engaged in particular industries as well as people living in particular localities, and (2) central government is made up of delegates from these, not separately elected. Whereas democracy would admit all men and women to participation in the work of government and then proceed to control and reorganize social and economic institutions as should seem most wise and just, the constitution of the Russian Soviet Republic, adopted under the influence of the Bolshevist party, July 10, 1918, in Article 4, Chapter 13, grants the right to vote and hold office only to those who are and have been working men, to peasants who work their own ground and housekeepers. It specifically excludes from participation in the government employers, recipients of income from capital or property, merchants, business men and clergymen. That is to say, the Bolshevist government denies to those who have shared in many of the activities of present society participation in introducing changes in the framework of that society. Their government is, as they themselves describe it, "the dictatorship of the proletariat"-it is not a stage in the development of society toward a more and more complete democracy. The attainment of democracy is a historical process, a development, a continuous movement; not merely a device. It is marked by exclusion not by inclusion. The Bolshevist soviet system denies to many of those who have shared in the attainment of such popular government as we possess the opportunity to help in carrying that self-government further. It creates a new class of sufferers under tyranny. It is, for the time at least, a domination of all society in Russia by one class. The Bolshevist argument that eventually all will be of this one class and therefore all will participate in the government begs the question as to whether this change is desired by a considerable majority of the community. It is the dominance of force, not of reason. It is afraid to leave the question to a vote, and insists on settling it according to a preconceived and pedantic ideal withcut an expression of the general judgment.

What shall be the attitude of existing democracy to this plan? In Russia the issue is already joined, and there is no

justification in morals, political wisdom, or self interest for any democratic nation to interfere. It is moreover already evident that the democratic sentiment of England and of America is in revolt against continued occupation of Russia.

Russia must work out her own salvation. It is true that Russia is starving, and if America or the more prosperous nations of Europe can take food and equipment for self support into Russia they will be doing a good work. They will be helping men to see and determine on their future with clearer eyes and stronger courage. But they must leave their machine guns behind them.

So far Bolshevism has asserted itself actively only in countries recently autocratic, that is in Russia and Germany. Democratic countries have as yet been immune. Will they remain so? There is one method and one method only to secure this result, that is by the development of a more complete democracy. There are grave evils, there is grave discontent in all the advanced countries of the world. The influence of Russia on this discontent is twofold, partly perhaps intentional, by the direct efforts of the present government of Russia to induce the same classes in other countries to take control as have control in Russia; secondly, unintentional-the indirect influence of the Russian example. The former I believe to be very slight, the latter very large. There are quite enough Bolshevist influences native in each country to make the direct Russian influence practically negligible.

To send a few radicals to prison, to deport a few foreigners, to suppress a few newspapers, to break up a few meetings, to proscribe the red flag, are useless. All these means of opposing the spread of ideas have been tried under autocracy and under class aristocracy and they have always failed. To misrepresent facts in the newspapers or in speeches, to talk on the subject without taking the trouble to understand it, is no better; it is worse than useless; it is helpful to the cause of Bolshevism. Not in this way can the extension of any group of beliefs be checked. There is, as I have said, one way and one way only, that is by removing the conditions which are

justly subject to criticism,-or in other words to perfect our democracy.

Any community which is seriously engaged in the work of developing a more complete political and industrial democracy will at the same time be disarming militant Bolshevism as it will every other form of revolutionary action. An England adopting more thoroughgoing Representation of the People Acts, making her people more and more free, extending the provisions of her factory acts, her education acts, insurance and minimum wage laws; providing against unemployment; making her taxation system more just and equable; developing her resources in the interest of all her people alike, not for special interests; taking thought that poverty should be abolished and the opportunity of a decent life be provided for every man, woman and child in the land—a democratic England so occupied-an America so occupied-has nothing to dread from Bolshevism. If it has anything to teach us we should gladly learn. It would be strange if idealistic Russia, after the wonderful achievements of the last two years, had nothing to teach us. But if we are engaged in active and intelligent reform the stately march of democracy will not be turned aside by any Russian influence from its advance toward greater human justice, equality, enlightenment and happiness.

SOME RELATIONS OF PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT TO THE MANAGEMENT OF THE WAR INDUSTRIES

By C. E. Clewell

Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering

When the invitation was received last summer to give one of these Saturday afternoon lectures, the demands upon the war industries of this country were at their height, and the importance of efficiency and speed in these plants was perhaps without precedent. The privilege of addressing you at this lecture hour appealed to me at the time as an opportunity for presenting a brief review of some of the efforts which were being made to assist the industries of this country under the pressing conditions of the war emergency which then prevailed.

Of course, on the face of it, the subject of this lecture indicates that it was the original purpose to present these facts as items of interest in connection with an existing war. In the meantime the armistice has been signed, hostilities have ceased, and the urgency of the industrial situation in the efforts to keep pace with war demands has subsided into a more normal condition.

This has caused me to ask myself the question, in the preparation of the following notes, as to just how far these relations of physical environment to the management of war industries under war conditions, are applicable under the present more normal industrial situation.

Merely to emphasize the viewpoint which has been taken in compiling the following material, it is in place to record my conclusion at the outset, which points to the fact that the lessons which have come to light under the pressure of the war emergency in connection with the topic of this lecture contain an application of the most fundamental importance to the national industrial resources in this reconstruction period which now follows one of the most momentous situations in the industrial field ever faced by this country.

Not only are these lessons important now, just as they were during the war, but what is more, the urgency of the war conditions was the cause of intensified study and observation into fields which had been more or less untouched during the preceding years of peace. These intensified studies and their accompanying conclusions may well prove to be a potential asset of great value during the reconstruction period now in evidence and over into that possibly more normal state of the industrial world which may follow later on.

It is with considerable satisfaction, therefore, that the following brief summary of some of the relations of physical environment to the management of the war industries can be presented at this time, not as a war topic in itself, but from the broader aspects of their application to the industries as they exist now and as they will probably exist in the years to come; and with this attitude to the subject in hand, we may now pass to a consideration first, of what the subject is intended to comprehend, and second, as to some of the details involved by the term industrial environment as well as some of the relations which it bears to industrial management as a whole.

The unusual conditions of the labor situation which the country has experienced during the past year or so, are now matters of such common note that it is perhaps unnecessary to mention one of the great problems which the management of our war industries faced in the fulfillment of their orders, not only effectively, but under pressure of the most urgent demands for speed in production. Reference is here made to the labor turn-over, which became a serious situation, and which had the unfortunate tendency to threaten the very foundations of success in the prosecution of the war. Unusual wages, the forced willingness of the industries to accept men for employment under almost any conditions, the action of the draft law in taking men from non-essential jobs for military service, these and other causes contributed to a state of unrest, and presented to the War Industries Board a problem in the reduction of this excessive labor turn-over which was of great magnitude and which was difficult to handle in the extreme.