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really dangerous enemy of Austria is th-s assertion of the Slavs in Austria Russia; and it was apparently in order to counterbalance that danger that Bismarck had induced the Austrian emperor to conclude the treaty with Germany in 1879. And suddenly it came to light that that treaty was, in fact, no guaranty, no defence, no protection at all. This duplicity of the German chancellor gave a great shock to the Emperor Francis Joseph; and it cannot surprise anybody that, from the moment when he became aware of the secret treaty with Russia, he would not trust a political party which still continued to look to the author of that treaty as their guiding star and as the director of their home politics. What could the emperor think of a political party in his realm whose patriotism was not love for their country, irrespective of the political color of the government of the day, with which they did not happen to agree, but a mere lip patriotism, the principle of which consisted in the thought within their innermost heart, "We will remain in existence somewhere else, even if our country should no longer be in existence"?

certainly seems to be correct. Whether under Palmerston or under Gladstone, whatever Liberal government was at the head of affairs in England, Austria, governed by ministers of German nationality from Metternich's time onward, was always in good spirits when the Liberals in England went out of office. Though perhaps somewhat antiquated, the following extract from a despatch of Prince Metternich to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires in London, dated November 29, 1834, will show how fully aware Lord Palmerston was of that fact. Metternich writes:

The German party in the Austrian Parliament continually reproached the Czechs and other Slav nationalities in Austria with a secret hankering for Russia, with gravitating toward Moscow. The Slavs always spurned that accusation; all they wanted was to be able to maintain their respective nationalities. It was ridiculous, they argued, to accuse the Poles or Ruthenians of a secret love for Russia, their greatest and most cruel enemy. And now that the Bohemian Slavs (Czechs) are politically united with the Poles and other Slav nationalities in Austria, there is not the slightest danger nor the slightest reason for the accusation, or even suspicion, that the Slavs in Austria gravitate towards Russia. What they particularly object to is to be Germanized. Germanization in Austria, they maintain, always means and always did mean, as experience proves, a return to absolutism and a denial of popular rights. From an English point of view, and according to English experience,

The same day on which I received your report of November 15, Mr. Strangway received a note from Lord Palmerston. dated the sixteenth, which he permitted me to read. Its contents are, as nearly as possible, as follows: We are out; the Duke of Wellington is Prime Minister, and entrusted with the formation of the Cabinet; to-morrow we shall give up the seals into the King's hands. I have no time to tell you more, occupied as I am with putting my affairs in order. Ever yours, etc. P. S. Lose no time in taking this note to Prince Metternich. I am convinced he will never in his life have been more overjoyed than when he reads it, and that I shall never have seemed so agreeable to him as now that I am bidding him Goodbye!

I know very well, that at that time Austria was an absolute monarchy, whereas to-day it possesses a constitutional government. But the fact nevertheless remains, that the paramount influence of the German element in Austria even after 1848 boded no good for the cause of liberty. The German party in Austria claim a monopoly of the love of liberty. Nothing could be further from the truth. They pretend that without their help the whole machinery of the government of the empire would stop. The Germans in Austria have no right to demand a paramount position over and above all the other races of the empire. They are not numerically a majority; they have never yet shown any remarkable political tact, like the Magyars, nor can they boast of success in guiding the destinies of the empire.

At the time when the influence of the German element was supreme in Austria, when the other races were considered and treated as Helots, when the German language alone was permitted as the official language, the unfortunate wars of 1859 and of 1866 took place. The Magyars under Marie Theresa-be the cry, "Moriamur pro rege nostro Maria Theresia," historically correct or not-had at least to some extent saved the monarchy. The Germans, who were all-powerful in Austria during the two last wars, could not avert Solferino nor Sadowa.

And since the great events of 1870 the dangers of Austria have increased in an extraordinary manner. It would be incorrect and unjust to accuse the whole German party in Austria of want of loyalty towards their emperor, of "hankering" for Germany, or gravitating towards Berlin. But it cannot be denied that a portion of the German party, including some of its leaders, make no secret of such a desire. As early as 1878 a member of the German party openly declared in the Austrian Parliament that daily the cry became louder in some of the German provinces of Austria, "If only we belonged already to the German Empire." And what was the cause of that treasonable cry? It was that the Cabinet of the day did not obey in all things and in everything the behest of the German party in the Austrian Parliament; because the government had consented to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, after all, they had to do, according to the mandate of the great European powers. You call that patriotism? cried a Slav deputy in the Austrian Parliament. A threat, a wish to secede from the empire, because the government of the day happens on one question to have a different opinion from your own. As far as my knowledge of the German language goes, "I should call it by quite a different name." And lately we have seen more sensational performances on the part of that extreme wing of the German party. As soon as they found that they could not carry everything before them with a VOL. XV. 769


high hand, they began to threaten to call the German emperor and the German nation to their help; they even held party meetings in Germany, and commenced a "Germania irredenta" agitation. They and the whole German party, who formerly could not find vituperative words enough to hurl against the members of the Slav nationalities, when they tried to obstruct the proceedings in Parliament, now themselves obstructed with such violence that the session had to be closed because no business could be done.

The political situation in Austria is serious, and might even become dangerous. There is a complete parliamentary deadlock, as far as Cisleithania is concerned; the strife between the different races and nationalities is more violent than ever. The German party are apparently irreconcilable, and their opponents are equally firm, and determined not to yield. The decree requiring the members of the Civil Service in Bohemia to know the Bohemian language is only the first appearance of a flame; there is fuel enough for any number of conflagrations. The details, however, of all the different national, racial, and religious difficulties in Austria cannot interest, nor would they be understood by a foreigner.

To these internal questions must be added the problems of foreign politics, which are not less delicate, not less difficult, and not less dangerous. They concern not only Austria (in the narrower sense of the word), but the whole Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Of course the Triple Alliance is still in existence; but Italy may be left out of the reckoning, as far as the real difficulties of Austria's foreign policy are concerned. The choice lies between the neighbor on the north-east and the power to the north-west of the Hapsburg monarchy, between Russia and Germany. As to the degree of reliance that can be placed on some treaties of alliance, the famous, or rather infamous, treaty of neutrality which was concluded by Prince Bismarck between Germany and Russia behind the back of Austria can have left no doubt in the

mind of the Emperor Francis Joseph. A rapprochement between Austria and Russia, a closer understanding between these two powers, seems therefore the most natural and sensible step on the part of Austria. The language of the organs of Prince Bismarck concerning this entente cannot surprise anybody. They seem to be inclined to cry "quits" now, and try to compare this AustroRussian treaty with the German-Russian neutrality treaty. But the AustroRussian entente has absolutely nothing in common with that Bismarck treaty. The latter was signed behind the back of Austria, Germany's loyal ally; whereas the Austro-Russian rapprochement was effected openly, in broad daylight, and to all appearance with the full knowledge of Germany. Besides, the agreement arrived at between AustroHungary and Russia does not in any way directly affect the interests or policy of Germany, whereas Bismarck's secret treaty most seriously touched the interests of Austro-Hungary.

The crisis which the German party in Austria has lately brought about, shows clearly one of the great dangers which threaten the peace and, perhaps, the existence of Austria. Even the question of the Austro-Hungarian compromise, a matter which recurs every ten years, is at the present moment less threatening, and not so burning and acute as the seemingly irreconcilable difficulty between the Germans and the Slavs in Austria. Cabinet ministers, mere politicians, or party leaders cannot do anything to make a durable peace between the jarring and warring parties. Only a few days ago they showed themselves incapable of effecting a short truce. The Emperor Francis Joseph alone can in some degree bring order into this chaos; for he is trusted by all parties; he is looked upon as the incarnation of honesty and good faith, and his word is implicitly believed. What the emperor intends to do is, up to this moment, a secret to everybody; but whatever his proposals may be, it cannot be doubted that they will restore peace, at least for some time, at all events during his lifetime. This is all

very well, as far as it goes, for Austria and for the peace of Europe. But what will happen when, in the course of time, Francis Joseph will be succeeded by a monarch who has not the vast experience nor the extraordinary popularity of the present emperor? That is the question. To put it in one short sentence: the peace of Europe, the question whether Austro-Hungary can and will continue to exist in its present form and shape, depend on one life. And therein lies the danger of the situation for Europe as much as for the Hapsburg monarchy. How will things go on in Austria when there will be nobody who commands universal respect, and to whose will all parties in the empire finally give way? Should the Germans then tend towards the north-west and the Slavs to the north-east, with nobody in power to prevent this double centrifugal motion, a general conflagration and a general European war would be unavoidable.

And for this reason the present bickerings between the German party and the Slavs in the Austrian Parliament, unimportant as they may appear to be at a superficial glance, possess the greatest importance, the most serious significance for Englishmen, as well as for the citizens of all the other European countries.


P. S.-The great demonstration made by the Emperor Francis Joseph, in paying a long visit to the English ambassador in Vienna on the occasion of the Jubilee, is a step unprecedented in Austria, where the rigid Spanish court etiquette of the Middle Ages still holds good. In contrast to this friendly behavior is that of the German emperor, the eldest grandchild of the queen, who

incredible as it may appear-neither held a review in her honor, nor attended a church service, nor paid a visit to the British ambassador, nor even sent a telegram to his grandmother. During the last few days it has appeared as if Berlin had been wiped out by an earthquake from the face of this planet. From all parts of the world messages of

goodwill and of congratulation were published by the newspapers, but none came from the capital of the German emperor. That the reptile press organs of the old Djenghis Khan in Frederichsruhe have only words of vituperation or of raillery concerning England and her queen is quite natural. The sight of a great free people has the same effect upon Prince Bismarck as the cross or holy water has upon the prince of darkness. For the serious politician the conduct of the two emperors shows to some extent which way the wind blows, and will blow in the


From The Nineteenth Century.

As Napoleon was the highest incarnation of the power of the land and of the military aptitude of the French people, so was Nelson the supreme exponent of the power of the sea and the embodiment of the naval genius of the Anglo-Saxon race. Fate ordained that the careers of these two should violently clash, and that the vast ambitions of the one should be shattered by the untiring energy of the other. The war which began in 1793 was in effect a tremendous conflict between the forces of the land and those of the sea, each directed by a master hand, and each fed by the resources of a great nation. The apparent inequality of conditions was considerable at the outset, and later overwhelming. Conquered or overawed by the power of the land, the allies of England fell away, becoming the instruments of Napoleon's policy, till the small island State stood alone. There was no outpouring of wild enthusiasm such as carried the armies of revolutionary France from victory to victory; but, instead, a stern determination to uphold the cause of order and of real liberty in the face of all odds, and in spite of much real suffering. With the ultimate triumph won upon the sea, the name of Nelson will forever be associated. It is his immortal honor not only to have stepped forth as the champion of his country in the hour of dire need, but to have bequeathed to her the knowledge in which lies her only salvation.

Captain Mahan's "Life of Nelson" is far more than the story of an heroic career. It is a picture, drawn in firm

1 Life of Nelson the Embodiment of the Sea

Power of Great Britain. By Captain A. T. Mahan, lines by a master hand, in which the

D.C.L.. LL.D., U. S. Navy. London: Sampson
Low, Marston & Co., 1897.

2 January 13, 1791.

master of the art of land warfare that the world has known.

In 1793, a British post-captain of thirty-five sailed into the Mediterranean in command of H.M.S. Agamemnon, to enter upon a career of twelve years, which ended in the hour of his most glorious victory, and won for him undying fame as the most brilliant seaman whom the greatest of maritime nations has ever produced.

"One never knows," wrote Catherine the Second to Grimm, "if you are living in the midst of the murders, carnage, and uproar of the den of thieves who have seized upon the government of France, and who will soon turn it into Gaul, as it was in the time of Cæsar. But Cæsar put them down! When will this Cæsar come? Oh, come he will, you need not doubt." These words were strikingly prophetic. Less than five years later a young Corsican artillery officer of twenty-six scattered the National Guards in the streets of Paris, and, having restored the waning authority of the convention, was appointed second in command of the Army of the Interior. In the following year (1796), as commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy, he defeated the Austrians, reduced the king of Sardinia to vassalage, occupied Milan, and shut up the veteran Wurmser in Mantua. "Cæsar" had come to rule the destinies of France for eighteen years, to overturn the entire system of Europe, and to prove himself the greatest

significance of the events chronicled stands out in true proportion. Nelson's

as the least carried away by an exaggerated hero-worship. It is evident that he is profoundly impressed by the personality of the man in whom sea power found its greatest exponent; but he can be coldly-almost harshly-critical, and to the strain of human weakness, which mingled with but did not mar the closing years of Nelson's glorious career, he shows no excess of mercy. The aim "has been to make Nelson describe himself-tell the story of his own inner life as well as of his exter

nal actions," and in the main this

course has been followed. If here and there the running personal comment→ never the historical analysis-seems a little fade, and leads to unconscious repetitions, the book holds the reader from beginning to end.

It is remarkable that Nelson, though almost continuously afloat from 1770 till 1783, saw no naval action during the great war of American Independence. In this period, however, the foundations of his future greatness were laid. The opportunities were few, but none were lost. As a postcaptain of twenty-two he took a leading part in the siege and capture of Fort San Juan, gaining experience to be turned to full account in after years on the coast of Corsica. Of practical seamanship he became a master. he had shown marked independence of judgment, together with a certain restiveness under authority feebly or wrongfully wielded. In 1785, defying popular opinion in the West Indies, and disregarding the orders of the admiral (which relieved him of responsibility), he enforced the Navigation Laws, and after much anxiety and vexation was upheld by the Admiralty. "This strug gle with Sir Richard Hughes," states Captain Mahan, "showed clearly not only the loftiness of his motives, but the distinguishing features which constituted the strength of his character both civil and military." In 1788 Nelson returned to England with his newly-married wife, and being out of favor with the court and the Admiralty for having openly shown his friendship for the Duke of Clarence, then at

place in history, his mission
great opponent of the spirit of aggres-
sion, of which the French Revolution
was the inspiring force and Napoleon
the mighty instrument, his final tri-
umph-all are traced with infinite skill
and inexorable analysis.

At each of the momentous crises, so far removed in time and place-at the Nile, at Copenhagen, at Trafalgar-as the unfolding drama of the age reveals to the onlooker the schemes of the arch-planner about to touch success, over against Napoleon rises ever Nelson; and as the latter in the hour of victory drops from the stage when he has played so chief a part, his task is seen to be accomplished, his triumph secured. In the very act of dying he has dealt his foe a blow from which recovery is impossible. Moscow and Waterloo are the inevitable consequences of Trafalgar.

In this passage the keynote of the book rings out clearly. We knew that the author of "The Influence of Sea Power" would place before us this aspect of Nelson's career as it has never yet been presented, that no writer of the present or the past was so competent to deal with Nelson's achievements and to portray him as a director of war. We did not know whether the brilliant naval historian could assume the more difficult rôle of the biographer, and could unveil a living image of the man of simple yet complex nature, of impulse, yet of cold reason. In some respects, at least, Captain Ma han's success in the more delicate portion of his task is complete. He has shown the gradual training of Nelson's mind in the school of experience. He has placed beyond the reach of cavil the fact of Nelson's genius, which a recent writer ventured to question, and he has rightly claimed for that genius in its maturity a wider range than the knowledge of the sea. Like his great antagonist, Nelson was something more than a born leader of fighting men, and both owed their success as directors of war to the insight which, when associated with self-reliance and readiness to accept responsibility, the essence of real statesmanship. Captain Mahan is, however, not in the


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