embodied in the Treaty. They urged that these facts had been overlooked by the Allies and in the Treaty. It is impossible to imagine what more stringent political conditions could have been imposed on an Imperialist Government.' After standing thus on the defence the German Delegation passed to the offensive. In the Peace document laid before us a moribund conception of the world, imperialistic and capitalistic in tendency, celebrates. . . its last horrible triumph.'

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3. German Views on the Territorial Clauses. Dealing with the territorial proposals they commented in general terms as follows. Their basis is indifferently now . . . an immemorial historical right, now... ethnographic ownership, now the consideration of economic interests... In every case the decision is against Germany.' But the Germans laid themselves open to the very charge of inconsistency, which they condemned. Thus over the Saar Valley they refuse to carry out any reparation as a punishment'. Again, Only with Upper Silesia can Germany fulfil the obligations arising from the war but without it never. On this basis, if on no other, Germany could not acquiesce in the cession of Upper Silesia.' In the case of Alsace-Lorraine also they based their argument on the great importance of the economic connexion with Germany. since 1871'. It thus appears that, when it suited the German convenience, the economic argument blotted out that of the wishes or consent of the population concerned. They were ready to accept a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine, which they had agreed to forgo in the Armistice, provided it was taken by neutrals and after the conclusion of peace. But they would have no plebiscite in Moresnet or Malmedy or in Upper Silesia, and they refused to accept the arrangements with regard to Luxemburg or Danzig. There was little coherence in these views but their argument was better and more consistent, when they pointed out that the new Schleswig plebiscite boundary fixed in the Draft Treaty, was drawn through purely German districts and goes beyond the wishes of Denmark'. Subject to a redrawing of the line according to ethnic boundaries they were prepared to accept the Schleswig plebiscite in principle.

Under the head of the League of Nations they demanded that that body should consist of technical bodies and impartial courts. They demanded also that Germany should immediately

enter the League with equal rights, that commerce, trade, and agriculture should be equal between nations, and that the nationals of one member-State of the League should be on an equality with those of another as regards taxation and imposts. These last demands were very far-reaching and the concession of them would have been much to the German advantage. As for armaments, the Germans demanded a general reduction and limitation within two years, up to which time special arrangements could be made for Germany. Finally they demanded that negotiations should be carried on by word of mouth, and in justification for this, as for everything else, asserted that there are ‘natural rights of nations as well as natural rights of man', and inborn rights of men and peoples'.

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4. German Proposals for the Polish Frontier. It was in dealing with Poland, however, that it became apparent that the German mentality had changed little. The German Government stated that it had friendly relations with Poland'; but it betrayed no friendly feelings. Every possible concession to Poland was refused, every possible territorial claim denied, every possible attempt made to depreciate Polish civilization and capacity. The German Government rejected the proposed rape of Danzig', opposed the cession of Memel and denied the Lithuanian character of its inhabitants. It stated that East Prussia had been part of Germany for 300 years, and that no one wanted to part from her except foreign agitators'. It stressed the economic, cultural and social significance' of German work in West Prussia, and declared that the frontier as drawn there was against ethnic justice, quoting President Wilson's book on 'The State' to prove that the town of Netze was Prussian, though now assigned to Poland. The cession of Upper Silesia to Poland would mean industrial decay' for 'conditions of life, sanitary regulations, and social amelioration' were incomparably better in Upper Silesia than in the adjacent kingdom of Poland, where legislation for the benefit of the working classes has but scarcely begun'. In every other part of their reply the same hatred of Poland emerges. Thus they refused to cede railway stock to Poland under Art. 370-1 'since Germany has taken no railway material from Congress Poland.' Even in the Labour section they seized the opportunity to point to States like the future

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Poland (which) possess no or insufficient qualification for the welfare of workers '.1

As regards the clauses relating to Russia and the Baltic States they put up a strong resistance. They declared they had renounced the Brest-Litovsk Treaties and had not ratified the Treaty of Bucharest. They could not do more, and they refused to recognize new States like Esthonia, Latvia, and the like.

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Turning to German colonies they took occasion to point out that they were acquired justifiably and developed', and that Germany claimed to govern Colonies as one of the great civilized races' (Kultur Volk). The retention by Germany of her Colonies is, however, equally based on the interests of the coloured population of these territories.' She demanded therefore a mandate for the Colonies. As regards Kiaochow they were willing to renounce German claims though they demanded, here as elsewhere, indemnification for public property in general. They also pointed out that Germany by Art. 147 (recognition of British protectorate in Egypt) had to engage to run counter to the principle of self-determination'.

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5. German View of Reparation. In respect to Compensation and Reparation the whole question is argued at length elsewhere in this volume.

The whole question of liability for compensation was made an occasion for demanding the return of the Colonies, in order to make good Germany's obligations under the Treaty. It

1 This reply on the Polish question might have been almost textually reproduced from German pre-war professional utterances on the ancient Slavs, e. g. from the work of Dr. Peisker and Giesebrecht on the ancient Slavs, the former written just before the war. The primitive German was as savage in war as the mounted nomad (the Slav), but far superior in character and capacity for civilization. The German with one leap into civilization, so to speak, from a plunderer becomes a founder of brilliant and well-ordered States, bringing to high perfection the intellectual goods which he has borrowed. On the other hand the lightest breath of civilization absolutely ruins the mounted nomad. It is then no wonder that the Slavs, incapable of resisting the terrible plundering raids and powerless to give themselves political organization, preferred to submit . . . Neither from the Germans nor from the Romans did they permanently wrest a span of ground; in spite of their enormous expansion their part is purely passive. Dr. Peisker goes on thus;

...

Giesebrecht excellently characterizes the Baltic Slavs: "A mixed race, not seldom fluctuating in sharp contradiction in their belief, law, and customs, the Wends were already a fallen nation when they came in contact with the Franks. Thus from them could proceed much that was energetic as far as it could be carried out by individuals, families, or associations, but nothing that pre-supposed national unity.' Dr. Peisker, Cambridge Mediaeval History, Vol. II, pp. 433-4, 453, 457.

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will be remembered that, in the case of the Saar Valley, Germany refused to carry out any reparation as a punishment', while alleging that she could not cede Upper Silesia if she was to pay her debts. The German Government offered, however, to pay 20 milliards of gold on or before the 1st of May, 1926, and a total of not more than 100 milliards of gold.1 They declined the ton for ton principle' as regards shipping, declared they must have a sufficient commercial fleet, and offered to build ships as required for compensation. Their final standpoint was expressed as follows: The German people cannot support any conditions which amount to its disorganization. It does not live only in order to perform acts of reparation, but rather to effect its reconstruction while discharging the burdens laid upon it.'

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6. General Conclusions. Of the other questions raised by Germany only one demands notice here-the German claim to represent the new democracy.

The Labour section of the Treaty was used as a vehicle of propaganda for the new German Government to appeal to the workers of the world in the character of the most recent and most enlightened of governments. They ended on a note of warning. The Allies should remember that Bolshevism sprang from despair and that despair would result from forcing this treaty on Germany. It would be better for the world to enjoy a new common life based on liberty and labour'. Justice and the free consent of all parties to the Treaty will furnish the strongest-nay in course of time the only guarantees of the treaty that is to be concluded.'

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7. Interval between German Observations and Allied Reply, 29th May to 16th June. The Allied and Associated Powers took over a fortnight to reply to the Germans. During this period the wildest possible rumours were afloat, and one interesting development took place, the proclamation of a Rhineland Republic at Coblenz (4th June). This new internal revolt against Germany did not show great vitality or meet with the support of the Four', and consequently it speedily collapsed. Their attitude to this abortive attempt showed that the Powers did not wish to make the position of the German

1 This offer was hedged round with some very perplexing and apparently prohibitive conditions, e. g. retention of her colonies and large merchant ships, her enjoyment of the same freedom of action as other people', &c.

Government too difficult. Meanwhile the Austrian Treaty was presented to the Austrian Delegation, and it is difficult to suppose that its terms could have encouraged the Germans in their demand for concessions. Finally on the 13th, after the Four had discussed and decided on the main points, the drafting of a reply was entrusted to a Committee of Five. These included for France M. Tardieu, perhaps the most widely learned of all the Plenipotentiaries, Mr. Philip Kerr representing the British Empire, Mr. Hudson the United States, Count Vannutelli Rey Italy, and M. Saburi Japan. Their reply was approved, signed by M. Clemenceau, and dispatched on the 16th.

8. The Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers, 16th June. The reply falls into two parts-a covering letter, summarizing the general terms, and a formal answer in detail to the German observations.

The latter may first claim our attention. The first section of this, and in principle the most important, gave the Allied view of the Basis of the Peace Negotiations'. Mr. Wilson had already been reported by the Matin as having said that he did not think that the Treaty violated the Fourteen Points. The Allied and Associated Powers as a whole, declared that they and the other principles of President Wilson, as laid down in his speeches from the 8th January to 27th September 1918, and as modified in the Allied memorandum included in the President's note of 5th November 1918, are the principles which have guided them in the deliberations which had led to the formulation of the Conditions of Peace'. They seized the opportunity to point out that the many quotations made by the Germans from the speeches of Entente statesmen other than Mr. Wilson were quite irrelevant to the issue, but that in point of fact in their note of the 10th January 1917, to the President of the United States, the Allies had laid down very similar terms for the conclusion of peace. They also quoted as apparently still applicable the Allied note of 10th January 1917, in the passage which refers to the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilization".1

1 This quotation is important, and Mr. Lloyd George apparently considered that this foreshadowed an American mandate at Constantinople, v. speech in Parliament of 27th February 1920, and contrast this with his speech of 5th January 1918, Nor are we fighting . . . to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race.' This speech appears to contradict the note of 10th January 1917.