by authority, and for general purposes the general definitions of the dictionary suffice. But, as we have seen, the special purposes of argumentation require special authorities. Suppose the question reads, "Should state funds be appropriated for the support of sectarian institutions of learning?" Clearly, the one word which needs definition is "sectarian." Now, since it happens that an eminent and apparently impartial body of men has taken great care in defining this term as applied to institutions of learning, and since on the basis of their definitions the income of millions of dollars is now being appropriated, and since, finally, no counter-definition has been authoritatively offered, one can do no better than to define "sectarian," for the purposes of the above question, in the words of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. The opinion of John Hay as to the meaning of an "alliance" between nations would be good authority. Wharton's definitions of the terms connected with criminal evidence are satisfactory. Secretary Root is good authority as to the meaning of the "foreign policy" of the administration. The United States Commissioner of Education is good authority as to the meaning of the term "secondary education." If the question concerns the constitutionality of a law, the student does well to consult the chapter in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations on "The Circumstances under which a Legislative Act may be declared Unconstitutional." In short, this method of definition is good whenever a man can be found who is accepted by the audience as authority on the particular question.1

1 In the defense of Lord George Gordon by Lord Erskine, the whole case hinged on the definition of high treason. Lord Erskine established by authority the definition which won the case. See G. P. Baker's Specimens of Argumentation, pp. 92-98.

3. Definition by Negation. - Definition by negation, that is, by showing what a term is not, is particularly useful in argumentation whenever there is special danger of confusion between the real meaning of the term to be defined and a particular spurious meaning. The method of negation as employed in debate is illustrated by the following quotation from the Lincoln-Douglas debates, in which Lincoln shows that "genuine popular sovereignty" is not the kind advocated by his oppo

nent:

I say this "Douglas popular sovereignty" — for there is a broad distinction, as I now understand it, between that article and a genuine popular sovereignty.

I believe there is a genuine popular sovereignty. I think a definition of genuine popular sovereignty, in the abstract, would be about this: That each man shall do precisely as he pleases with himself, and with all those things which exclusively concern him. Applied to government, this principle would be, that a general government shall do all those things that pertain to it, and all the local governments shall do precisely as they please in respect to those matters which exclusively concern them. I understand that this government of the United States, under which we live, is based upon this principle; and I am misunderstood if it is supposed that I have any war to make upon that principle.

Now, what is Judge Douglas's popular sovereignty? It is, as a principle, no other than that if a man chooses to make a slave of another man, neither that other man nor anybody else has a right to object. Applied in government, as he seeks to apply it, it is this: If, in a new territory into which a few people are beginning to enter for the purpose of making their homes, they choose either to exclude slavery from their limits or to establish it there, however one or the other may affect the persons to be enslaved, or the infinitely greater number of persons who are afterward to inhabit that territory, or the other members of the families of communities, of which

they are but an incipient member, or the general head of the family of states as parent of all however their action may affect one or the other of these, there is no power or right to interfere. That is Douglas's popular sovereignty applied.1

Burke thus defines "peace" by the method of negation:

The proposition is peace. Not peace through the medium of war; not peace to be hunted through the labyrinth of intricate and endless negotiations; not peace to arise out of universal discord fomented, from principle, in all parts of the Empire; not peace to depend on the juridical determination of perplexing questions, or the precise marking the shadowy boundaries of a complex government. It is simple peace; sought in its natural course, and in its ordinary haunts. It is peace sought in the spirit of peace, and laid in principles purely pacific. I propose, by removing the ground of the difference, and by restoring the former unsuspecting confidence of the Colonies in the Mother Country, to give permanent satisfaction to your people; and (far from a scheme of ruling by discord) to reconcile them to each other in the same act and by the bond of the very same interest which reconciles them to the British government.

The selection

4. Definition by Exemplification. of an individual to represent the whole is a valuable means of explanation. An example in exposition is like a specimen in science.

The obvious utility of exemplification, to translate from abstract to concrete, is seen in the extensive use of pictures and models, in the quoted sentences appended to definitions of words in dictionaries and the like.

Two qualities should be had in mind, in choosing an example. First, its embodiment of the idea or property in question should be salient and striking, as it is selected for this particular thing. Secondly, it should be as pure and typical

1 Lincoln's Complete Works, The Century Company, vol. i, p. 541.

as possible, and as free from extraneous or exceptional elements. A perfect exemplification is wellnigh as valuable, in the realm of interpretation, as a perfect definition. . . . Especially in exemplifying intricate subjects, it is advisable to illustrate, as far as may be, one thing at a time; an example may easily be confused by being too complex.1

The value of an example depends on the fact that in definition, as in every other phase of our work, the concrete is much more effective than the abstract. Having proceeded to this point in our study largely by means of examples, we need not here add others.

5. Definition by Explication. In defining the terms of a proposition by explication, we enlarge upon its bare statements, making clear just what is involved or implied, and directing attention to those attributes of the terms defined which are of especial significance in connection with the particular proposition.

This kind of exposition may of course be applied, by way of simplification, to one's own statements, but oftenest it deals with the thought of others. In this latter case it takes upon itself all the obligations implied in dealing fairly. Not only sound criticism but common justice depends on this. The interpretation of another's thought is too momentous a thing to be trusted, as it too prevailingly is, to vague and general impressions. The thought must be treated with all the respect due to a man's personal possessions. According to the need therefor, it must be as the derivation of the word explication suggests unfolded, unwoven; and in this idea is connoted not only the general process but the patience, the candor, the honesty requisite to disengage the author's real thought from the close-plaited, idiosyncratic, not seldom complex web of his expression.2

1 J. F. Genung, The Working Principles of Rhetoric, p. 565. Gina & Co.

2 Ibid. p. 578.

Observe with what care and justice Lincoln unfolds the statement of an opponent by explication:

MR. PRESIDENT AND FELLOW-CITIZENS OF NEW YORK: The facts with which I shall deal this evening are mainly old and familiar; nor is there anything new in the general use I shall make of them. If there shall be any novelty, it will be in the mode of presenting the facts, and the inferences and observations following that presentation. In his speech last autumn at Columbus, Ohio, as reported in the New York Times, Senator Douglas said:

"Our fathers, when they framed the government under which we live, understood this question just as well, and even better, than we do now."

I fully indorse this, and I adopt it as a text for this discourse. I so adopt it because it furnishes a precise and an agreed starting-point for a discussion between Republicans and that wing of the Democracy headed by Senator Douglas. It simply leaves the inquiry: What was the understanding those fathers had of the question mentioned?

What is the frame of government under which we live? The answer must be, "The Constitution of the United States." That Constitution consists of the original, framed in 1787, and under which the present government first went into operation, and twelve subsequent framed amendments, the first ten of which were framed in 1789.

Who were our fathers that framed the Constitution? I suppose the "thirty-nine" who signed the original instrument may be fairly called our fathers who framed that part of the present government. It is almost exactly true to say they framed it, and it is altogether true to say they fairly represented the opinion and sentiment of the whole nation at that time. Their names, being familiar to nearly all, and accessible to quite all, need not now be repeated.

I take these "thirty-nine," for the present, as being "our fathers who framed the government under which we live.' What is the question which, according to the text, those fathers understood "just as well, and even better, than we do now"?