place in history, his mission as great opponent of the spirit of aggression, of which the French Revolution was the inspiring force and Napoleon the mighty instrument, his final triumph-all are traced with infinite skill and inexorable analysis.

At each of the momentous crises, so far removed in time and place-at the Nile, at Copenhagen, at Trafalgar-as the unfolding drama of the age reveals to the onlooker the schemes of the arch-planner about to touch success, over against Napoleon rises ever Nelson; and as the latter in the hour of victory drops from the stage when he has played so chief a part, his task is seen to be accomplished, his triumph secured. In the very act of dying he has dealt his foe a blow from which recovery is impossible. Moscow and Waterloo are the inevitable consequences of Trafalgar.

In this passage the keynote of the book rings out clearly. We knew that the author of "The Influence of Sea Power" would place before us this aspect of Nelson's career as it has never yet been presented, that no writer of the present or the past was so competent to deal with Nelson's achieve ments and to portray him as a director of war. We did not know whether the brilliant naval historian could assume the more difficult rôle of the biographer, and could unveil a living image of the man of simple yet complex nature, of impulse, yet of cold reason. In some respects, at least, Captain Ma han's success in the more delicate portion of his task is complete. He has shown the gradual training of Nelson's mind in the school of experience. He has placed beyond the reach of cavil the fact of Nelson's genius, which a recent writer ventured to question, and he has rightly claimed for that genius in its maturity a wider range than the knowledge of the sea. Like his great antagonist, Nelson was something more than a born leader of fighting men, and both owed their success as directors of war to the insight which, when associated with self-reliance and readiness to accept responsibility, is the essence of real statesmanship. Captain Mahan is, however, not in the

It is remarkable that Nelson, though almost continuously afloat from 1770 till 1783, saw no naval action during the great war of American Independence. In this period, however, the foundations of his future greatness were laid. The opportunities were few, but none were lost. As a postcaptain of twenty-two he took a leading part in the siege and capture of Fort San Juan, gaining experience to be turned to full account in after years on the coast of Corsica. Of practical seamanship he became a master. he had shown marked independence of judg ment, together with a certain restiveness under authority feebly or wrongfully wielded. In 1785, defying popu lar opinion in the West Indies, and disregarding the orders of the admiral (which relieved him of responsibility), he enforced the Navigation Laws, and after much anxiety and vexation was upheld by the Admiralty. "This struggle with Sir Richard Hughes," states Captain Mahan, "showed clearly not only the loftiness of his motives, but the distinguishing features which constituted the strength of his character both civil and military." In 1788 N-Ison returned to England with his newly-married wife, and being out of favor with the court and the Admiralty for having openly shown his friendship for the Duke of Clarence, then at

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Prince of Wales, was unable to obtain a ship. His fearless assumption of responsibility in the West Indies, and the breadth of view which he displayed, had impressed both the prime minister and Mr. Rose, the secretary of the treasury. Although, therefore, for the moment under a cloud, his strong self-reliance had already made its mark. "Even in the earlier stages of his profession," said Codrington, "his genius had soared higher, and all his energies were turned to becoming a great commander." Such men were sorely needed when, at the end of 1792, Pitt realized that war with Revolutionary France was inevitable, and on the 30th of June, 1793, Nelson was appointed to the sixty-four-gun ship Agamemnon. "The Admiralty," he wrote, "so smile upon me, that really I am as much surprised as when they frowned."

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The three years which followed form, states Captain Mahan, "the period in which expectation passed into fulfilment, when development, being arrested, resumed its outward progress under the benign influence of a favorable environment." Nelson was fairly launched on his unparalleled career. Nothing could be better than the author's treatment of the wonderful chapter of history which now opened. Here is no mere narrative of the tions of an individual, but a luminous exposition of war in which the interaction of the sea and land operations on a great scale is admirably traced. We are enabled to see the gradual establishment of law in a vast contest, which began with "no sound ideas," no vestige of a clear policy. And we can follow the rapid development of Nelson's genius maturing through rich experience, his reason correcting his impulse and his power as a director of war rising to meet the ever-increasing demands which it was called upon to meet. Fortune was now propitious. In Lord Hood, Nelson found a commander-in-chief who recognized his special capacity for "separate and responsible service." Henceforth, till the battle of the Nile, his "life presents

a series of detached commands, independent as regarded the local scene of operations," and exactly calculated to furnish the scope and the opportunities for which he craved.

The abandonment of Toulon in December, 1793, left the Mediterranean fleet without a harbor east of Gibraltar. Naval warfare in sailing days demanded the use of harbors quite as much as now when coaling stations are regarded in the light of a new requirement. Corsica, held by a French garrison, appeared to offer the necessary facilities, and on Nelson's advice, in opposition to the opinion of General Dundas, the siege of Bastia was undertaken. "If the Army will not take it," he wrote, "we must, by some way or other," and he both planned the siege and directed the operations to a successful conclusion. At this juncture a French squadron sailed from Toulon, and Admiral Hotham, commanding an equal force, fell back towards Corsica, missing a great opportunity, as Nelson instantly recognized. Hood, concentrating his fleet, was unable to bring the enemy to action, but effectually covered the siege of Calvi, where Nelson lost the use of his right eye when directing the fire of the batteries on shore, whose construction he had ad-. vised. Corsica was now "unassailable," as Captain Mahan states, so longas the sea was controlled by the British Navy; but Nelson had not as yet. realized the impossibility of over-sea operations in face of naval supremacy, and evinced traces of the same anxiety which later he felt for Sicily. In the memorable action of the Agamemnon and Ca Ira on the 13th of May, 1795— his first sea fight-Nelson unmistakably showed "the spirit which takes a man to the front, not merely in battle but at all times." The difference between his bold initiative on this day and the decision instantly acted upon at St. Vincent was only one of degree. So also when, on the following day, Hotham rested satisfied with a temporary advantage, Nelson pleaded for a pursuit of Martin's fleet. There was risk, as the author shows, but in the circum

stances it was a risk which ought to have been accepted. On the 13th of July, another chance presented itself to Hotham, but the signal for a general chase was delayed "pending certain drill-ground manoeuvres," and the French lost only one ship. This naval campaign, successful only in the sense that captures were made, supplied object lessons which Nelson took to heart. The French fleet was not crip pled, and Captain Mahan, who in some passages seems to question the deterrent effect of a fleet "in being," re marks: "How keep the fleet on the Italian coast, while the French fleet remained in Toulon? What a curb it was appeared again in the next campaign, and even more clearly, because the British were then commanded by Sir John Jervis, a man not to be checked by ordinary obstacles." Controversy has raged over this point, and unfortunately the disputants will each be able to claim the author as an ally. The inconsistency is perhaps more apparent than real, for the records of naval war conclusively show that an effective fleet-a fleet at sea or ready to sail and handled by fighting seamen-is a most powerful deterrent to naval operations, and especially to the over-sea transport of military forces.

In the chapters dealing with Nelson's proceedings on the Riviera in 1795 and 1796 Captain Mahan discusses with much ability the possibilities of bringing sea power to bear on the land campaign. Nelson's plan for landing five thousand men at San Remo on the French line of communications with Nice was not justified under the existing conditions. It was eminently characteristic of his marked capacity for seizing upon the decisive factor in a given situation; but "his accurate instinct that war cannot be made without running risks combined with his lack of experience in the difficulties of land operations to mislead his judgment in this particular instance." Napoleon was now launched on a full tide of victory; Spain declared war; Corsica was in rebellion; on the 25th of September, 1796, orders were sent to Jar

vis to quit the Mediterranean. By Nelson this decision was bitterly resented. "I lament our present orders in sackcloth and ashes, so dishonorable to the dignity of England." His earlier view had changed, and, realizing all that the evacuation implied, his mind dwelt upon the advantages of a bold offensive on the sea. "The fleets of England are equal to meet the world in arms." The defection of Admiral Man, however, left Jervis in a position of great numerical inferiority. The fleet in being, already a heavy "curb," now amounted, with the addition of the Spanish squadron, to thirty-four sail of the line. It was natural that the British government should consider the odds too great.

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To Nelson these three years were of the utmost importance. His mind, continually occupied in solving naval problems, in forecasting events, and in studying the European situation, underwent rapid development. His exploits on a minor stage had been remarkable, and, as Captain Mahan justly out, the brilliant achievements followed ought not to be permitted to obscure "the long antecedent period of unswerving continuance in strenuous action, allowing no flagging of earnestness for a moment to appear, no chance for service, however small or distant, to pass unimproved." It is the great merit of the author to have thrown a strong light upon this period, far less dramatic than that which followed, but essential to a right understanding of the secret of Nelson's transcendent success as a naval commander.

Sent back into the Mediterranean with two frigates to evacuate Elba. Nelson accomplished his task; and after fighting two actions, escaping his pursuers by an act of splendid daring, and sailing through a night in company with the Spanish fleet, he joined Jervis the day before the battle of St. Vincent. The well-known story is lucidly retold, and the diagrams enable the unprofessional reader to grasp the situation. The British fleet in single column was tacking in succession to follow the Spanish main body, when the great