that an ordinance is unreasonable which provides not only that the sealer may every six months, but as much oftener as he thinks proper, inspect and examine. the weights and measures. The objection made is to this discretionary power sought to be given to the officer to inspect and examine as often as he may think proper to do so. The purpose of the statute, the ordinance, and of the creation of the office, and furnishing the officer, argues the court, is the protection of the public by seeing that the measure in weight and bulk by which sales and purchases are made corresponds with the standard, and therefore this matter is placed under the supervision of this officer, and power is necessarily vested in him to accomplish the object in view. To render the system and its purpose effectual it may be quite necessary that he should have

this power given to him in that respect. And the time and circumstances which may require inspection and examination of the weights and measures of a dealer are very properly, to some extent, left to his judgment. His duty requires it every six months. Attention may be required at intermediate times to a greater or less extent, and when he deems it necessary his authority enables him to see that the law is not violated, intentionally or by mistake. It cannot be assumed that, in the exercise of the power devolved upon him, the officer will be governed by any motive other than such as in his judgment the discharge of his duty requires. It is also urged in this case that it is not within the power of the common council to embrace, within the powers given to the sealer, authority to require the merchant to send his weights and measures to such place in

the city as the officer may direct. The court observed, however, that this provision becomes applicable only in the event that they are not in conformity with the standard, and then they are to be sent to such place to be brought into such conformity and sealed. This may properly require something done which cannot conveniently be performed at the store, and to do which the officer may have a suitable place.12

An ordinance prohibiting the use of false weights or measures under a penalty of $25 for each offense was upheld as reasonable in an action against one who had in actual use a balance for weighing ice, which, upon a test of 50 pounds, registered 60 pounds, to recover the penalty imposed by such ordinance, and as the ordinance did not require proof of intent or guilty knowledge, such proof was held not essential.18

A California act adopting a standard of weights and measures, and providing that the respective counties and municipalities of the state may appoint sealers of weights and measures, has been held not invalid under the Constitution which provides that no state office shall be continued or created in any county or municipality for the inspection of any merchandise, the statute in question being merely a general law authorizing the appointment by municipalities of such sealers. 14 So the statute just referred to has been held valid under that article of the Constitution which provides that any county or municipality may make and enforce all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.15

Under a statute enabling councils of towns to appoint an inspector of weights and measures to test, and, if found correct, to stamp the same, a town may by ordinance prohibit the use of spring scales for any market purpose.16

It has been held that where a city was granted the power "to provide for the inspection and sealing of weights and

12 People ex rel. Gould v. Rochester, 45 Hun, 102.

18 New York v. Hewitt, 91 App. Div. 445, 86 N. Y. Supp. 832.

14 Scott v. Boyle, 164 Cal. 321, 128 Pac. 941. 15 Ibid.

measures," and "to enforce the keeping and use of proper weights and measures by venders," an ordinance providing for the selection of an inspector of weights and measures, making it his duty to test the accuracy of scales used by persons or corporations in the sale of any article or commodity, and to condemn scales found not to conform to the standard of the state of Illinois, was reasonable, and a proper exercise of the power granted the city; and that a subsequent statute creating a state inspector of weights and measures of coal did not work a repeal of the ordinance with respect to scales at coal mines, since there could be only one correct standard, and it was to be presumed that each officer would only do his duty.17

Under the general law relating to weights and measures, and the city charter of March 1st, 1834, the city council of Cincinnati had the power to appoint an inspector or sealer of weights and measures, and to enforce by fine the use of weights and measures sealed by such inspector.1

18

The power of a municipal corporation to condemn for inaccuracy computing scales in use by merchants has been denied in a Michigan case, the court observing that the express power to examine and determine the accuracy of the scales as to weight does not by implication confer upon the council the right to determine the accuracy of the charts, ready reckoners, adding machines, or other devices by which the value of the goods weighed shall be determined. The object of the statute is to determine the accuracy of weighing, not the accuracy of the process by which the price is found. The statute aims to protect the public from false weights and measures, and not from the dishonesty of dealers in reckoning the cost of the goods purchased.19

Under a Massachusetts act providing that all scales, balances, computing scales, and other devices having a device for in

16 Snell v. Belleville, 30 U. C. Q. B. 81. 17 Spring Valley v. Spring Valley Coal Co. 71 Ill. App. 432.

18 Huddleson v. Ruffin, 6 Ohio St. 604. 19 Parker v. Austin, 156 Mich. 573, 121 N. W. 322, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 266.

dicating or registering the price as well as the weight of the commodity offered for sale, shall be tested by the sealers of weights and measures, as to the correctness of both weights and values indicated by them, the correctness to be passed upon is purely arithmetical, and the statute, for that reason, is unconstitutional.20 Of the above case the court in Parker v. Austin supra says: "It is sufficient to say of Moneyweight Scale Co. v. McBride, that it involved the inherent power of the legislature, and not of a municipality, the creature of the legislature. It is worthy of remark here that the court in that case held that 'the correctness of these scales is not now before us.' The court decided that the statute required the charts to be arithmetically correct, and sustain the law upon that basis. It also held that if it conferred upon the sealer the power to determine the commercial correctness of the charts, it was unconstitutional."

It has been held that under the power to fix the salary or compensation to be paid to the sealer of weights and measures, and to require every person who sells by weight or measure to submit his weights and measures to the inspection of the city sealer, and to have them sealed by him, the common council may, by ordinance, fix the fees of the sealer, and provide that the same shall be paid by the

20 Moneyweight Scale Co. v. McBride, 199 Mass. 503, 85 N. E. 870.

21 Bangasser v. Citizens' Gas Co. 19 Alb. L. J. 400.

22 Springfield v. Starke, 93 Mo. App. 70.

23 Ford v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 33 App. Div. 474, 53 N. Y. Supp. 764; Fausnaugh v. Rogers, 62 App. Div. 535, 71 N. Y. Supp. 125.

24 Hettenbach v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 18 Hun, 129.

25 Springfield v. Starke, 93 Mo. App. 70.

person for whom the services are performed.21 But in the absence of explicit authority in positive law a Missouri court deems it an unreasonable requirement to compel every merchant and shopkeeper of a city of the third class to pay fees twice a year to have the weights and measures necessarily used in his business approved by a local inspector; if every weight and measure required for ordinary dealings in the city is to be overhauled every six months, at an expense of from 10 to 25 cents for each examination, the sum total of that expense would constitute a substantial item of burden upon the domestic commerce of the municipality.22 A city, in the absence of an express statutory provision delegating such power, has no authority to provide that its sealer of weights and measures may recover from merchants for unsolicited services in testing their weights. and measures.2 23

Again, it has been held that a city had no authority to pass an ordinance which would compel one not engaged in selling merchandise to pay for the inspecting of his scales, where the only power conferred by its charter upon the subject was to make ordinances "in relation to the inspection and sealing of weights and measures, and enforcing the keeping and use of proper weights and measures by venders.24 The power to impose a fine for nonpayment of fees for inspecting a merchant's scales and measures is not to be inferred from a general grant of authority to the city to promote its "general welfare." "25

fnok Bambislam

O NATION can long

"N endure half slave and

half free." That axiom of a former generation is as true to-day as it was in the stormy period preceding our Civil War. It is immaterial that in the present age we have no slavery of manual servitude. If we have a slavery of licentiousness and moral degradation, the deterioration and final fall of the nation is equally assured. And so we need to sap the trenches, and explode a mine under the embattled line of commercialized vice. It is imperative that through some effective action we arouse the decent element to the danger that threatens the body politic by reason of the insidious and disintegrating tendency of lewd shows, obscene pictures and posters, indecent magazines and books of fiction and filthy pictures, and the other agencies of immorality now so prevalent. There are comprehensive Federal and state laws prohibiting the traffic in such matters. Every Federal district and every county has officers sworn to enforce those laws. Why is it that these evils exist? The laws surely represent the will of the majority, and a very vast majority. But there is a sad lack of interest in their enforcement. Selfishness, to a great extent, is accountable for this public apathy, the dislike to inconvenience one's self or to arouse antagonism on the part of some commercial leper. Then there is the disinclination to pose as a "googoo." But when it is realized that the spread of such moral contagion is a menace to the home, the basis of our national life, and the children, the hope of our future national existence, it is apparent that the man who does not exert himself to throttle these evils is a traitor

to his country and its necessities. Lack of public moral support is the excuse of many a public official for his laxity in enforcing a salutary law. Take this factor, and the undeniable conclusion that some district attorneys are so politically bound hand and foot that they dare not offend a powerful publisher who moulds sentiment, or a large manufacturer who controls votes, and the causes for the existence of commercialized vice are apparent. Wake up the citizens, and throw the pliant prosecutor into the discard, and commercialized vice will largely disappear, as will also the necessity for organizations for its suppression. Sturdy, unselfish individual public morality, possibly at some initial inconvenience, is the crying necessity of the present era in this country, where an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity has rendered us unprepared in more ways than one.

What are our present laws prohibiting the forms of vice above noted, and what are their interpretations?

The term "public morals" may be said to signify the rules of conduct adopted and enforced by a people as a result of the experience of ages, and the realization derived therefrom as to the standard of behavior most conducive to the greatest contentment of the greatest number. These rules of conduct may be codified in the form of statutory enactments, or they may have become so universally recognized that the necessity for a law to enforce their observance has never been considered. Of what supreme importance the maintenance of public morals is considered by the judiciary is indicated by expressions taken from English and American decisions. Thus in Rex v. Curl, 2 Strange, 788, the court says: "Peace includes good order and government, and that peace may be

broken in many instances without an actual force, to wit, if it be an act against morality;" and again in Com. v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & R. 102, 7 Am. Dec. 632; "Hence it follows, that an offense may be punishable if in its nature and by its example it tends to the corruption of morals, although it be not committed in public;" and also in Williams v. State, 4 Mo. 480: "All acts and conduct calculated to corrupt public morals or to outrage the sense of public decency are indictable;" and then in Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 168, 12 L. ed. 1032, the court said: "The suppression of nuisances injurious to public health and morals and morality is among the most important duties of government." The Supreme Court of the United States has stated similar propositions, to wit, in Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 751, 28 L. ed. 587, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652, it held "the state could not, by any contract, limit the exercise of her power to the prejudice of the public health and the public morals," and in Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 816, 25 L. ed. 1079: "No legislature can bargain away the public health or the public morals;" and, further, in New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252: "The constitutional prohibition upon state laws impairing the obligations of contracts does not restrict the power of the state to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, as the one or the other may be involved in the execution of such contracts."

It follows, therefore, that anything which tends to detrimentally affect public morals is such a thing as the legislature, representing the whole people, will endeavor by drastic enactment to suppress. We have laws against adultery; we have laws against seduction; we have laws against unnatural relations between man and man. The introduction of the incentive to such acts as are by these laws prohibited is found, to a large extent, in obscene literature and illustrations. In other words, what is in the thoughts will be exemplified by the action of the person in whom the thoughts exist. A well

known writer has recently said: "And if you don't want to think in grossness, don't read in it; if you don't want to act in grossness, don't think in it. To exploit it is to exaggregate its proper significance in the affairs of life." Upon this theory the legislatures of various states and the Congress of the United States have passed laws seeking to suppress the trade in and circulation of obscene books, pictures, magazines, and other articles of a similar character and tendency. In the state of New York, § 1141 of the Penal Law is the enactment which covers such cases. Similar action under the Federal laws is based on the provisions of §§ 211 and 212 of the United States Criminal Code. The credit for these provisions, and those of other states along similar lines, is due chiefly to Mr. Anthony Comstock, for forty-three years Secretary of The New York Society for the Suppression of Vice.

The courts have decided that the term "obscene" describes such things in the way of books, magazines, and pictures as would suggest lewd and sensuous thoughts to the minds of the young and inexperienced into whose hands they might come. This immediately suggests the fact that whereas the circulation of a picture or a book under some circumstances might be illegal, under other circumstances the law would not apply. For instance, a legitimate work of art exhibited in an art gallery is not disturbed, whereas a copy of the same picture or sculpture, generally circulated and easily accessible to the young, and which would create in a youthful mind lewd and sensuous thoughts, is a subject for suppression under the laws above referred to. above referred to. A medical book containing suggestive illustrations, while not disturbed when properly in the hands of a physician or medical student, would be a subject for action if generally circulated and made accessible to the young and inexperienced. A book of fiction even, having a high quality of literary merit, and accessible by reason of price or other factor to the mature book collector, who regards the publication solely from the standpoint of literature, may properly be sold to and possessed by such collector, whereas a cheap copy of the same