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actions affections allgemeine Andres angebornen Ansicht ausser Begriff beiden bestimmt Bewegung blosse c'est cause Chapt Clarke Complex daher Denken deswegen Dinge eben eigentlich eignen Eindrücke einfachen einige Empfindung endlich enthalten Erfahrung Erkenntniss erst existence fait finden findet first Folge Form Ganzen geben Gegenstand geht Geist geistigen gewisse gibt gleich good Gott grosse Handlung Hume Ibid idea ideas Ideen idées indem Jahre kind knowledge kommen konnte Körper l'homme Lehre letztere lich Locke machen macht materiellen Menschen mind moral muss n'est Namen natural nature Neigungen nothwendig nous objects Philosophie power Princip qu'il reason Religion richtig Satz Schrift Seele sensation sense seyn Sinn soll stand Standpunkt Subject substance Theil things tion tout true truth unsere Unterschied Verhältniss Vernunft verschiednen Verstand viel Vorstellungen wahr Wahrheit Weise weiter wenig Werk Wesen will Willen wirklich Wissen wohl Worte zweiten
Página lxxxii - If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number'} No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
Página xvii - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper,* void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience...
Página 311 - It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking; and I could not avoid frequently using it.
Página lxxvi - Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality.
Página lxxvi - ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.
Página xvii - This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself, and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it and might properly enough be called internal sense.
Página xxii - But as the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the other are framed. The acts of the mind wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas...
Página xvii - And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call sensation.
Página lxxvi - In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment : The mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will : Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.
Página lxxvii - When it is asked, What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact? the proper answer seems to be, that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning that relation? it may be replied in one word, experience.