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(195 N.Y.S.)

Q. R. S. Co. v. Phillips-Jones Corporation, 185 | Stahl & Jaeger v. Satenstein, 185 N. Y. Supp.
N. Y. Supp. 127. Judgment affirmed 135
N. E. 946, 233 N. Y. 626.

Raffaeli v. Pomeroy, 184 N. Y. Supp. 314. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 897, 233 N. Y. 513.

Rapid Transit Subway Const. Co. v. Craig, 191 N. Y. Supp. 383. Order affirmed 135 N. E. 911, 233 N. Y. 544.

Red Cross Line, In re, 191 N. Y. Supp. 949. Order affirmed 135 N. E. 821, 233 N. Y. 373. Reynolds, In re, 191 N. Y. Supp. 245. Appeal dismissed 135 N. E. 937, 233 N. Y. 606. Roberts v. New York Life Ins. Co., 186 N. Y. Supp. 422. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 950, 233 N. Y. 639.

Robertson v. Charles Frohman, Inc., 191 N. Y. Supp. 55. Appeal dismissed 135 N. E. 905, 233 N. Y. 530.

Rubel Bros. v. Dumont Coal & Ice Co., 192 N. Y. Supp. 705. Dismissal of appeal denied 135 N. E. 942, 233 N. Y. 618.

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Seaver v. Lindsay Light Co., 187 N. Y. Supp. 622. Judgment reversed 135 N. E. 329, 233 N. Y. 273.

Shapiro v. Kenmare Auto Co., 188 N. Y. Supp. 949. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 948, 233 N. Y. 632.

Sheenan v. Spring Valley Wood Products Corporation, 185 N. Y. Supp. 641. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 918, 233 N. Y. 561. Sheldon v. Argos Mercantile Corporation, 185 N. Y. Supp. 513. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 928, 233 N. Y. 585. Sheppard v. New York, 187 N. Y. Supp. 953. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 966, 233 N. Y. 676.

Sidman v. Stephens, 189 N. Y. Supp. 954. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 966, 233 N. Y.

675.

Silesten v. Regina Candies, 183 N. Y. Supp. 956. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 919, 233 N. Y. 563.

Slattery v. Herbstone Realty Co., 189 N. Y. Supp. 955. Judgment reversed 135 N. E, 836, 233 N. Y. 420.

Slattery v. Herbstone Realty Co., 189 N. Y. Supp. 955. Judgment reversed 135 N. E. 962, 233 N. Y. 668.

Smathers v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 191 N. Y. Supp. 843. Order affirmed 135 N. E. 942, 233 N. Y. 617.

Smith v. MacArthur Bros. Co., 190 N. Y. Supp. 644. Order affirmed 135 N. E. 908, 233 N. Y. 537.

Smith v. Trustees of Village of Clifton Springs, 182 N. Y. Supp. 951. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 930, 233 N. Y. 591.

Snare & Triest Co. v. City of New York, 181 N. Y. Supp. 304. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 904, 233 N. Y. 528.

Society of Justice, In re, 193 N. Y. Supp. 954. Order affirmed 135 N. E. 972, 233 N. Y. 691.

132. Judgment reversed 135 N. E. 242, 233 N. Y. 196.

Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., 188 N. Y. Supp. 358. Judgment reversed 135 N. E. 834, 233 N. Y. 413.

Standish, In re, 188 N. Y. Supp. 900. Order affirmed 135 N. E. 972, 233 N. Y. 689. Staniewski v. Johnston, 189 N. Y. Supp. 956. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 951, 233 N. Y. 640.

State Treasurer v. West Side Trucking Co., 191 N. Y. Supp. 346. Order affirmed 135 N. E. 244, 233 N. Y. 202.

Thorndike v. Ludlow, 187 N. Y. Supp. 955. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 895, 233 N. Y. 507.

Tiffany v. Oyster Bay, 182 N. Y. Supp. 738. Judgment modified 136 N. E. 224, 234 N. Y. 15.

Tilzer v. Battery Park Trading Co., 185 N. Y. Supp. 397. Appeal dismissed 135 N. E. 920, 233 N. Y. 567.

Tobias v. Lynch, 182 N. Y. Supp. 643. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 898, 233 N. Y. 515. Topliff v. Schimpff, 187 N. Y. Supp. 617. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 927, 233 N. Y. Town of Mamaroneck v. New York Interurban 584. Water Co., 190 N. Y. Supp. 580. Motion to dismiss appeal denied 135 N. E. 933, 233 N. Y. 598.

Town of Mamaroneck v. New York Interurban Water Co., 190 N. Y. Supp. 580. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 962, 233 N. Y. 666. Travis v. American Cities Co., 182 N. Y. Supp. 394. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 896, 233 N. Y. 510.

Treuhaft v. Bender, 184 N. Y. Supp. 805. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 916, 233 N. Y. 556.

Treuhaft v. Bender, 184 N. Y. Supp. 954. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 916, 233 N. Y. 556.

Turnure v. Breitung, 186 N. Y. Supp. 620. Turpin v. St. Regis Paper Co., 192 N. Y. Supp. Order affirmed 135 N. E. 955, 233 N. Y. 649.

85. Order affirmed 135 N. E. 907, 233 N. Y. 536.

U. S. Printing & Lithograph Co. v. Powers, 187 N. Y. Supp. 957. Judgment reversed 135 N. E. 225, 233 N. Y. 143.

U. S. Title Guaranty Co. v. Brown, 187 N. Y. Supp. 663. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 961, 233 N. Y. 664.

U. S. Trust Co. of New York v. Nathan, 187 N. Y. Supp. 649. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 894, 233 N. Y. 505.

Utterback-Gleason Co. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. of Detroit, 184 N. Y. Supp. 862. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 913, 233 N. Y. 549.

Vacca v. Genesee & W. R. Co., 191 N. Y. Supp. 956. Order affirmed 135 N. E. 940, 233 N. Y. 613.

Vadney v. United Traction Co., 183 N. Y Supp. 926. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E 952, 233 N. Y. 643.

Van Dorn v. Crary, 189 N. Y. Supp. 252. [ Wickwire v. Warner, 182 N. Y. Supp. 165. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 958, 233 N. Y. 657.

Wachtel v. A. R. Mosler & Co., 186 N. Y. Supp. 449. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 929, 233 N. Y. 588.

Wagner v. Motor Truck Renting Corporation, 189 N. Y. Supp. 596. Judgment affirmed 136 N. E. 229, 234 N. Y. 31.

Waitt Const. Co. v. Chase, 188 N. Y. Supp. 589. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 948, 233 N. Y. 633.

Wall v. International Ry. Co., 188 N. Y. Supp. 550. Judgment reversed 135 N. E. 512, 233 N. Y. 309.

Walsh v. Coll, 182 N. Y. Supp. 956. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 897, 233 N. Y. 512. Walsh v. James Talcott, Inc., 189 N. Y. Supp. 958. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 965, 233 N. Y. 673.

Wardrop v. Santi Moving & Express Co., 184 N. Y. Supp. 956. Judgment reversed 135 N. E. 272, 233 N. Y. 227.

Weissman v. Davis, 185 N. Y. Supp. 958. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 921, 233 N. Y. 569. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. R. Co., 183 N. Y. Supp. 602. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 934, 233 N. Y. 600.

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Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 923, 233 N. Y. 572.

Wilcox, In re, 191 N. Y. Supp. 959. Appeal dismissed 135 N. E. 909, 233 N. Y. 541. Wilkins' Will, In re, 188 N. Y. Supp. 957. Order affirmed 135 N. E. 910, 233 N. Y. 541. William L. Crow Const. Co. v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 187 N. Y. Supp. 493. Order affirmed 135 N. E. 949, 233 N. Y. 635.

Williamson v. Salmon, 187 N. Y. Supp. 959. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 958, 233 N. Y. 657.

Winter & Co. v. Rudolph Piano Co., 182 N. Y. Supp. 958. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 901, 233 N. Y. 522.

Winthrop v. Bank for Savings, 188 N. Y. Supp. 958. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 895, 233 N. Y. 508.

Woodruff v. Germansky. 184 N. Y. Supp. 958. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 601, 233 N. Y. 365.

Woodworth v. Rice Bros. Co., 184 N. Y. Supp. 958. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 925, 233 N. Y. 577.

Zinke v. Hipkins, 183 N. Y. Supp. 959. Judgment affirmed 135 N. E. 899, 233 N. Y. 516.

THE

NEW YORK SUPPLEMENT

VOLUME 195

(119 Misc. Rep. 205)

SAPERSTEIN v. BERMAN.

(Supreme Court, Special Term, Kings County. August 12, 1922.)

1. Adjoining landowners 10(3)—Eminent domain joining spite fences not unconstitutional.

2(1)—Statute as to en

Real Property Law, § 3 (inserted by Laws 1922, c. 374), declaring that, on erection by a landowner of a fence more than 10 feet high, to exclude the owner of a structure on adjoining land from enjoyment of light or air, the adjoining owner thereby deprived of light or air may maintain action to have the fence adjudged a private nuisance, and if so adjudged its continued maintenance may be enjoined, does not deprive one of property without making compensation, but is a proper and lawful exercise of the police power.

2. Nuisance 31-Removal of spite fence not ordered on preliminary motion. In an action to restrain the erection of a fence, in violation of Laws 1922, c. 374, § 3. a temporary injunction will be awarded to restrain the further erection of the fence; but, in view of the fact that the statute is a recent enactment, and that its validity presents a new question in this state, the determination as to the removal of the part of the fence already erected will be left for the decision of the trial court.

Action by Philip Saperstein against Daniel Berman. Temporary injunction granted.

Emanuel Mehl, of Brooklyn, for plaintiff.

Max L. Kane, of Brooklyn, for defendant.

CROPSEY, J. [1] By chapter 374, Laws of 1922, which became effective March 30, 1922, section 3 was inserted in the Real Property Law (Consol. Laws, c. 50). It reads as follows:

"Fences and Structures, When Private Nuisance. Whenever the owner or lessees of land shall erect or shall have erected thereon any fence or structure in the nature of a fence which shall exceed ten feet in height, to exclude the owner or occupant of a structure on adjoining land from the enjoyment of light or air, the owner or occupant who shall thereby be deprived of light or air shall be entitled to maintain an action in the supreme court to have such fence or structure adjudged a private nuisance. If it shall be so adjudged its continued maintenance may be enjoined. This section shall apply to all such existing fences or structures but shall not apply to any action now pending nor shall it preclude the owner or lessee of land from hereafter improving the same by the erection of any structure thereon in good faith."

The plaintiff's property adjoins that of defendant's wife. Defendant's affidavit, however, speaks of it as his property, and no point is

>For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes 195 N.Y.S.-1

made of the fact that his wife is not a defendant. Evidently the defendant is equally responsible with his wife for the erection of the fence in question. The papers and the photographs show the fence is built close to the dividing line between the properties, and extends from the ground more than 10 feet in the air, and is close to the side of plaintiff's building, in which there are windows. The fence was not completed at the time of the issuance of the order to show cause, which contained a temporary injunction. It is evidently the intention. of defendant to erect the fence above the height of the plaintiff's windows. The fence is made of corrugated tin or iron, and the side of it towards plaintiff's property is painted black. The other side is unpainted. The effect of the fence is to exclude plaintiff from the enjoyment of light and air; and that it was built for that purpose seems plain, notwithstanding the denials of the defendant and his wife. The plaintiff's papers claim that he has an easement to the unobstructed light and air in his side windows by virtue of a paper claimed to have been executed by a former owner of defendant's property. The answering affidavits indicate there can be no merit in this claim. Upon the argument of the motion plaintiff's counsel said he did not base his right to relief upon that ground.

The general rule of the common law is that an owner may build what he pleases upon his own property, no matter what the effect may be upon the property of the adjoining owner, and that it is immaterial what his motive is in so doing. 1 Ruling Case Law, p. 399, title “Adjoining Landowners," § 38. But notwithstanding this general rule a number of jurisdictions have refused to follow it. And spite fences, so-called, have been declared to be private nuisances, even where there was no statute on the subject, when it was found as a fact that they were built solely with the wicked purpose of injuring the adjoining owner and not for the benefit of the person erecting them. Barger v. Barringer, 151 N. C. 433, 66 S. E. 439, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 831, 19 Ann. Cas. 472; Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N. W. 838; Peek v. Roe, 110 Mich. 52, 67 N. W. 1080; Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 South. 283, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 129, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 714; Hibbard v. Halliday, 58 Okl. 244, 158 Pac. 1158, L. R. A. 1916F, 903; Wilson v. Irwin, 144 Ky. 311, 138 S. W. 373, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 722; Bush v. Mockett, 95 Neb. 552, 145 N. W. 1001, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 736. The cases in New York that have been found on this subject are mostly old ones and seem to adhere to the common-law rule. Pickard v. Collins, 23 Barb. 444, 458; Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 261, 28 Am. Dec. 461; Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N. Y. 39, 28 Am. Rep. 93; Levy v. Brothers, 4 Misc. Rep. 48, 23 N. Y. Supp. 85; Adler v. Parr, 34 Misc. Rep. 482, 70 N. Y. Supp. 255.

The question here presented is: What is the effect of the new statute? Undoubtedly it is applicable to the facts presented, and in the circumstances shown it gives the plaintiff the right to maintain an action to have the fence adjudged a private nuisance and to have its continued maintenance enjoined. But defendant's counsel contends that the statute is unconstitutional; that it deprives a landowner of property rights without making compensation there for. It is my opinion, however, that the statute is constitutional, and I think it is a proper and lawful exercise of the police power. Somewhat similar

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(195 N.Y.S.)

statutes have been enacted in a number of the states, and their constitutionality has been uniformly upheld. The reasons for so holding are set forth at length in those opinions, and hence need not be stated here. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N. E. 390, 2 L. R. A. 81, 122 Am. St. Rep. 560; Healey v. Spaulding, 104 Me. 122, 71 Atl. 472; Horan v. Byrnes, 72 N. H. 93, 54 Atl. 945, 62 L. R. A. 602, 101 Am. St. Rep. 670; Scott v. Wilson, 82 Conn. 289, 73 Atl. 781; Karasek v. Peier, 22 Wash. 419, 61 Pac. 33, 50 L. R. A. 345. Some of these cases say that the fence must be practically a division fence; that is, that it must be on or close to the line of the property of the person who seeks to enjoin it. But, if that be necessary, the fence in question here is so located. Such legislation as that in question is wholesome. People should not live merely to annoy their neighbors, and those who do things solely for that purpose should be enjoined.

[2] Inasmuch as this is a new question in this state, I will not, upon this preliminary motion, require the fence to be removed. Whether or not that shall be done will be for the trial court to decide. At the present time the further erection of the fence will be enjoined. Ten dollars costs to plaintiff.

Ordered accordingly.

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(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department. June 9, 1922.)

1. Attorney and client 190(4)-Evidence held to chow plaintiff's consent to discontinuance was in fraud of attorney and assignees.

Evidence that plaintiff had contracted to give his attorney one-fourth of the amount recovered by the judgment, that the attorney had rendered services of value and importance in prosecuting the action, that plaintiff had also assigned other interests in the judgment to his creditors, subject to a sequestration in support of plaintiff's wife's claim for alimony, and that plaintiff thereafter signed a consent to discontinuance of the action, stating to one of his assignees his purpose was to defeat his attorney's right to any compensation, held to show that the consent to discontinuance was in fraud of the rights of the attorney and of the assignees.

2. Dismissal and nonsuit 14, 18-Right to discontinue is not absolute.

Though as a general rule the party commencing an action may discontinue as of right, regardless of his reasons therefor, the right to discontinue is not absolute; but it is necessary to obtain the consent and order of the court permitting a discontinuance, and the court can prevent the consummation of a scheme to defraud by means of such discontinuance. 3. Attorney and client 190 (2)-Court has inherent power to prevent discontinuance in fraud of attorneys.

Courts have inherent powers to refuse discontinuance of a cause, when thereby the rights of attorneys under their contracts with their clients would be defeated, if the attempted discontinuance is intended to defraud the attorneys, in which case the court will permit the litigation to be continued by the attorney.

4. Action 35-Attorney and client 190 (2)-Statutory remedies given attorney are cumulative as to right to prevent discontinuance.

The statutory remedies given an attorney by Judiciary Law, § 475, are not exclusive, but are cumulative of the remedy under the inherent power of the court to prevent a discontinuance in fraud of the attorney's rights; and such discontinuance can be prevented where the client is insolvent and there is no showing he received any compensation for the discontinuance to which the statutory lien could attach.

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