Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good ConductDaniel B. Klein University of Michigan Press, 1997 - 318 páginas "Tricks and treachery are the practice of fools that have not wit enough to be honest," wrote Benjamin Franklin. This volume explores ways in which the honest establish trust and enjoy good fortune, even without policing. The central mechanism at work is reputation. To work, information about the individual's conduct must be observed, interpreted, recorded, stored, and transmitted. Different forms of "seals of approval" develop to communicate the quality of an individual's reputation to others. The studies in this volume reveal how vast information systems like Dun & Bradstreet and TRW generate reputation and beneficial exchange, and how brand names, middlemen, and dealers give their own sort of seal of approval. One chapter describes the origins of Underwriters' Laboratories, an organization that sells its inspection services and mark of approval for product safety. Another argues that J. P. Morgan's investment banking service was in large part applying astute judgment in granting the Morgan seal of approval to firms in need of capital. Other, less formal, reputational mechanisms such as gossip, customary law, and written correspondence are also explored. Contexts range from trust among merchants in Medieval Europe, social control in small communities, and good conduct in a vast anonymous society such as our own. Throughout these broad-ranging studies, the central theme of the volume emerges: in an open, competitive environment, honesty can recruit cleverness to assert itself and to drive out the dishonest. Contributors include Bruce Benson, Harry Chase Brearly, J. Benson De Long, Avner Greif, Benjamin Klein, Keith B. Leffler, Sally Engle Merry, Paul R. Milgrom, J. Wilson Newman, Douglass C. North, Marc Ryser, Adam Smith, Gordon Tullock, and Barry R. Weingast. Daniel B. Klein is Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, Irvine. |
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Página 147
... honest . This mechanism allows an agent credibly to commit himself ex ante to be honest ex post . The merchant can thus trust the agent the agent possesses a reputation as honest agent . The geniza reflects the importance of the second ...
... honest . This mechanism allows an agent credibly to commit himself ex ante to be honest ex post . The merchant can thus trust the agent the agent possesses a reputation as honest agent . The geniza reflects the importance of the second ...
Página 156
... honest agent , a merchant had to signal credibly that he would operate through an agent for many periods.78 In Italy , one may conjecture , this commitment was made by establishing a family firm , whose lifespan was " infinite , " and ...
... honest agent , a merchant had to signal credibly that he would operate through an agent for many periods.78 In Italy , one may conjecture , this commitment was made by establishing a family firm , whose lifespan was " infinite , " and ...
Página 245
... honesty can serve as an adequate bond for honest behavior if members of the trading community can be kept informed about each other's past behavior . Well informed traders could boycott those who have violated community norms of honesty ...
... honesty can serve as an adequate bond for honest behavior if members of the trading community can be kept informed about each other's past behavior . Well informed traders could boycott those who have violated community norms of honesty ...
Contenido
Knowledge Reputation and Trust by Voluntary Means | 1 |
Lecture on the Influence of Commerce on Manners | 17 |
Adam Smith and the Role | 29 |
Derechos de autor | |
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Reputation: Studies in the Voluntary Elicitation of Good Conduct Daniel B. Klein Sin vista previa disponible - 1997 |
Términos y frases comunes
Adam Smith advertising agency relations arbitration assets bank behavior Bills business associates buyer capital century Champagne Fairs cheating clearinghouse commercial law competitive contract cooperation cost credit bureau customers default developed disputes Dun & Bradstreet Economic Foundations enforcement equilibrium extended dealings firm function Fustat Ginko Kyokai give credit Goitein gossip gossip and scandal Greif high quality honest incentive individual industry institutions interaction investment bankers J. P. Morgan Journal of Economic judgment Klein Law Merchant Law Merchant system Maghribi traders Medieval member agent moral Morgan and Company Morgan partnership Naharay National nomic norms parties partners payoff period play players political price premium Prisoner's Dilemma problem profits promisor Pujo Committee reputation mechanism reputation system role Sarakatsani seals of approval social control Society strategy Studies sumer tion Tokyo trade transaction trusters U.S. Steel University Press York
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