Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

This distinction has been adopted in other cases,' and it is certainly reasonable and just that where the people-in whom, as has been seen, rest the right and power of determining the qualifications have deliberately chosen a term of narrower signification in conferring the right, it should not, for the purpose of defeating the right, be construed as synonymous with a term which demands more extended qualifications.

159. 2. Residence.-One of the most common requirements is that the person offering to vote shall, for a given period, have been a resident of the district, as the State, county or township, within and for which the election is held.

The question of what constitutes residence is one of no little difficulty, but, in general terms, it may be said that a person's residence is the place of his domicile. Or, as was said in a leading case, it is "that place where the elector makes his permanent or true home, his principal place of business, and his family residence, if he have one; where he intends to remain indefinitely, and without a present intention to depart, when he leaves it he intends to return to it, and after his return he deems himself at home."

Every person is deemed to have a domicile somewhere, and when it has been once acquired in a certain place it will be deemed to continue there until a new one has been acquired. Tempor

Smith. Moody, 26 Ind. 299; Stewart . Foster, 2 Binn. (Penn.) 110; McCarthy . Froelke, 63 Ind. 507.

In Harvard College v. Gore, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 370,-a case involving the question of jurisdiction in the probate of a will-PARKER, C. J. says "The term inhabitant, as used in our laws and in this statute, means something more than a person having a domicile. It imports citizenship and municipal relations, whereas, a man may have a domicile in a country to which he is an alien, and where he he has no political relations."

'Fry's Election Case, 71 Penn. 302, 10 Am. Rep. 698. See also, State v. Aldrich, 14 R. I. 171; Sturgeon v.

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors]

* Harbaugh ◊. Cicott, 33 Mich. 241; Fry's Election Case, 71 Penn. 302, 10 Am. Rep. 698; Preston v. Culbertson, 58 Cal. 198; Thompson v. Ewing, 1 Brewst. 103.

It does not, however, follow, "because a man must have a domicile somewhere, and that a domicile once gained remains until a new one is acquired, that a man must be entitled to vote somewhere, or that the the right to vote at a particular poll, being once established, is pre

ary absences, therefore, although frequent or long continued, will not, while the person has a continuous intention to return, deprive him of his domicile and right to vote,' even though he may have unlawfully voted while absent.

Students at college who have taken up their permanent residence at the college town may, of course, vote there like other citizens. So students who have been emancipated from their fathers' families and who have no residence elsewhere may, while residing at the college during the period of instruction, if otherwise qualified, vote there; but if the student has not been emancipated, if he still claims his father's home as his own and expects to return there when his temporary absence at college shall terminate, he will not acquire a residence at the college and cannot vote there."

sumed to continue until the right to vote elsewhere is shown. * # • Abandonment of a residence is instantaneous, and if it be, by a voter, of a residence in one voting district, at a date too near the election for the requisite intervening time of residence to be a voter in another voting district to which he has removed, the voter will be entitled to vote in neither voting district." Kreitz 0. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 8 Am. St. Rep. 349.

Den

Thus a resident and voter in Florida will not while living temporarily in Washington as a public officer, lose his residence in Florida. nis v. State, 17 Fla. 389. To like effect, Wheat v. Smith, 50 Ark. 266, 7 8. W. Rep. 161.

O'Hair v. Wilson, 124 Ill. 351, 13 West. Rep. 882.

Pedigo o. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148. Sanders v. Getchell, 76 Me. 158, 49 Am. Rep. 606; Putnam v. Johnson, 10 Mass. 488; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350; Wilbraham ♥. Ludlow, 99 Mass. 587.

Fry's Election Case, 71 Penn. 302, 10 Am. Rep. 698; Vanderpoel .

O'Hanlon, 53 Iowa, 246, 36 Am. Rep. 216.

In Opinion of Judges, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 589, the court say: "If the student has a father living; if he still remains a member of his father's family; if he returns to pass his vacations; if he is maintained and supported by his father-these are strong circumstances repelling the presumption of a change of domicile. So if he have no father living; if he have a dwelling house of his own, or real estate of which he retains the occupation; if he have a mother or other connections, with whom he has been before accustomed to reside, and to whose family he returns in vacations; if he describes himself of such place, and otherwise manifests his intent to continue his domicile there-these are all circumstances to prove that his domicile has not been changed.

But if having a father or mother, they should remove to the town where the college is situated, and he should still remain a member of the family of the parent; or if having no parent, or being separated from his father's family, not being maintained or sup

Contingencies of this nature have in some instances been anticipated by the constitution of the State. Thus it is provided in several States' that no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence while employed in the service of the United States, or while a student in any seminary of learning, or while kept in an almshouse or asylum at the public expense, or while confined in any public prison.

Notwithstanding such a provision as this, however, a person who attends a seminary of learning may gain the right to vote there if he intends to make that place his permanent residence independent of his sojourn there as a student.' So in the absence of a statute, a person does not forfeit his residence in a precinct in which he was a voter merely by becoming an inmate of a county poorhouse as a county charge, nor does he acquire a residence at the poorhouse."

In Ohio it was held that resident inmates of "The National Asylum for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers," established by Congress upon land acquired in that State by the United States, were not residents of the State and hence not entitled to vote as such, and that this was so though the inmate had been a resident of Ohio before becoming a resident inmate of the asylum."

§ 160. 3. Age. In all of the States the right to vote is limited to those who have attained the age of twenty-one years."

Inasmuch as the law does not regard fractions of a day, an infant is deemed of age during the whole of the last day of his twenty-first year."

ported by him; or if he has a family of his own, and removes with them to such town; or by purchase or lease takes up his permanent abode there without intending to return to his former domicile; if he depend upon his own property, income or industry for support, these are circumstances, more or less conclusive, to show a change of domicile, and the acquisition of a domicile in the town where the college is situated."

As in New York, Illinois, Indiana, California, Michigan, Rhode Island, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, Oregon and Wisconsin.

[merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small]

re a

§ 161. 4. Males only may vote.-Except where their disability has been removed, the right of suffrage can not be exercised by women. Although women are citizens in the broad sense of that term, yet the right of suffrage is not co-extensive with citizenship.'

Neither was the right conferred by the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, for although it is thereby declared that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside, and that no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, yet inasmuch as the constitution does not define nor add to the privi leges and immunities of citizens nor declare the right of voting to be one of them, and inasmuch as women did not possess the right before the amendment, it is plain that it is not conferred by the amendment."

So, inasmuch as the right to determine the qualification of voters rests, as has been seen, with the people of the States, an express provision in a State constitution limiting the right to vote to male citizens, is not in conflict with the constitution of the United States,"

Constitutional amendments in several States confer the right, and as to non-constitutional offices the right may be conferred by statute.1

8162. 5. Payment of a Tax.-In several of the States the right to vote is limited to those who have paid a tax, varying in kind and amount with the several States.

Where the kind is not specified it may be a tax either upon

Fitzhugh. Dennington, 2 Ld. Raym.
1094; Anonymous, 1 Ld. Raym. 480;
Herbert v. Turball, 1 Keb. 589; Wells
t. Wells, Ind. 447; Hamlin v. Stev-
enson, 4 Dana (Ky.) 597; State v.
Clarke, 3 Harr. (Del.) 557.

'Minor . Happersett, 21 Wall.
(U. S.) 162; Van Valkenburgh v.
Brown, 43 Cal. 43, 13 Am. Rep. 136;
Spencer v. Board of Registration, 1
McAr. (D. C.) 169, 29 Am. Rep. 582;
Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. 599.

[blocks in formation]
[ocr errors]

real or personal property; but a tax can not be imposed at an irregular or unusual time merely for the purpose of creating the right to vote. That the tax was illegally assessed, however, has been held not to deprive the party paying it of his right to vote; nor does the fact that the tax was not paid by the voter in person if paid by his agent with authority either previously conferred or subsequently duly ratified.'

Tax requirements, however, must be uniform and not discriminate between voters by requiring one class to be tax-payers and not requiring it of others."

§ 163. 6. Ownership of Land.-So that one is a tax payer or free-holder is, in many cases, made a qualification.

6

§ 164. 7. Mental Capacity. It is expressly provided in several of the States that idiots and lunatics may not exercise the right of suffrage, but even in the absence of such a provision it is believed that they are excluded."

Where, however, the person is neither an idiot or lunatic, his vote is not to be rejected simply because he is a man whose mind is greatly enfeebled by age."

As to the degree of proof required upon an allegation of mental unsoundness, the law is not settled, but the opinion has been expressed that the test applied to the question of the competency of a person to make a will would be applicable."

Catlin . Smith, 2 Serg. & R. (Penn.) 267.

2 Opinion of Judges, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 575.

3 Humphrey. Kingman, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 162.

Humphrey v. Kingman, 5 Metc. (Mass.) 162; Re District Attorney, 11 Phila. 645; Gillin v. Armstrong, 12 Phila. 626.

Lyman v. Martin, 2 Utah, 136. Upon the general subject see also: Re Providence Voters, 13 R. I. 737; Re Voting Laws, 12 R. I. 586.

A city law requiring voters to pay a poll tax is not in violation of the constitution as imposing an additional qualification. McMahon . Mayor, 66 Ga. 217, 42 Am. Rep. 65.

As in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin.

7 Sinks . Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306, 2 Am. Rep. 397; Clark v. Robinson, 88 Ill. 498. Cooley's Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 753.

8 Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306, 2 Am. Rep. 397.

Mr. McCrary in his work on Elections, § 80.

10 In Clark v. Robinson, 88 Ill. 498, it was held that a person who is capable of doing ordinary work and transacting business, who knows money

« AnteriorContinuar »