NE of the most disO tinguished of mathematicians has said that "mathematics is a science in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we say is true." Mathematical demonstration is based upon certain undefined terms, and unproved propositions. The expressions "point," "straight line," and "plane" have no absolute and precise meaning, and their accepted definitions are found, upon analysis, to involve a large number of assumptions. It is possible to construct a perfectly logical non-Euclidian theory of space, and to imagine a world of two dimensions, or of four dimensions, in which the majority of our mathematical axioms would be untrue. Poincaré has devised a complete system of geometry in which our accepted definitions of straight lines and parallel lines would not at all obtain.

The most exact of the sciences rests wholly upon its basic definitions. No intelligent discussion of any subject is possible unless definitions of the terms used are agreed upon. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the difference that exists between law and morals, and to

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point out some reasons why the distinct fields and spheres of each should be preserved, and not merged. served, and not merged. Distinctions that should be universally recognized are apparently becoming obscured. There is a prevailing tendency toward the medieval confusion between legality and morality, so that it is to many lay minds a novel and somewhat shocking idea that conduct may be immoral and yet perfectly legal, or, conversely, illegal and yet perfectly moral. perfectly moral. Unconscionable defenses are recognized and upheld by the law, but the immorality of repudiating a just debt cannot be cured by the mere continuance of the default. No one could think there was anything immoral in carrying the Harvard flag in a parade through the streets of Boston, but it has been made criminal by law. Here we have instances of immoral conduct which is legal, and of illegal conduct which is not immoral. And it is no doubt true that it may, on occasion, be both moral and righteous to violate penal laws which, by reason of their generality, cannot be made to fit all occasions.

said, start with definitions of the terms used.. For law, then, we will adopt Blackstone's definition, "A rule of civil Conduct prescribed by the supreme power in the state, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong;" and by morals we must be understood to mean that body or system of rules and principles governing right conduct and good character of the individual, determining his personal behavior and mode of life with respect to his duty toward himself, his conscience, and his God; as tested by a higher law than statutory enactment. The antithesis is obvious. Law has to do with conduct toward one's fellows, so far as it affects their rights and material well-being. Morals is concerned with duty toward one's self for the conservation and development of character, and affecting the

God. The fact that these two circles sometimes interlace, or overlap, does not mar their independent symmetry. An object may be at the same time round and red; but that would not give any excuse for confusing form and color as distinct attributes. As soon as we ignore

well-being of self. Law regards rights, and strictly is not concerned with duties, except the negative duty of refraining from trespass upon the rights of others; while morals imposes many obligations which have nothing to do with the positive rights of others. The lone castaway upon an uninhabited, uncharted island could not violate any rule of law, but he might commit many offenses against good morals. He might be vicious, but could not be criminal.

If the respective scopes of law and morals are represented by circles, the center of the circle of law would be one's neighbor, and its circumference, his rights. The center of the circle of morals would be self, and its circumference, one's duties towards self, conscience, or

or lose our appreciation of difference between two different things, we impair our ability to recognize either of those two things. Colorblind people who are unable to distinguish between red and green do not see either red

or green as we see them; and if we lose sight of the fundamental distinction between law and morals we shall not be able to understand either. The extent towhich a legal and moral color-blindness is affecting the tendencies of recent legislation is made more apparent if we revert briefly to the definition of law already given. It is a rule of civil conduct: that is to say, of civic conduct, the conduct of a citizen as such,-his conduct towards his fellows so far as it affects their rights; not his moral conduct, not his development of personal good or bad character, not his duty to inculcate by precept and example a moral standard of personal character in others; that is the province of religion or ethics, but not of law. Our definition of law as a rule of civil conduct connotes all this. Yet legislatures continually propose and adopt rules which attempt to regulate private and personal conduct and restrict personal freedom of action, without reference to any trespass upon the rights of others. Lawmakers have no hesitation in pre

scribing what we shall smoke, what we shall drink, what medicine we may take, what medical advice we may give or receive, and what amusements we may indulge in.

There are, in this country, strong and well-organized religious bodies whose members believe it to be wrong and demoralizing to indulge in the amusements of card playing, dancing, and theater going. Under the popular idea of the legitimate scope of legislation, if one of these sects should happen to command a majority of one in a legislature, it would be not improper for it to make card playing, dancing, or theater going, felonies. It is only necessary to label any restrictive piece of legislation a "moral issue" to command the almost unanimous support of the members of any legislature. A reputation for virtue and morality cannot be more cheaply and easily acquired than by the vociferous support of "moral" legislation.

It seems not to be understood that as soon as legislation attempts to restrict and regulate anything more than civil conduct, it ceases to be law, and becomes an unwarrantable and dangerous interference with personal liberty. It is a mere repetition of a familiar truism to say that "the price of liberty is liberty;" that liberty is not a privilege, but a right, not granted, but inherent. The Constitution, as originally adopted, contained no Bill of Rights. One of the framers, when asked whether this omission was intentional, significantly remarked, "Do the natural rights of man, the rights for which we have fought and bled, depend on a gracious concession? If a man sells half his land, must he take a release from the buyer for the other half? Then why is it necessary for people to have a grant of natural rights from a government which derives every power it has from the grant of the people?" To-day it would almost seem that the individual has no rights which the legislature is bound to respect.

Our definition of law further says that it is a rule of conduct prescribed by the supreme power in the state, and this part of the definition is often mistakenly interpreted to mean prescribed by a majority of the voters.

The men

who founded this government had no such idea. Government, in their opinion, derived its just powers from the consent of the governed, from the consent of the whole people. The Constitution of the United States is full of checks and balances designed to prevent and restrain the arbitrary domination of a bare majority. This government was founded upon a revolt against usurped powers, and rebellion against tyranny. Absolute and unlimited power reposing in any governmental body has been a thing unknown to American doctrine or experience until lately, when we find in a state Constitution declarations that the authority of certain bodies or functionaries of the state is absolute and plenary. The distinction between statutory law and constitutional law is, in some commonwealths, now abrogated. A statute or a constitutional provision is enacted by the same method, and may be adopted by a majority vote. For the antiquated and exploded doctrine of the divine right of kings we have set up the fetich of the divine right of the majority, and governments are understood to be designed, not to secure and protect the inherent right of the minority, but to carry out and enforce the will of the majority.

Morals necessarily, to some extent, rests upon opinion and view point, and particular rules of morals may be the subject of difference of opinion. Moral responsibility and moral character cannot exist unless the individual is left free to decide between right and wrong. Freedom of will and fredom of choice are necessary attributes of a moral being. Law, on the other hand, if it stays within its own proper field of action, does not, and should not, allow for differences of opinion or for freedom of conduct. When our definition speaks of law as a rule of conduct commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong, the context indicates that it means right and wrong as regards the rights of others. As to the respecting of these rights the individual can be allowed no freedom of choice. But it is not possible to take from a man the right to govern himself, in matters not affecting the rights of others, without emascu

lating him as an individual. A person deprived of all his faculties, mental as well as physical, would be no longer a moral being. It seems to be the aim of some of the most "advanced" of western legislatures to reduce all men to this condition of innocuous desuetude and moral idiocy. The distinction between the legitimate sphere of influence of law and morals is ignored, and any acts or conduct-even in trivial and indifferent matters-which a dominant clique disapprove or want to have the credit of disapproving, are legislated into crimes.

It has been made a crime to sell pieces of tissue paper measuring about one and a half by three inches in size. It is a crime in at least one state to sell cigarettes, while it is not an offense to deal in cigars or tobacco. It was made a crime in New York to manufacture cigars in a tenement house, and, in the same state, it was made a crime to manufacture oleomargarin. In some cities it is a crime to cross the street except in a particular way; in others it is a crime to alight from a street car, except on a designated side. Every large city has hundreds, if not thousands, of penal ordinances, and every denizen therein becomes an habitual criminal, so that violation of so-called laws is regarded with general indifference, and conviction of criminal offenses is treated with levity. Along with a great number

of trivial and ridiculous laws there are also constantly being enacted numerous laws which attempt to enforce morality, to make every vice a crime, and the policeman the moral arbiter of every individual' conscience.

Of course, when law attempts to invade the field of morals it loses certainty. Law is objective; morals, subjective. Law ought to be, and in its nature must be, definite and certain. Questions of morals have to be resolved by circumstances, and with reference to psychic and spiritual states and conditions. Law is necessarily too clumsy and crude an instrument with which to measure morals. Laws designed to enforce morality necessarily fail of their purpose, and their failure brings discredit on law and disparagement to morals. The con-fusion of law and morals inevitably brings indifference and disrespect to all rules of conduct, legal and moral. If we would preserve the sanctity of the moral law, and due respect and obedience for the civil law, we must keep the two within their proper fields of action. We must render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's.

was

HE colony of Georgia found in 1733 by General James Oglethorpe, as a home for the poor and oppressed. In keeping with the high motives of the founder, the laws and regulations adopted for the settlers were of the most altruistic nature. On this theory the importation of rum and slaves was prohibited. These ideal laws did not meet with favor among the colonists, under the conditions.

Before leaving England, the settlers had been engaged in indoor occupations or farming under conditions vastly different from those encountered in the new country. The clearing of the forest and lowlands, and the excessive heat at the time when the greatest amount of farm labor was absolutely necessary for making the crops, were new and difficult conditions which had to be met in order that the settlers might prosper.

Across the Savannah river, the Carolinians with the labor of the slaves were growing rice and cotton in abundance. The African climate had hardened the negro to heat, and under the intelligent direction of the white men his labor was proving very profitable.

The British government desired that Georgia should prosper in order that this settlement might act as a barrier to the incursions of the Spanish in Florida and the Indians to the South and West. Petitions to the trustees for allowance of slaves were numerous. The Reverend George Whitefield, who supported the Bethesda Orphanage with the product of negro slave labor on his farm on the South Carolina side of the river, wrote the trustees: "Georgia never can or will be a flourishing province without negroes are allowed."

Futhermore, a number of families had moved in from South Carolina with their slaves, and when the authorities investigated their holdings in Georgia they threatened to leave the colony; and a number of planters near the river had hired slaves for life, and brought them over with the understanding that in the event of any trouble with the authorities the vendor was to appear and claim the slave as his property.

At

Thus it was that the need of slaves was made clear to the trustees, and it also seemed that the colonists would have slaves in the face of the law. last, giving ear to the crying need of the province, the trustees answered a petition dated October 26th, 1749, favorably, and the importation of African slaves was allowed, but not without severe regulations. These regulations were substantially as follows: Slaves should not be in large numbers on any plantation, they should be enjoined and encouraged to marry, and should be forbidden to use profane language. Negroes should not be sold without registry, and they should not learn any of the mechanical arts. They should not be worked on the Sabbath Day, but should be compelled to go to church, and be instructed in religious matters by Protestant ministers.

At the time slaveholding was legalized, there was already a number of slaves in Georgia, some belonging to newcomers, while others had been purchased for life and were held by subterfuge. As soon as the ban upon the slave trade was removed, the Portuguese and English traders shipped the "black ivory" into the colony in large numbers, the source of supply being the savage tribes along the West African coast. The prisoners which one tribe had taken from a hostile tribe were bartered to these traders for firearms and baubles, instead of being baked and served for dinner. The