the really substantial measures which became law-the projects actually executed were comparatively few. But, regarding this epoch in all these aspects, it yet remains one of the most noticeable in the history of English law; and a study of the legal events which mark it is necessary for the full appreciation of the history of the Commonwealth.

CHAPTER IV.

THE GENESIS OF THE HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY.

It is now well recognized that in studying the history of a nation, its legal system and the relations of the body of law to the people are of the first importance. For it is the law by which the daily conduct of a people not wholly barbarous is governed, and we must examine it if we would fully understand the ideas and the feelings of an age. Thus the history of the maritime courts and of the maritime jurisprudence of England reveals pictures of its social and political past, and introduces us to unexpected sources of law and procedure. Moreover, the early history of English maritime law has an interest beyond the boundaries of the British empire, for the beginnings of it are equally the beginnings of the maritime law of the United States. These points stand out prominently when we come to examine the genesis of the High Court of Admiralty, and of its jurisdiction during the growth of the English people. That court has been, since 1873, merged in the Supreme Court of Judicature; it now oddly enough as it seems, forms a part of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division (a), but of

(a) The cause of the incorporation of two totally different Courts in one Division was that neither the Admiralty nor the Probate Courts were Common Law or Chancery Courts. They were Courts which sat at one time at Doctors' Commons, and the practitioners in them were at one

necessity there exists under this guise of nominal consolidation a practical separation which is inevitable, since there can never be a real consolidation of tribunals without a community of interests, and this does not exist by reason of the differences of the subject-matter of the jurisdiction of this Division.

But we are concerned now, not with this comparatively recent transformation of a tribunal which existed in a separate form for many centuries and still exercises important functions and is almost international in its character, but with its beginning and with its early growth.

It is obvious that there cannot be a Court of an Admiral unless such an officer exists, and such an appointment indicates a systematic, though it may be a rough and ready management of the naval affairs of a nation. In the first place, therefore, we should know something definite in regard to the creation of the office of Lord High Admiral, and of the duties with which he was entrusted, since in them are to be found the germs of a later maritime jurisdiction.

Of the origin of the High Court of Admiralty we are now much better informed since the publication by the Selden Society of the two volumes known as Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty (b). The Introduction to them

time also civilians, as distinguished from practitioners in the Common Law and Chancery Courts.

(b) Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty. Edited for the Selden Society by Reginald G. Marsden. 2 vols.

is so lucid and simple that it has a tendency to minimize the amount of valuable and careful research which was bestowed on this work by the editor.

From the Introduction and from the body of this work it is possible to obtain some interesting light on the beginning of the High Court of Admiralty. The following pages will be chiefly confined to one subject, namely, the paramount influence which medieval piracy had on the creation of what at first was a rude and unsystematic jurisdiction. To professional lawyers it matters not at all how a particular jurisdiction or court came into existence; indeed, we are all too ready to forget that the history of a nation can never be properly understood without a clear perception of the connection between political and social movements and the growth of the law. But before we consider in detail the subject of piracy in the early ages of England, we must for a moment refer to the word "admiral."

The term

admiral" was first used in England in the fourteenth century: in 1300 one Gervase Alard is called "Admiral of the Fleet of the Cinque Ports." That may be considered, at present at any rate, as the first English use of the word, though it occurs at an earlier period in connection with the French possessions of the English kings. In a Vascon Roll of Edward I., in 1295, "Berardo de Sestars (or de Sestas) is appointed Admiral of the Baion fleet-Admirallum maritime Baion et capitaneum nautarum et marinariorum nostrorum in ejusdem villa.' The following year De Sestas is again mentioned with the same title, whilst in another Vascon Roll of the same

year, William de Leyburn and John de Butetort are described as "Amiraux de nostre navire D'engleterre."

Mr. Marsden is therefore obviously right when he says that "the word 'admiral' came by way of Gascony to England," but whether it came in the first place from the east or from Genoa, as he suggests, does not seem so clear. It is sufficient for English historical purposes that we find at the beginning of the fourteenth century a maritime leader who bears the title and, as such, is the deputy of the king and is the captain and judge of the fleet.

The question, however, suggests itself, Why should the leader of a naval squadron be the judge of matters which concern private individuals? why should he exercise functions wholly different from those of a naval commander responsible only for the discipline and conduct of his fleet?

We have grown so accustomed to the fact that the High Court of Admiralty was originally the Court of the Lord High Admiral of England, that one feels almost surprised when such a question suggests itself. But a moment's reflection will show that without some sound historical explanation it is not easy to answer it satisfactorily. The admiral of a fleet is not a lawyer he is a naval commander; he is not to be found in one place; on the contrary, his duties would naturally take him to sea. He is not, for example, as was the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports, a high local official within his jurisdiction supreme, who would give judgment upon every matter on which he could lay his hands, criminal or civil, maritime or muni