an immutable principle, elements essential to the right itself might be invaded, frittered away or entirely exscinded under the name or pretense of regulation, and thus would the natural order of things be subverted by making the principal subordinate to the accessory. 99 1

Thus in a recent case in Ohio it was held that a law which required registration as a prerequisite to the right to vote, but allowed voters only seven days within the year in which to register and correct the registration, and which made no provision for registration thereafter, nor for any excuse for not registering in time, nor any means whereby absentees could be subsequently registered, is unreasonable and invalid."

So in a late case in Massachusetts a statute providing that no person thereafter naturalized in any court shall be entitled to be

1

Page v. Allen, 58 Penn. St. 338, 98 Am. Dec. 272.

'Daggett v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548, 54 Am. Rep. 832, "We have been unable to find any case," say the court, "where the registration act has been upheld as constitutional which contained provisions similar to our statutes. The necessary absence of a voter, on the seven days provided in the statute for registration, either by sickness, business, imprisonment or other lawful reason, absolutely for. feits for the time being his constitutional right of suffrage. He can not anticipate expected absence, and register at an earlier period. He can not prove his right by his affidavit, or the affidavit of others, and excuse his personal presence at the place of regis tration. He can not on the day of election, or within five days prior thereto, by any proof of constitutional qualification, supply the want of former registration.

A foreigner who has taken out his first papers, and made his necessary declaration to become a citizen, and whose rights to full citizenship and the elective franchise will ripen dur

We believe it an easy task so to frame a registry law that, while protecting the election from fraudulent votes, and securing the integrity of the ballot, it will in no practical way impede or injuriously restrain the constitutional right of the voter. But in the language of WELCH, J. in Monroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St. 666, the law must be reasonable, uniform, impartial and calculated to facilitate and secure, rather than to subvert or impede, the exercise of the right to vote. Believing the act in question unnecessarily, unreasonably and injuriously to impair and impede the right of suffrage to the voter who is necessarily absent at the time fixed by the act for registration, we are unanimously of opinion that we are compelled to declare it to be subversive of constitutional rights, and therefore void."

registered as a voter within thirty days of such naturalization, was held unreasonable and void.1

On the other hand, in a very recent case in Illinois, a statute which provided for registration and directed that registration should close three weeks before election was sustained. "If cases can be supposed," said the court, "where the 'three weeks' requirement will deprive qualified electors of the privilege of depositing their votes, cases can also be supposed where one day's requirement will work the same result. This mode of reasoning, carried out to its logical sequence, will make any kind of a registry law unconstitutional. For it would be a physical impossibility for the judges of election to receive the votes and make up the registry at the same time and on the same day. If the Legislature has the power to direct the registry to be completed before election day, and if, in its wisdom and under a sense of its responsibility to the people, it has said that three weeks before election is a reasonable date for the completion of the registry, shall this court substitute its judgment for that of the law-making power and say that shorter time would have been more reasonable?"

§ 152. Same Subject-Increasing Period of Residence or other Qualifications. In accordance with principles previously considered it is settled that a registry law which, to entitle a person to registration, requires a previous residence at a place or for a time greater, different or other than that fixed by the constitution of

Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497, 59 Am. Rep. 105. "It undertakes," says the court, "to prevent a single class of citizens, namely, those who are naturalized, possessing all the qualifications established by the constitution of the commonwealth, from exercising the right with which that constitution invests them, for a period of thirty days, by forbidding the registrars of voters to register them during that period. All persons must stand equal before the law, and the statute, assuming them to be citizens, imposes this prohibition upon them

as citizens of a specified class. A statute regulating the exercise of the right of suffrage, or the ascertainment of the qualifications of voters, must not only be reasonable in its character, but uniform and impartial in its application. If it were possible to impose a period of probation upon all qualified citizens before they were entitled to exercise the privilege, it certainly is not possible under the constitution to select a single class and impose it on this class alone."

2 People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 56 Am. Rep. 793.

the State, or otherwise increases or changes the constitutional requirements, is unconstitutional and void.1

Thus where, by the constitution, a person, otherwise qualified, who had resided in the county for thirty days was entitled to vote, a registration law which required a residence of ninety days as a prerequisite to registration, was held invalid;' and so where the constitution requires but ten days' residence, and the registry law demands twenty days; and so where the constitution permits all citizens, otherwise qualified, to vote, and the registry law excludes those who have become such by naturalization within thirty days prior to the election.'

§ 153. Requirements as to Time, Place and Manner must be observed. The requirements of the statute as to the time, place and manner of effecting the registration must be substantially complied with. Slight variations by which no one was misled or prejudiced would be disregarded, but in matters of substance the method prescribed must be observed."

Thus, says Mr. MCCRARY, the removal of the registration "to another place near by, of which all the voters have due notice, and upon which they act, is not fatal. But the removal to a place some distance away, of which sufficient notice is not given, and by means of which a portion of the electors are deprived of their rights, will render the registration void." •

§ 154. Effect of Failure to register. The registration law, being found within the principles already considered, to be a valid enactment, it follows that, unless excused by some fact which the law itself deems sufficient, the voter must register if he would exercise his privilege. The fact that he is qualified must be evidenced by the proper registration, and where it is not so evidenced the failure must, where the opportunity for registra

People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198, 21 Am. Rep. 465; Page v. Allen, 58 Penn. St. 338, 98 Am. Dec. 272, State v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308; Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497, 59 Am. Rep. 105.

People v. Canaday, 72 N. C. 198, 21 Am. Rep. 465.

Page v. Allen, 58 Penn. St. 338, 98 Am. Dec, 272.

◄ Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass. 497, 59 Am. Rep. 105.

5 State v. Commissioners, 20 Fla. 859; Newsom v. Earnhart, 86 N. C. 391.

McCrary on Elections, § 104; Newsom v. Earnheart, 86 N. C. 391

tion is afforded, be attributed to the voter's own fault or neglect. As is said by a learned judge, "In such a case, if a voter be disfranchised, he is by his own omission a voluntary party to his disfranchisement.” 1

§ 155. Effect where no Opportunity for Registration is provided. Where the statute requiring registration is imperative and declares that those who are not registered shall not be entitled to vote, the failure to register disqualifies the voter and renders his vote, if cast, of no account, notwithstanding the fact that his failure to register was occasioned by the neglect or refusal of the proper officers to provide the means for registration at the time and place prescribed. All votes, therefore, cast

State v. Baker, 38 Wis. 71, 23 Am. Dec. 948, note; State v. Hilmantel, 21 Wis. 566; People v. Wilson, 62 N. Y. 186.

"It appears from the finding in this case," said GRAVES J., that there has never been any valid or complete registration of voters, or any legal board of registration in the township of Franklin, in the county of Houghton, since the organization of the township in 1864, and that at the general election on the 6th of November, 1866, in the several townships of said county, whereat the relator and respondent were respectively voted for, for the office of sheriff, a large number of electors, in said township of Franklin, without having been registered, for the reason that there was no acting board of registration, did nevertheless actually vote for the relator, and that the votes thus given, if allowed to him, would secure to him a majority, and, if disallowed, would leave him in a minority. The question, and the only question presented, therefore, for our consideration is whether the votes thus given for the relator were legally cast.

It is admitted that the act for the

registration of voters is valid; but it is argued that no one, otherwise qualified, can be deprived of his vote for being unregistered, when the officers designated to administer the act fail, for any cause, to provide a registry.

The essence of the argument is, that the right to vote results from the constitution, and that every provision of this act to preserve the purity of elections, which requires electors to be registered, and prohibits all voting without it, is always to be considered as subject to the tacit exception that the means for registration, in accordance with the act, are certainly provided.

It is not to be disguised that this reasoning has considerable strength, but it has failed, however, to satisfy

us.

The statute in question is grounded upon the same article of the constitution which gives the right to vote, and its object, as expressly declared in the title is 'further to preserve the purity of elections, and guard against the abuses of the elective franchise, by a registration of electors.'

In accordance with this declared object, the act proceeds to provide

by persons unregistered, though their default was owing to the failure by the proper officers to furnish an opportunity for regis tration, are to be thrown out in determining the result.'

The qualified voter may have a remedy by action, in a proper case, against the officers for not permitting him to register, or he may enforce performance of their duty by mandamus, but where the law is imperative, he can not vote if he is not registered.'

But not only are the votes of unregistered voters to be thrown out, but it has also been held that the failure to furnish the necessary opportunity for registration would vitiate the entire election, certainly where the number of voters thus practically disfranchised was so great as to materially affect the result. If