Had the judge then, as Geddes had suggested, some information as to Manley's past which rendered the subterfuge of the letter worse than useless? Inwardly Skinner cursed vehemently.

"But-but," he stammered.

"By the way, Mr. Skinner," said the judge, "in the bundle you sent around to me there was a letter marked 'private and confidential' which I conceived to have been introduced into the file inadvertently-"

"Now he's coming to it," mentally ejaculated Skinner. "Now he's beginning to squirm!" His spirits arose.

"Inadvertently and I hesitated to acquaint myself with its-"

"What letter? Let me see the papers. I don't remember."

Skinner opened the bundle and found the Mason letter. "Oh, did I leave that in the file? Heavens! I didn't mean you to see that letter. Of course it gives the whole busi-"

But the judge had not finished. He continued over Skinner's interruption. "Hesitating for the reasons statedwhich you will of course appreciate-I tried to get you on the phone last evening. Naturally in the absence of permission-"

"You mean you mean that you-you didn't read it?"

"I did not read it, Mr. Skinner. The matter need give you no further uneasiness," assured the judge a little coldly.

Skinner gawked open mouthed. The judge's incredible sense of honor had afforded him perfect insulation. And Skinner's wires had short-circuited! He suddenly stiffened. His unwieldy frame sagged against the library table. And the shock went under his tough hide to the very quick! He twisted his dazed face up toward the unfeeling bust of

Pallas above the library door, and flung a question to the Universe: Can you beat it? Can you beat it?”

"Pardon me-beat what?" inquired the judge mildly.

Skinner turned one sick look upon that tranquil face, and in that moment realized something that his sordid soul never before believed that there are lawyers— and lawyers.

Despair, defeat, sagged his lax jaw. "I meant-er-do you think you can beat -the company?" he explained wearily. Then himself added: "I think you can. I have concluded to settle. Will you step over to my office?"

The judge smiled placidly. How groundless had been his fears! The nightmare was over. Now the little woman who waited would rejoice. He started to reply. Then he hesitated. Could he take this money? Suddenlythe actual money looming into viewhis conscience thundered: Thou shalt not! He smiled wearily to think that he had ever contemplated the possibility. Yet he sighed as he recalled the destitution of Ben Runciman's daughter. Well, he would take care of her. Clearing his throat, he began: "Upon mature consideration, Mr. Skinner, I—"

A clerk from his offices had hurried up. "Excuse me, Judge Enright, but you directed-" He held out a yellow envelope.

"Pardon me, Mr. Skinner, one moment."

COMPANY maintaining highly charged electric wires where persons have a right to go is under the duty of exercising the utmost care, to the end that such persons be not injured thereby. The business of such a company is "so fraught with peril to the public that the highest degree of care which skill and foresight can obtain, consistent with the practical conduct of its affairs under the known methods and present state of its particular art, is demanded." While the company is not an insurer, its patrons have the right to presume that they will not be injured in attempting to use that which the company sells, and that it will do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight can reasonably do, to protect them from injury.2

Care, in this sense, means more than mere mechanical skill; it includes circumspection and foresight with regard to reasonably probable contingencies.3

This care is nothing more nor less than reasonable; reasonable care being always commensurate with the danger to be anticipated.

Due care in any case is dependent

1 Jacksonville Electric Co. v. Sloan, 52 Fla. 257, 42 So. 516; Younie v. Blackfoot, Light & Water Co. 15 Idaho, 56, 96 Pac. 193; Daltry v. Media Electric Light, Heat & P. Co. 208 Pa. 403, 57 Atl. 833; Danville v. Thornton, 110 Va. 541, 66 S. E. 839.

2 Denver Consol. Electric Co. v. Lawrence, 31 Colo. 301, 73 Pac. 39; Escambia County Electric Light & P. Co. v. Sutherland, 61 Fla. 167, 55 So. 83; Shaw v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Corp. 168 N. C. 611, 84 S. E. 1010. 3 Anderson v. Jersey City Electric Light Co.

upon and determined by the consequence or probable result of neglect. An increase of the danger and evil results of negligence increases the degree of care required to meet the duty to be borne by the responsible party.

This care, caution, and diligence extend to the construction, operation, and maintenance of the plant, and include the exercise of this high degree of care and diligence in making inspection, for the discovery of possible impairment or defects. And to this end the company should provide itself with and use the known appliances necessary to control its electrical current, and prevent the passing of dangerous currents of electricity into the houses of its patrons, whether such deadly current be generated by it, or be caused by lightning striking its wires.7

By reason of this degree of care which such companies are required to observe, their patrons and persons on lawful business in the houses of their patrons have a right to assume, in the absence of knowledge or notice to the contrary, that the appliances and fixtures of the companies are free from defects which would permit the flow of an unnecessary and dangerous current of electricity into the houses.

63 N. J. L. 387, 43 Atl. 654, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 314.

4 Younie v. Blackfoot Light & Water Co. 15 Idaho, 56, 96 Pac. 193.

5 Barnett v. Atlantic City Electric Co. 87 N. J. L. 29, 93 Atl. 108.

6 Smith v. Middlesboro Electric Co. 164 Ky. 46, 174 S. W. 773.

7 Columbus R. Co. v. Kitchens, 142 Ga. 677, 83 S. E. 529, L.R.A.1915C, 570.

8 Smith v. Middlesboro Electric Co. supra.

Injury Due to Defect in Wires or

Appliances of Consumer.

There are two theories and two lines of decisions touching the liability of an electric company supplying current to a consumer where the injury arises by reason of a defective condition in the wires or equipment belonging to the consumer. One is that by the act of furnishing for use so dangerous a force as electricity a party is bound to know that the poles. and wires over which it is to be conveyed are in such condition that the furnishing of such current will not endanger life or limb. The other is that the one who provides and controls the apparatus and equipment over which the current is conveyed is bound to attend to their safety, and that its mere supply to such party does not render the party supplying it responsible for the condition of such apparatus and equipment.10

The following rule is laid down in Hoffman v. Leavenworth Light, Heat & P. Co.; "when such power is simply furnished to a responsible party for use in a system of poles, wires, and appliances owned and controlled by such party, and in proper condition to receive the current safely, the furnishing party is not required to maintain inspection, or to see at its peril that such equipment is kept safe, but so long as not chargeable with knowledge of defect therein, it may justly and reasonably assume that such safety will be maintained; justly and reasonably, because the using party is presumed to act in accordance with prudence and safety until the contrary appears."

An electrical company is not liable for

9 Maysville Gas Co. v. Thomas, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 403, 75 S. W. 1129; Lewis v. Bowling Green Gas Light Co. 135 Ky. 611, 117 S. W. 278, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1169; Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. v. United Electric Co. 71 N. J. L. 430, 58 Atl. 1082; Herbert v. Hudson River Electric Co. 136 App. Div. 107, 120 N. Y. Supp. 672.

10 Hoffman v. Leavenworth Light, Heat & P. Co. 91 Kan. 450, 138 Pac. 632, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 574, also Hill v. Pacific Gas & E. Co. 22 Cal. App. 788, 136 Pac. 492; National F. Ins. Co. v. Denver Consol. Electric Co. 16 Colo. App. 86, 63 Pac. 949; Memphis Consol. Gas & E. Co. v. Speers, 113 Tenn. 83, 81 S. W. 595, 16 Am. Neg. Rep. 596; Fickeisen v.

Where the owner of a shop had the same wired by an independent contractor, and the wiring was inspected by the city authorities and accepted by them as sufficient, it thereupon became the pri vate property of such owner, and he alone was responsible for the condition of such wires. Accordingly, where such owner hung a lead wire over a nail until the insulation on the wire became defective, and the building was set on fire thereby, and one who volunteered to extinguish the fire was killed by an electric shock from such wire, the electric company was not liable for his death.14

In Kentucky, the rule seems to be that an electric lighting or power company is not responsible for injuries received by persons arising solely from the defects in the wiring or appliances within the patron's building, and which are owned and exclusively controlled by the patron. In such a case the company does not owe such person any duty of inspection of the inside wiring or appliances. Of course, the defective condition of the patron's wires or appliances would not relieve the company from liability for the consequences of turning into the same a dangerous current.15

Where a company was supplying electricity to a customer who had installed all

the inside wiring, excepting fuses, and all the wires, lamps, etc., were his property, the company was under no obligations to inspect the wiring, although the contract under which the current was supplied gave it the right to enter upon the premises for the purpose of "inspecting its own or the customer's wires or apparatus."16

The owner of a house wired the same, under the inspection of the electrician of the city in which the house was located, and the wiring and electrical equipment were his property. In turning off an incandescent light, after connection had been made with his wires and current turned on the same by the defendant company, he received a shock, which caused the injuries complained of. Two experts, one testifying for the plaintiff and the other for defendant, who examined the premises to discover the cause of the accident, agreed that excessive voltage could only have been transmitted into the building by one of two means,— either by the transformer being out of order, or by a crossing of the secondary wire with a wire of higher voltage, neither of which conditions was found to exist. To the contrary, the testimony of these experts was that, in their opinion, the accident was due to the circumstance that the brass on the light bulb protruded from the socket in such a way that, when the light was on, the upper end of the brass was in contact with the wires in the socket. This theory was borne out by an experiment made by one of the experts. It was held that the plaintiff had failed to establish actionable negligence against the defendant, and judgment rendered in favor of defendant on a demurrer to the evidence, was affirmed.17

In a Louisiana case, in which recovery was sought for loss caused by fire started by electricity conducted into the house of a customer by the defendant, it was the

16 Brunelle v. Lowell Electric Light Corp. 188 Mass. 493, 74 N. E. 676.

17 Peters v. Lynchburg Light & Traction Co. 108 Va. 333, 61 S. E. 745, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1188.

18 Hanton v. New Orleans & C. R. Light & P. Co. 124 La. 562, 50 So. 544.

latter's contention that the fire would not have occurred had the fixtures in the house been such as it was entitled to require. In this respect the court said: "Those fixtures had been in use for years before the fire, without injury or loss. They were accepted by defendant as sufficient. Had anything been wrong about them, defendant should have ascertained the fact by inspection and examination. Householders know nothing whatever of electricity, nor what the requirements called for to insure safety. Defendant is engaged in that particular business, and supposed to be informed fully as to what is needed in the premises."18

In New Jersey it has been declared. that an electric company must inspect the wires and appliances installed in a building by other parties, before turning its current into the same. In this case, however, the damage was caused by a defective meter which the company itself had contracted with a competent electrician, as an independent contractor, to install.19 Of course, the company could not relieve itself of the obligation of a personal duty by employing an independ

ent contractor.

If an electric light or power company contracts to wire and equip a building for the use of electricity, it is bound by the rules of law applicable to persons engaged in that business, and it undertakes to use the care and skill ordinarily used by such persons. It is liable, therefore, only for a breach of that duty.20

The fact that a subscriber owns the wires and fixtures constituting the electrical appliances of his residence or place of business does not affect the question of the liability of the company for its negligence. This fact is only pertinent in the inquiry as to whether or not the defendant was negligent. It is liable for an injury resulting from its negligence although the dangerous current traversed the wires and fixtures of the subscriber before causing the injury.21

19 Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. v. United Electric Co. 71 N. J. L. 430, 58 Atl. 1082. 20 Herzog v. Municipal Electric Light Co. 89 App. Div. 569, 85 N. Y. Supp. 712, affirmed in 180 N. Y. 518, 72 N. E. 1142.

21 Union Light, Heat & P. Co. v. Arntson, 87 C. C. A. 1, 157 Fed. 540.

Overcharge of House Wires. Where a person was shocked by taking hold of a lamp, by reason of the primary current getting into the low tension wires in the building, due to two classes of wires coming in contact with each other outside the building, which was caused by the leaning of a pole on which was a heavy weight, and the condition of the pole could have been discovered within several weeks prior to the accident, it was held that the company was negligent.22

A plaintiff, suing to recover for injuries caused by the secondary light wires in the building in which he was. employed becoming charged with the primary current, may show that it is customary for companies of the kind of defendant to use a device, not used by defendant, which would prevent high voltage from flowing from primary to secondary wires and thence into buildings.

23

In connection with this subject reference should be had to the subdivision of this article entitled, Application of Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

{ Delay in Repairing Defect.

The fact that a dangerous condition of electric wires was allowed to continue for an unreasonable length of time, thereby causing the injury complained of, may be shown under allegations that the defendant negligently constructed and maintained a defective system of wires, defective because of improper fuse, plug, insulation, etc. And in such circumstances, it was held proper for the plaintiff to show that he tried to get the defendant's office by telephone, in order to have the defect remedied, but could, not, and that he then went to its substation and office and found no one there, and tried to find defendant several times, but could not until after the accident happened.24

22 Union Light, Heat & P. Co. v. Lakeman, 156 Ky. 33, 160 S. W. 723.

23 Webster v. Richmond Light & R. Co. 158 App. Div. 210, 143 N. Y. Supp. 57.

24 Younie v. Blackfoot Light & Water Co. 15 Idaho, 56, 96 Pac. 193.

25 Von Trebra v. Laclede Gaslight Co. 209 Mo. 648, 108 S. W. 559.

26 Ibid.

Defective Insulation.

It is said to be well settled that, when injury or death is caused by coming in contact with a highly charged electric wire, it is conclusively presumed that the insulation of the wire was defective.25 Again, it is said that it is not necessary, for one who was injured by reason of defective insulation, to prove that the insulation was off the wire at the point of contact. All that is required of him is that he show that the defective insula

tion caused the injury without fault on his part, and that he was rightfully where he was.26

Where the insulation on primary wires, attached to a building, became worn, which permitted the bare wires to come in contact with the building cornice, setting fire to the building, the electric company was liable.27

Where recovery for an injury is sought on the ground of defective insulation, evidence of the location of the wires is admissible as bearing upon the degree of care required of the defendant in the particular instance.28 Expert testimony is proper on the question whether or not the wire in question was properly insulated.29

Wires Left on Buildings.

An electric company was held liable for the death of one who was killed by a shock while attempting to put out a located near his own, caused to ignite by fire, started in the awning of a building the defective or improper condition of wires which formerly supplied an outside lamp with electricity, and left hanging in front of the building by the company when it removed the lamp; the deceased not being a trespasser as to the company.30

27 German-American Ins. Co. v. New York Gas & E. L. H. & P. Co. 103 App. Div. 310, 93 N. Y. Supp. 46, affirmed in 185 N. Y. 581, 78 N. E. 1103.

28 Denver Consol. Electric Co. v. Walters, 39 Colo. 301, 89 Pac. 815.

29 Ibid.

30 Caglione v. Mt. Morris Electric Light Co. 56 App. Div. 191, 67 N. Y. Supp. 660.