged this Kovtunenko with defamation of character, and there was a lawsuit. The Burmese court ordered Kovtunenko to appear in court.

He refused and hid in Soviet Embassy. It was at the end of April. Up to now Kovtunenko is hiding in the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon. Mr. SOURWINE. He has been hiding since April?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. What are the principal propaganda themes of the Soviets in Burma? You mentioned one, and anti-Americanism.

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Mainly anti-American. Soviet intelligence, in all these articles as I remember were aimed at spoiling name of United States. For instance, I mentioned already there was a book that was published in Dagon Publishing House called "His Deeds."

It described very vividly how Americans behave in Burma, that they make espionage war, that they use for subversive activities their economic adviser groups, that they have special radio installations in Rangoon. Then it described that they have very bad morals, and

so on.

Mr. SOURWINE. In their propaganda in and from Burma, to what extent do the Communists use misinterpretation or slanting off actual events, and to what extent do they peddle straight lies?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. I found that such forgeries as the Frost letters were not very many. During my work in this network, from approximately January 1958 up to February 1958 when these newspapers were closed, there were published about 25 articles that passed through me.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is clear fabrications?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Among these articles clear fabrications were may be 5 or 6, because even about this Indian Financial Minister what they told were rumors.

Mr. SOURWINE. So misinterpretation and slanting is about 4 to 1? Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Over clear fabrication?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes.

Mr. SOURWINE. Were there others besides yourself in Soviet intelligence in Burma?

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. Yes, there was a group-there were four groups, intelligence groups in Burma.

Mr. SOURWINE. Tell us about that.

Mr. KASNAKHEYEV. The first group I worked with was political intelligence group. It was the most operational secret elite group. I was told that it was responsible directly to the central committee of Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. In this group chief was Ivan Vozniy. His assistant was Boris Galashin that recruited me in Another assistant Igor Trushkovskiy. Galashin worked under the cover of attaché of the Embassy. Trushkovskiy worked

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