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powered to compel the repairs was the spiritual court, and that by spiritual censures." Where did Mr. Perceval get the word "only" from? His authority merely states, "The spiritual court may compel parishioners to repair their parish church," &c. Do I deny this? On the contrary, I maintain it to be the case; nay, that as long as that court retains the power, it is the only proper court for enforcing the obligation. Whence, then, Mr. Perceval's conclusion,-" this last [case], on which he seems most to rely, is directly against him”? Why I seem "most to rely upon it," when I have made but one passing reference to it in reply to an observation of the attorney-general, (and a pointed reply it is,) and why it is "directly against me," when it only affirms what I have all along maintained, I cannot conceive.

"Now let us see (it is added) whether Chief Justice North is alone in his opinion that the proper court for the enforcement of the obligation lying upon the parishioners to make a rate,' is the spiritual court; and that therefore, in the strict sense of the terms,' it is not 'a common-law obligation.'"

Mr. Perceval will pardon me for saying, that there is no connexion between his premises and his conclusion. I hold as much as he does, that the proper court is the spiritual court, but deny altogether his conclusion that it is not "a common-law obligation." The question is, what is to be done if the ecclesiastical court has become powerless in the matter, and having proved, as I venture to think, upon very good authority, that it is a common-law obligation, with the enforcement of which the spiritual court has been entrusted, it is affirmed that in such a case the court of Queen's Bench can and will issue a mandamus to enforce the obligation.

So that the authorities with which he endeavours to support his premises are useless.

But what are they? Cases cited from Dr. Nicholl's tract, and even a passage from Dr. Nicholl himself, who expressly wrote the tract to oppose such views as those of Mr. Perceval, and has in terms stated that it is a common-law liability, and therefore that if the spiritual court is powerless in the matter, the Court of Queen's Bench is bound to issue a mandamus to enforce it. "The legal liability being established......if no specific legal remedy exists, the Court of King's Bench will grant a mandamus."-(p. 20.) "Whenever a liability by custom, either general or special, exists, the conusance thereof belongs originally to the temporal courts; as Lord Holt says, 'It (the payment of a stipend to a clerk) is founded on a custom, and by consequence triable at law."—(p. 17.) And yet Mr. Perceval quotes this very tract to prove that liability to church-rate is not "one that can be enforced by the common-law courts."

When Dr. Nicholl says, "it is not of temporal jurisdiction," he is speaking on the supposition that the ecclesiastical courts retain power to enforce the obligation, "of which (as he says) the conusans is by this act [i. e., circumspecte agatis,] allowed to the spiritual court." (p. 18.) And he refers to the very cases quoted from him by Mr. Perceval, as proving" that the refusal of the Court of King's Bench to grant a mandamus for making a church-rate has always proceeded

on the ground that it is a matter of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and not on any doubt as to the legal obligation of the parishioners to repair." -(pp. 25, 26.) And, "If the interdict had become impossible, and no other specific legal remedy did exist, the King's Bench would grant a mandamus. The legal liability being established, the very fact of a refusal to grant a mandamus would shew that a remedy existed elsewhere."-(p. 20.)

It is quite true that church-rate is, as stated in the authorities cited by Mr. Perceval, a "subject purely of ecclesiastical jurisdiction," and therefore, that as long as that ecclesiastical jurisdiction is able to enforce the obligation, the courts of common law cannot properly interfere in the matter. But why is it so? Because, as Lord Coke tells us, "the conusans is allowed to the ecclesiastical courts" by the act of "Circumspecte agatis;" but, as the same great authority adds, parishioners are bound to repair the church " per consuetudinem notoriam et approbatam." "So that (as Dr. Nicholl says) the legal obligation to repair was pre-existing, per consuetudinem notoriam et approbatam-i.e., by the common law-the compelling it was by this statute allowed to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction" (p. 9); the temporal courts having endeavoured to prevent the spiritual from taking cognizance of such causes. (See Hist. of Church Rates, pp. 44, 45.) Mr. Perceval's distinction, therefore, between the laws of the church and the laws of the state as applied to this case is peculiarly unfortunate, for it is the law of the state, and not the canon law, by which the ecclesiastical courts are enabled to enforce the obligation. The common canon law does not require parishioners to repair their churches, and the obligation to do so here arose out of the custom, as our oldest canonists testify. A custom from time immemorial is the law of the state, the common law of the land. Church repair by parishioners became so, and therefore became the common law of the land; and it was because a custom so prevailing was the law of the state, that the spiritual courts were able to enforce the obligation of church repair upon laymen, and when the temporal courts endeavoured to take the cognizance of the matter out of the hands of the ecclesiastical courts, the act of "Circumspecte agatis" secured it to them. But had it not been the law of the state that such a custom should be binding, the ecclesiastical court could not have enforced it.

Mr. Perceval must, I suppose, be aware, that if anything is sought in the ecclesiastical court on the ground of custom (as church-rate is), if the custom is denied, a prohibition would at once be granted, and the question of custom would be settled in a court of common law, and if the decision was favourable-i. e., if the thing sought was due by common law-a consultation would be awarded; i. e., the cognizance of the particular case would be allowed to the ecclesiastical court. Now, I ask Mr. Perceval, what would be the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench upon this question if they followed precedents;-"Are parishioners bound by common law to repair their churches?" I will add one more to the authorities previously quoted on this point. "By common law (says Lord Holt) the parishioners of every parish are bound to repair the church."--(Dr. Nicholl, p. 9.)

But the enforcement of the obligation has been allowed to the ecclesiastical court. Hence, as long as that court retains power to enforce the obligation, it is a "subject purely of ecclesiastical jurisdiction." But if that court is powerless, and the interference of the courts of common law is necessary to enforce the obligation, the Court of Queen's Bench, that has repeatedly declared that the parishioners are by common law bound to repair their church, is bound to issue a mandamus to compel it. The existence of an ecclesiastical court allowed to have jurisdiction in this, among other things, does not make it less the law of the state; and if that ecclesiastical court has become powerless, the enforcement of the obligation necessarily falls upon the common-law courts.

The conclusions, then, drawn by Mr. Perceval from these authorities, I think I may without fear leave to the reader to dispose of.

Did it never strike Mr. Perceval that Dr. Nicholl's tract was rather a dangerous place for him to supply his quiver from?

I will only add on this head the following extract from Mr. Deacon's reply to the attorney-general :—

"There is not a single authority he can cite that will bear him out in this position, that where the churchwardens have duly summoned a vestry to make a rate, and the parishioners have refused, the Court of King's Bench would not grant a mandamus, upon being satisfied on oath that a rate was necessary, and that there was no power of the ecclesiastical court to compel the making of it. The extra-judicial opinions which have been occasionally thrown out by the courts of common law, as to their power of enforcing the making of the rate, and the payment of the rate, are founded entirely on this principle, that there is a remedy elsewhere-viz., in the ecclesiastical court. The obligation of the parishioners to make the rate has never for a moment been disputed; and if the court had not been satisfied that the proper remedy was in the spiritual court, they would never have expressed the slightest doubt upon the propriety of granting a mandamus."—(pp. 13, 14.)

There is only one point, then, remaining to be noticed-namely, whether the act of " Circumspecte agatis" classes church repair among the things" mere spiritual." Mr. Perceval is inclined still to contend that it does, though he grants that Dr. Nicholl has pronounced that it does not. Will Lord Coke's authority have more weight with him? He says, on the words "mere spiritualia," "Sic dicta, quia non habent mixturam temporalium (Lyndw.), they are here called meere spirituall, for that they have no mixture of the temporalties and because they are corrections pro salute animæ." And on the words, "Pro mortali peccato-viz., fornicatione, adulterio"-he says, "There be two examples put in particular of meere spiritualty for correction of these offences." Need we then search further to ascertain the meaning of this statute? To me the construction of the statute seemed conclusive, and therefore I did not do more than quote at large the part referring to this subject; but Lord Coke's authority is surely decisive.

Mr. Perceval adds, Mr. Goode " says also, if it were a thing purely and exclusively spiritual, no doubt the common-law courts would not interfere to enforce it.' We have seen already the common-law courts, under Lord Kenyon and Chief Justice Abbott, peremptorily refuse to interfere to enforce the making a rate on the distinct ground

alleged, that it is a 'subject purely of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.'" What does Mr. Perceval see no difference between a thing being "purely and exclusively spiritual," and its being a " subject purely of ecclesiastical jurisdiction"? Surely he must be aware that there are many things which are the "subjects purely of ecclesiastical jurisdiction" that are not "purely and exclusively spiritual." These decisions, then, do not in the least shake the truth of my assertion.

I have now, I believe, replied to all the points in Mr. Perceval's letter; and as I think your readers must be getting rather weary of the subject by this time, I will only add that

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, WILLIAM Goode. London, Sept. 6, 1838.

ON 1 PETER, 111. 19.

SIR,-The following question recently suggested itself to my mind in reading a celebrated and difficult passage, 1 Peter, iii. 19, &c., which, I think, you may perhaps have the goodness to resolve for me. The words Πορευθεις εκήρυξεν απειθήσασι ποτε, are rendered in our version, "went and preached (to the spirits in prison), which sometime were disobedient," &c.; a rendering which is required by the interpretation of this passage claimed by Bishop Horsley. What I wish to ask is, whether you consider this as an admissible, or at least as the most probable and legitimate, construction of the clause. The words are rendered in this version exactly as they would have been had the word anεonoari been preceded by the article. Is it the case that its omission has no influence on the meaning of the passage? My own impression is, that it has; that it goes to connect the disobedience of those to whom it is recorded that Christ went and preached, with the time at, or the circumstances under, which he preached to them. The spirits in prison disobedient in the days of Noah seems to me to be inclusively the object of the verb Eкapužev. I do not understand ATεLongaσL TOTE OTE &c. in the light of a mere specification of the class of spirits in prison to whom Jesus preached, but as assigning the circumstances under which he preached to them. It appears to me that this is the characteristic difference between the omission and insertion of the article in such cases. When the article is inserted, the adjective or participle simply serves to specify the object of the verb, and makes (itself) no part of it. The case is different when the article is omitted. In this case the verb has for its object, not merely the thing or person which the noun expresses, but this thing or person in those circumstances which the participle specifies. The action of the verb does not stop, so to speak, at the noun governed by it, but passes on till it takes in an idea compounded of this noun, and an action or passion indicated by the participle.

ποτε

This is a distinction which has continually presented itself to my mind, and in which I desire to be informed whether I am borne out. Supposing it correct, it would determine the interpretation of the passage against Bishop Horsley.

QUÆRENS.

ON THE TRUE INTERPRETATION OF LUKE xxI. 32.

SIR,*-I beg to offer some remarks on the papers of your correspondents, the "Rev. W. B. Winning," "H.," and "G. F.," in which these gentlemen have discussed the meaning of Luke, xxi. 32, with its parallel texts in Matt. xxiv. and Mark, xiii.

"H."

Mr. Winning maintains, I think justly, that yɛvea is here used in its meaning of "a generation of contemporary men;" and that therefore the sense of the passage is, that some of those who were contemporary with our blessed Lord should not depart this life until all the things which he had just before predicted should have come to pass controverts this interpretation on the several grounds of verbal criticism, of the just rules of scriptural interpretation, of fact, and of doctrine. And " G. F." hopes that he has discovered a sense for yɛvnra, which causes "all darkness in the passage to vanish," and affords the means of "a clear and easy interpretation of the prophecy."

I shall take the critical objections of "H.," and the elucidation of G. F.," first; and then consider the remaining objections of the former.

1. "Professor J. F. Schleusner," "H." says, "declares that γενεα does signify offspring, posterity, all who derive their origin from one common stock, a family, nation, tribe, or kin;" which is the wellknown Homeric sense of the word

Ταυτης τοι γενεης τε και αιματος ευχομαι είναι :

And he cites the following satisfactory Hellenistic authoritiesJosephus A. i. 10. 3. & A. i. 5; Gen. xxxi. 3; Levit. xx. 18, and xxiv. 41; Jer. viii. 3; together with a few others, which are not to the purpose. It may be added, that the word sometimes is used for a set, class, or denomination of people, without any literal consanguinity or community of procreation; in which respect only Psalm lxxii. (lxxiii.) 15, seems to differ from the above-mentioned passages.†

I fully acquiesce in the sentiments quoted by Mr. Winning from the late Bishop Jebb, on the merits of Schleusner, and on the caution with which his Lexicon ought to be used; but a reference to Schleusner's own pages would have convinced Mr. Winning that his censure is undeserved in the present case. Schleusner distributes the different significations of yevea into five classes, the fourth of which is "Homines una ætate viventes, homines alicujus ætatis seu sæculi." And under this class is placed the identical text of Luke, xxi. 32, with its parallel, Mark, xiii. 30.

When the following truly valuable letter was sent to the Magazine, the press of parliamentary matter was such that it could not be used. The Editor regrets extremely that such a paper should subsequently have been so long overlooked.—ED. ↑ British Magazine, No. XII. p. 54. I may here notice the reference of "H." to Psalm lxxiii. 15. "If I say, I will speak thus; behold, I should offend against the generation of thy children." That there is not any physical consanguinity or unity of procreation intimated here is true; but moral or spiritual procreation, or relationship, is not less real than a physical one.

Brit. Mag. No. XIII. p. 172.

VOL. XIV,- Oct. 1838.

3 H

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