devient chaque jour davantage à mesure que ce qu'on est convenu d'appeler le développement de la civilisation, rend plus complexes les problèmes qui naissent du conflit des intérêt ou des passions.

Le temps n'est plus où le juge pouvait, avec la seule aide des codes, et par l'application exacte de la loi strictement et convenablement interprêtée, résoudre tous les litiges qui s'offrent à lui.

La loi écrite, si poussée qu'ait été son étude, si récentes et si détaillées que soient ses prescriptions, ne suffit plus souvent pour dire la justice, et ce n'est pas moi qui viendrai vous apprendre quel rôle considérable la notion d'équité peut et doit désormais jouer dans les décisions judiciaires.

Or, pour pouvoir, en toute hypothèse, décider ce qui est juste, ce qui est équitable, le magistrat ne saurait trop enrichir son intelligence et affermir sa raison au contact permanent de la realité, et dans le commerce de ceux qui, professionellement, sont appelés à tout connaître, je veux dire les avocats.

Si le juge doit défendre son coeur contre les entraînements et les passions, il doit aussi sans cesse appliquer les ressources de son intelligence à mieux connaître non seulement la loi mais les hommes. Mais, dans l'exercice de ses devoirs professionnels le juge reste nécessairement, obligatoirement éloigné des réalités. Il ne peut pas, il ne doit pas, se trouver directement aux prises avec les conflits des affaires, et le tumulte des passions.

Et c'est pourquoi je vois,-et vous tous j'en suis sûr pensez comme moi, l'intérêt le plus évident pour un juge à se trouver aussi souvent que possible et dans le confiant abandon d'un congrès comme le vôtre, en contact et en parfaite communion d'idée avec ceux que l'expérience de tous les jours, les travaux de tous instants, mettent aux prises avec les hommes, leurs faiblesses et leurs passions.

Mais, Messieurs, hâtons-nous de dire que le profit de cette collaboration ne va pas, loin de là, aux seuls magistrats. Quelle fortune inespérée n'est-ce pas, pour un avocat, et que ne donnerait pas un avocat français pour pouvoir, dans une discussion désintéressée et libre, percevoir sans détours, les tendances, la mentalité des magistrats les plus éminents de son pays! Quel prix ne doit-il pas attacher à de telles rencontres qui permettent à l'avocat de mieux découvrir tous les ressorts de l'intelligence et de la raison auxquels il doit chaque jour faire appel lorsqu'il sollicite leurs jugements.

On dit avec raison que l'avocat vraiment digne de sa mission, doit être le premier juge de son affaire, et de son client, et qu'il doit savoir spontanément écarter de la barre les causes qui n'en sont pas

dignes. Les meilleurs enseignements, les exemples les plus profitables, pour l'exercice de cette juridiction préparatoire, l'avocat doit à n'en pas douter les trouver dans l'intimité intellectuelle des magistrats de grand savoir et de grand coeur qui sont ici, autour de nous.

On pourrait, n'est-il pas vrai, Messieurs, prolonger cette analyse, et montrer ainsi quelle autorité ne peuvent manquer d'offrir des délibérations prises dans de si excellentes conditions.

A quoi bon? Vos instants sont comptés, et vous connaissez mieux que moi-même toutes les raisons qui ont justifié votre organisation et qui vous confirment journellement dans la nécessité de son maintien.

J'ai, quant à moi, voulu seulement vous dire que j'admire sans réserve les efforts que vous dépensez si généreusement pour assurer aux justiciables de ce pays une meilleure distribution de la justice, et rendre un sincère hommage au grand et salutaire exemple que vous donnez ainsi, car quiconque, dans un coin quelconque du monde, travaille à l'amélioration de la justice, travaille aussi à la consolidation de la paix.

Je vous demande de me pardonner mon indiscrétion, en pensant que moi aussi, je suis un fervent serviteur de la justice et un fervent serviteur de la paix. Je ne crains même pas de dire que je le suis deux fois, d'abord parce que je suis un avocat, et aussi et surtout parce que je suis français.

C'est à ce double titre, Messieurs, que j'ai cru pouvoir vous féliciter, et c'est à ce double titre que je vous demande de me laisser vous dire tout simplement: merci.

695

WHY?

In the course of my attempts to expound or discuss the Bankruptcy Act at the Osgoode Hall Law School, several questions have forced themselves upon my attention. Perhaps a statement of some of them will be useful to readers of the CANADIAN BAR Review in drawing their attention to some problems raised by the Bankruptcy Act as it now stands. It is to be hoped that the Act will not be reenacted in the forthcoming Revised Statutes of Canada without a serious effort first being made to improve its drafting and arrange

ment.

1. Why, in section 2, which is intended merely to define the meaning of words and expressions used in the Act, is an important substantive provision as to the application of the Winding-up Act tacked on to the definition of "debtor," instead of occupying its proper place in some later part of the Act?

2. Why is the subject of authorized assignments (ss. 9 and 10) put under the heading "assignments and compositions," or in other words, why are the provisions as to compositions, etc. (sec. 13) put in Part II along with assignments, in view of the fact that these provisions apply to cases of receiving orders as well as assignments?

3. Why are general provisions applicable to assignments and receiving orders alike, such as ss. 8A, 8B, 11 and 12, put, some in Part I under receiving orders, and others in Part II under assignments and compositions?

4. Why should a section like s. 8b be drawn with a main provision only six lines long, followed by an "unless," then by a "provided," then by another "unless," and finally by another "provided" — the first "provided" being subject to the provisions of another section, the second "provided " being followed by two exceptions, and the second exception being qualified by another "unless " and an "except "-the various subsidiary and qualifying clauses extending to 30 lines? It is a maze which rivals the celebrated labyrinth of Crete, and it is perhaps hardly worth while pointing out that in each of the two exceptions to the second proviso the words "such date" occur, which grammatically refer to the date of the receiving order or authorized assignment, but which, to give sense to the exceptions, one is probably obliged to say refer to a "due date," not

expressly mentioned. We are less fortunate than Theseus. Ariadne gave him a clue which enabled him to find his way out of the labyrinth. No fair guide comes to our assistance.

5. Why, upon the making of a receiving order, is the property of the debtor deemed to be "in the custody" of the court (s. 6), whereas, upon the acceptance of an assignment by the Official Receiver, the property of the debtor is deemed to be "under the authority" of the court? What is the meaning of these two expressions or either of them? If, prior to the appointment of a trustee, it is necessary to dispose of any part of the debtor's property, how can a good title be given, in cases other than provided for by s. 8A?

6. Why, in the case of an assignment, when a trustee is afterwards appointed and his name has been certified on the assignment by the Official Receiver, is it provided by s. 9 that the property of the debtor is "thereupon" vested in the trustee "as of the date of the acceptance and filing of the said assignment" (thus, in effect, making the vesting relate back to an earlier date), whereas the corresponding provision in the case of a receiving order, namely, s. 6, says that upon the appointment of a trustee, the property shall "forthwith pass to and vest in such trustee" (thus omitting any reference to the relation back of the bankruptcy to the time of the presentation of the petition, as provided by s. 4, that is, the time of the filing of the petition as provided by rule 76)?

7. Why does s. 25 provide that the property of the debtor divisible among his creditors shall comprise all such property as may belong to or be vested in the debtor " at the date of the presentation of any bankruptcy petition or at the date of the execution of an authorized assignment the latter date being obviously wrong, because under s. 9 the property vests in the trustee as of the date of the acceptance and filing of the assignment, not as of the date of the execution of the assignment -and the former date being right only on the assumption that s. 6 means what it does not say, namely, that the property vests as of the date of the presentation of the petition?

8. Why does s., 25 mention still another date, namely, "the date of said petition or assignment" (which may be different from any of the dates already mentioned), as the date for vesting in the trustee the debtor's former capacity to exercise powers over property, and why is a distinction made between a receiving order and an assignment by the concluding words of the section: "or, in the case of such bankrupt, before his discharge "?

9. Why does s. 11 by sub-s. 1 give precedence to a receiving order

or assignment (that is, presumably, as of the date of presentation of the petition or the acceptance and filing of the assignment, respectively) over all executions and attachments not fully executed by payment, and then by sub-s. 10 give precedence to the receiving order or assignment over executions and attachments against land only as of the time of registration of the receiving order or assignment?

10. Why does s. 11(1)(b) make an excepton of the rights of a secured creditor under s. 6 of the Act (that is, in the case of a receiving order), and make no corresponding exception of the rights of a secured creditor under s. 9 (that is, in the case of an assignment)?

11. Why does. s. 11, by the obscurity of its provisions, make the lot of the purchaser in good faith of land harder? Read in the light of ss. 6 and 9, the result of s. 11 seems to be that during the period from the presentation of a petition until the expiration of three months after the "making" of a receiving order, or from the acceptance and filing of an assignment until the expiration of three months after the "making" of the assignment, a purchaser of a parcel of land from the debtor, or from a person whose supposed title is derived through the debtor, gets no title, and if the receiving order or assignment is not registered against the parcel in question during this period, the purchaser's only safeguard against the danger of paying his money for nothing is to inform himself, as best he may, as to possible assignments, receiving orders, or petitions for receiving orders relating to all persons having title to the land within the period in question. After the expiration of the three-month period, if the assignment or receiving order has not been registered against the parcel in question, the purchaser who takes and registers his conveyance without actual notice of a petition, receiving order or assignment, is apparently protected, at least in the case of land registered under the Ontario Registry Act, and it is immaterial whether he has made any search in the Canada Gazette or in the alphabetical list kept by the registrar or elsewhere. If the foregoing statement is right, why should the matter not be more clearly stated in the Act? If the foregoing statement is not right, what does the section mean?

12. Why are the words "or insolvent" allowed to remain, or why were they ever inserted, in s. 29, which provides in effect that in certain circumstances a settlement shall be absolutely void or shall be prima facie void (subject to the proof of certain things by the beneficiary) according as "the settlor becomes bankrupt or insolvent or makes an authorized assignment" within one year or within five years, respectively, after the date of the settlement. The time of a

45-C.B.R.-VOL. IV.