bills of indictment; that he stooped to the level of an informer, by observing to the said jury, that a seditious temper had been manifested in the state of Delaware, which had been inflamed by the publications in a certain paper, called the Mir For of the Times and General Advertiser," and that he at the same time recommended to the district attorney to procure a file of the papers, and select from them something for the ground of a prosecution.

VIII. The eighth and last article charges, that at a circuit Court of the United States, for the district of Maryland, in 1803, he delivered to the grand jury an intemperate, imflammatory, and political harangue, with intent to excite their fears against the state government, and also that he delivered to them indecent and extrajudicial opinions.

Judge Chase, having been sum moned to answer to the foregoing articles of impeachment, appeared on the 2d January, 1805, before the senate of the United States, then constituting the high court of impeachment. The senate assembled in their usual place of meeting, which had been prepared, in an elegant style, for the ses sion of a court of justice. Being informed by Mr. Burr, the president, that the senate were ready to receive any answer, which he had to offer to the articles of impeachment, Judge Chase moved to be allowed until the first day of the next session of congress, to put in his answer, and to prepare himself for trial. This motion was prefaced by a speech of some length, in which he expressed a desire, to prepare an answer to the articles, which should contain a view of the whole merits of his defence. The charges embraced events, which happened in various

parts of the union, and at distant periods of time. As the answer must disclose the whole defence, and as the defence must be confined to the matters stated in the answer, much time was requisite for the necessary preparation. He was to defend his name and his honour, and in some sense the honour of the judiciary. The court did not grant the request in its full extent, but, in consequence of this application, the 4th Feb. following was assigned for receive ing the answer, and for proceeding

on the trial.

On that day, Judge Chase produced the answer, on which he meant to rely for his justification. It contains "a clear, concise, and authentick explanation of his conduct and of his motives, supported by such a statement of his proofs, as may be extensively read, clearly understood, and easily remembered." The language is glowing and nervous, and the ar guments urged with the force of a strong and active intellect. If it possesses any one pre-eminent trait, it is the wonderful fulness, with which the respondent replies to every part of the charges, which allege against him, either negligence of decorum, or turpitude of heart, in the exercise of his official duty.

It will be impossible, in an abridgment, to do justice to this masterly specimen of judicial eloquence. But as we have presented our readers with a view of the charge, we shall likewise attempt to draw an outline of the reply.

I. In reply to the first article of impeachment, the respondent admits, that the circuit court was holden before him and Richard Peters, Esq. the district judge, in April, 1800, within and for the district of Pennsylvania. At this

term, John Fries was indicted for high treason, and the opinion, which is the subject of the charge, was communicated to the counsel for the prisoner, after he was brought into court, but before the petit jury was impannelled to try him. This was the second trial of Fries for the same offence. At the first trial, the facts were fully proved, and his counsel rested their, defence on the question of law. The opinion, which the respondent delivered, was on this question; viz. whether resisting and preventing by armed force the execution of a particular law of the United States, be a "levying of war against the United States," according to the true meaning of the constitution. In two solemn decisions, by Judges Paterson and Peters, in the cases of Vigoll and Mitchell, and by Judges Iredell and Peters, in the case of Fries, the prisoner, in 1799, on arguments at great length, and on mature deliberation of the court, this point had been adjudged, and had thereby become a precedent for all courts of equal or inferiour jurisdiction. With the correctness of this opinion, the respondent was, on full consideration, satisfied, and, in his own words, "by the authority of it he should have felt himself bound, even had he regarded the question as doubtful in itself."

The reasons stated for communicating this opinion, in the manBer and at the time mentioned, were, that the respondent felt himself bound by the authority of former decisions, and considered it his duty, to prevent an unnecessary consumption of time, which was rendered precious by the pen dency of more than one hundred civil actions, many of which had already been subjected to great delay. It was necessary that this opinion should, at some stage of the

trial, be made known to the jury, and the respondent was therefore further influenced to make this communication, from the hope of guarding them against any erro neous impression of the law, since it was their right in this, as in all criminal cases, to render a general verdict of acquittal, which could not be set aside, although it should be contrary to law.

The respondent admits, that, at the trial, he expressed the opinions, that English decisions in cases of treason, at common law, against the person of the king, ought not to be read to the jury, on trials for treason under the constitution and statutes of the United States; that English decisions on this subject, prior to the revolution in 1688, ought to have very little influence in our courts; that decisions since that period, shewing what acts have been considered as a constructive levying of war against the king in his legal capacity, were admissible, but not those against his person. Those opinions however were not of binding authority in this country, but claimed respect from their intrinsick excellence, and from the exalted legal estimation of their authors.

The respondent insists, that it is the right and duty of the court, "to decide and direct what evidence, whether by record or by precedents of decisions in courts of justice, is proper to be admitted for the establishment of any matter of law or fact." He insists also, that he can be called in question only for the correctness of his motives, but he admits, that cases may be supposed, where a judge may have delivered "an opinion so palpably erroneous, unjust, and oppressive, as to preclude the possibility of its having proceeded from ignorance or mistake."

II. In reply to the charge gon

tained in the second article, relative to his having over-ruled the objection of one of the jury to serve on the trial, the respondent observes, that the juror wished to be excused," because he had formed an opinion, that the publication, called "The Prospect before us," from which the words charged in the indictment as libellous, were said to have been extracted, but which publication he had never seen, was, according to the representation of it, which he had received, within the sedition law." The reason, for which a juror should not be permitted to serve on a trial, is, "that he does not stand indifferent between the parties." The juror in the present instance had neither expressed nor formed an opinion as to the facts. As he did not know, whether the contents of the book were really such as had been represented to him; whether they would on trial be proved to be true; whether Callender was really the author of the book; or whether he wrote it with that evil intent, which was alleged in the indictment, he stood indifferent as to the matter in issue in the legal and proper sense.

III. The evidence of John Taylor was rejected on the following ground. The twelfth charge in the indictment contained these words. "He (meaning President Adams) was a professed aristocrat; he proved faithful and serviceable to the British interest." Taken separately, they charge Mr. Adams with no offence, and consequently could not be indictable as libellous but taken together, they intend, that Mr. Adams, being an enemy to the republican government of his country, had subserved the British interest against the interest of his own country; an offence both moral and legal. The testi

mony of Col. Taylor was rejected on the ground, that his evidence did not go to the whole matter contained in this article. Each count in the indictment contained twenty independent charges, or sets of words. Though one slander more or less in such a publication as "The Prospect before us,” could be of no moment; yet as, on legal principles, a plea of justification must always answer the whole charge, or it is bad on demurrer, and as the same rule is applicable to evidence, when the matter may be given in evidence, without a formal plea; evidence, which went to prove only a part of an entire and indivisible charge, was inad missible, and therefore the testimony of Col. Taylor was rejected.

IV. Posterity will be astonished, that it was made an article in an impeachment against a judge, that he required the counsel to reduce their interrogatories to writ ing, in a case of some difficulty, and for a more accurate observation of them.

No lawyer could ever doubt the right of a judge to make such an order, if he deemed it necessary. That it should excite murmurs, much more that it should be the ground of a serious charge against the respondent, for misconduct in his official character, betrays in the counsel a childish impatience of restraint, and must forever be recorded, as a monument of the condescension of the illustrious majority in the house of representatives, for the year 1804. If the court is the proper tribunał to decide all questions of evidence, it is certainly the duty of the judges, to use great deliberation, whenever the correct decision of these questions requires the application of exquisite legal principles, and great subtlety of reasoning.

It is one of the specifications in

this article against Judge Chase, that he refused to postpone the trial of Callender. The continuance of a cause does not depend on the arbitrary will of the court, but on fixed principles. Every application for a continuance must come within those rules, or the trial must proceed. The true and only reason for granting a continuance is, that the party accused may have the best opportunity, which the law can afford him, of making his defence. Where the ground of a continuance is the absence of witnesses, it is a settled rule, and made necessary to the expeditious and happy administration of justice, that the application should be supported by an affidav. it, that the testimony wanted is "competent and material," and that there is" reasonable expectation of procuring it within the time ⚫ prescribed." The affidavit of Callender did not state, that he expected to procure, at the next term, such evidence as he wanted, or that he should obtain the attendance of the absent witnesses, who were scattered over the union. The affidavit was clearly defective, and it became the duty of the court to re, ject the application.

After perusing the trial of Cal lender, it is apparent from the conduct of his counsel, that they were . unwilling to be tied down to an ob servance of the rules of law. It would have been vastly agreeable to them, and very much for the interest of their client, could the cause have been tried by a mob, instead of being heard before a tribunal, whose judges well knew the rules of law, and had the virtue to accomplish the duties of their official station.

In concluding his defence against those charges, contained in the fourth article of impeachment, he declares, that his

whole conduct in that trial, was regulated by a strict regard to the principles of law, and by an honeft defire to do juftice between the United States and the party accufed. He felt a fincere with, on the one hand, that the traverser might establifh his innocence, by thofe fair and fufficient means which the law allows; he fhould not, by fubterfuges and frivoand a determination on the other, that lous pretences, fport with the justice of the country, and evade that punishment of which, if guilty, he was so proper an object. These intentions, he is confident, were legal and laudable; and if, in any part of his conduct, he fwerved from this line, it was an error of his judgment and not of his heart.

V. In replying to the fifth article of the impeachment,the respondent shews, that the managers, who fabricated the article, were guilty of a material oversight in citing the law of Virginia, on which it is founded. The charge is, for awarding an erroneous process against Callender. But by the statute, it is left in the discretion of the court to award the proper process, provided it will bring the offender to answer to the presentment. The Judge then proves incontrovertibly, that in issuing a capias, his conduct was perfectly correct.

VI. The sixth article charges the respondent with an intent to op press Callender, in adjudging him to trial, during the term at which he was presented and indicted. But the respondent denies, that the law of Virginia, to which this article refers, warrants the inference drawn from it; "because it speaks of presentments, and not of indictments, which are very different things; and is, as he is informed, confirmed, by practice and construction in the state of Virginia, to cases of small offences, which are to be tried by the court itself upon the presentment, without an indictment, or the intervention of a jury."

In passing a judgment on the character of the majority in the house of representatives, who voted in favour of the impeachment, posterity will inquire, wherefore Judge Chase was selected, as the sole object of this impeachment. He was but one of the judges, who constituted the courts, in which the facts took place. In the opinions expressed, and in the judgments rendered, the associates of Judge Chase concurred in sentiment. The turpitude, if any, attached to both. Why were actions regarded in one as venial, while they were made the subject of a criminal charge against the other? Was it because Judge Chase would be a more splendid victim on the altar of political intolerance? Or was it to sooth the wounded feelings of the principal prosecutor? In the eye of impartial minds, remote from the scene of action, and free from those impediments, which obscure the clearness of its vision, this selection remains a record of partiality.

VII. It is sufficient to shew the futility of the charges, contained in the seventh article, to observe, that they do in substance amount to this; "that the respondent refused to discharge a grand jury on their request, which is every day's practice, and which he was bound to do, if he believed that the due administration of justice required their longer attendance; that he directed the attention of the grand jury to an offence against a statute of the United States, which he had been informed was committed in the district; and that he desired the district attorney to aid the grand jury, in their inquiries concerning the existence and nature of this offence. By these three acts, each of which it was his duty to perform, he is al

It has been the practice in this country, ever fince the beginning of the revolution, which feparated us from Great Britain, for the judges to exprefs from the bench, by way of charge to the of their ability, fuch political opinions, grand jury, and to enforce to the utmost as they thought correct and ufeful. There have been inftances in which the legiflative bodies of this country, have recommended this practice of the judges fupreme court of the United States, as and it was adopted by the judges of the foon as the present judicial system was established. If the legiflature of the United States confidered this practice a mifchievous, dangerous, or liable to abuse, they might have forbidden it by law to the penalties of which, fuch judges as might afterwards tranfgrefs it, would be justly fubjected. By not forbiding it, the legislature has given to it an implied fanction; and for that legislature to punwould be to convert into a crime, by ith it now by way of impeachment, an ex poft facto proceeding, an act which when it was done and at all times before, they had themfelves virtually declared to be innocent. Such conduct would be utterly fubverfive of the fundamental principles on which free government refts; and would form a precedent for the most fanguinary and arbitrary perfecutions, under the forms of law.

He then with brevity examines the political opinions, which were incorporated in his address to the grand jury, and in a satisfactory manner defends them.

The close of the respondent's plea is inexpressibly solemn and dignified. We insert it as a spe cimen of genuine eloquence.