the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, or for the "Federation of Europe?" But both these pernicious, effete, and misleading phrases are constantly thrust into the forefront as embodying the line of policy abroad to which England would adhere. Therefore it seems clear that Lord Salisbury is out of touch with the feeling of the country, and that, with the exception of a few fanatics, no honest man on either side of the House of of Commons, or in the whole body lords temporal and spiritual, thinks him to be so. one This being the case, let us consider for a moment what this insincerity involves. In the front rank is that general disquiet of the civilized world which must attend the uncertainty of the action of its most powerful member. No stability is possible as long as it is doubtful how England will act. The constant theme of every foreign newspaper, and the great fact which renders speculation impossible and prostrates every effort towards a Of settlement, is uncertain England. every other country in Europe it can be almost accurately predicated what her policy would be in certain eventualities, but of England it is precisely the reverse. Every one knows and sees plainly that if Russia and Germany were at war, France would endeavor to recover the provinces she originally stole and lost again. If Russia attacked Turkey, Austria would seize Salonica, France Syria, Italy alTripoli, and so forth. In fact, in most any possible combination or complication we know how things would go with the European powers; but as to England, it would be futile now to say what we should do. For what we seem to indicate we should do we certainly should not. It is mere diplomatic duin. And plicity, which takes no derive what possible benefit do from it? What was the meaning of our trumpery military display Crete?-a mere handful whom even Greece could have swept into the sea, let alone the Ottoman army. Why are our fleets rushing one we in of soldiers about at enormous expense, to main- war. Are The fundamental mistake in our foreign policy of the present is that we are not studying our own interests. It must be evident to demonstration that the whole business of Crete and Greece has been, in the first place, costly; in the second, useless to England. we embarking in fresh responsibilities? Are we saddling ourselves with some such undertaking as the wretched Cyprus affair, repudiated in the hour of Armenia's necessity with a speciousness of argument which all Europe has chicanery? Are we stigmatized as again playing fast and loose with the honor of the empire, and have the men who sit in our legislative councils the faintest glimmering of what British honor and good faith now mean from Calais to the Corea, from Archangel to Nothing an Englishman can Athens? ever taken seriously. say abroad is ForThere is no faith in us anywhere. eigners stigmatize us as the most immoral nation in the world as regards political pledges. Even an Italian feels he is leaning on a reed, whilst as to a Turk, he knows that it is actually a sword. Now, this is an unwholesome state of 1 There are one hundred thousand Russian troops kept in readiness at this moment to disembark on any point in the Black Sea; in addition to ninety thousand on the Armenian frontier. affairs-as unwholesome for a nation as it would be for an individual. We have no intention of keeping our word or of following up what we are now doing. As usual, we are waiting to see which way the cat will jump. We do not intend to put a farthing on tea, spirits, or tobacco, or to raise what is euphemistically called the income tax, but is the real war tax, to rescue one single Armenian from being butchered or his wife and daughter from violation. We have begun to hedge as usual by saying that after all he is only reaping the reward of his own misdoings. We are very philosophical over it, and are content to have our indignation done vicariously in Exeter Hall by gentlemen whom we think fools for taking so much trouble about it, or by others paid for the job. Of course the complicated race movements which are working out the re modelling of the world are altogether unintelligible to the English people collectively, and it is not to be expected that they should grasp the meaning of the Slav Question, of the rapprochement between Russia and Austria; why the former, who wants to devour him bones and all, is so friendly just now with the Turk; why Austria is only a half-hearted partner in the Triple Alliance through the danger of Magyar unrest or the senseless ambition of the Prince of Bulgaria. Macedonia may be in Africa for all they know; the Berats may be something to eat, Yildiz Kiosk a dancing saloon; but the British people can, and do, gather in a broad sense that things are going wrong, that somehow or other we seem to say we shall fight for the Turk; that we are muddling and meddling everywhere; that the naval and military resources of the country are used for no possible advantage to the empire; that no one trusts us; that even our cousins across the water hate us, more or less; and that there is not a nation in the world who would not be glad to see us reduced to the state of Holland. This, perhaps, is the most pitiable part of the whole affair, and only further illustrates the fact the that comic seems inseparable from the tragic. The unfortunate "Hundred" who have since been covered with ridicule for their manifesto to Greece, were in reality only acting on this supposition. They were "too previous," that was all. Had the tide of war rolled the other way, or war itself been averted, they would have shone forth as models of prescience. Some of them doubtless had an inkling of what was in the wind-or rather what ought to have been; but they reckoned without their host. For at that particular conjunction of affairs Lord Salisbury, acting on his own initiative as regards the Cabinet, made an historic blundera blunder still too near us for its enormity to be fully understood, but destined to bear bitter fruit. And as it is a matter of history, it can no longer be considered unpatriotic to describe it. mo the Before the actual outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and Greece overtures were made to Lord Salisbury, semi-officially, by Russia, which by the light of accomplished facts it is clear would have not only averted the war between the Greeks and Turks but would have the practically solved Cretan question. But from the ment that this well-conceived plan was rejected by Lord Salisbury England lost her influence in the councils of Europe, which up to that time had been gaining ground rapidly, in view of the magnificent display of naval strength we were exhibiting in Mediterranean. But it was soon patent to Europe that it was not within the ability or courage of prime minister to utilize England's sea power to enforce any policy of any kind. He could not rise to the occasion, and stood stripped at once of the mantle of England's great minister, Lord Beaconsfield, which by a mere chance had fallen on him. It is true that through one of those extraordinary intrigues which are always rife in Constantinowas let ple the French ambassador into the secret, but M. Hanotaux, on Russia's request, agreed to a "benevoThus lent neutrality" in the matter. our England was practically left a free of the Turks from Thessaly to mass troops on the Armenian frontier. And no doubt Russia would have done soas she is now doing, "without our leave or by our leave." At Yildiz Kiosk when this scheme became known the sultan was thrown into a state of mind bordering on insanity. Always frightened even of his own shadow, he trembled at the idea of signing the imperial rescript to mobilize the Redifs. His terror that England would act became so great tuat the Shiek-ul-Islam was preparing to denounce him as unworthy to be the khalif. But that aged but astute old person the grand vizier, backed up by the secret intrigues of Germany, literally staked his own head that England would do nothing. The intimate personal knowledge this old man had of Lord Salisbury convinced him that anything but talk about the concert or the Federation of Europe was all that Turkey need fear from England. He had no fear as to the result of actual war, and predicted that Greece would be annihilated. How nearly right he was is now evident. Then came Lord Salisbury's hurried visits to France-those mysterious interviews with M. Hanotaux, who, it is believed, was willing to drop into the arrangement, especially as it checkmated the German policy. But unfortunately the great courtier's journey extended to Nice, and there the paralyzing influence of the German dynasty made itself felt. For her Majesty (as is only reasonable at her advanced age) dreaded the risk of a great war. She no longer had Beaconsfield's character to trust to as when her fleet had sailed up the Dardanelles in 178, facing a tenfold greater danger. Further, she made her firm determination known to hold no jubilee commemoration if the peace of Europe was seriously broken. So his lordship returned to England, and from that moment it is beyond historic contradiction his country ceased to be the paramount power in the crisis, whilst one after the other-first for an effective blockade; then for a conference in Paris; then for a Prince of Battenberg only a dilettante leader of men.' When to be governor of Crete-all his proposals were set aside, even if they were discussed. Then German influence became domInant, with the only natural result that blood has flowed like water and thousands of poor wretches are houseless and ruined who had no concern in the matter. For when England backed out of it, William the Vain stepped in, bearded our sea power with his trumpery cockboats, and hurled the Ottoman army against the Greek nation to make sport for his German generals, and, possibly, to give warning to France that the skill which had crushed her was by no means extinct. Now all this would have been impossible had a single British torpedo-boat been moored in Salonica. But she would not have been really moored. She would have been at single anchor with a slip on her cable and secret instructions up the sleeve of her commander. Now, why should these things be? It is because Lord Salisbury is the exponent of the old policy, and a more feeble but autocratic influence has never been exerted over the Foreign Office. This arises from the inherent weakness of a Unionist Cabinet. Such a Cabinet must of necessity consist of two classes of ministers-those who are too strong to be kept out and who naturally belong to the "other" party, and those who can be counted on to assert no opinions of their own, selected by pure nepotism (in the restricted sense) or by back-stair influence. It is an open secret that Lord Salisbury never condescends to discuss foreign politics with his Cabinet until he has made up his own mind and acted on it. The only person he would listen to is Mr. Chamberlain-not from choice, but from the nature of things. But Mr. Chamberlain has bargained for a free hand with the colonies, and in consideration never meddles with European politics. As to Lord Salisbury's nephew, it is hardly necessary to say that whatever authority he once had in the Cabinet has entirely vanished with the experience now gained that he is the present prime minister's shadow grows less, or betakes itself to the dignified repose of immemorial Hatfield, the Conservative party will be as much adrift for a leader as is the Liberal now. There is not one Conservative member of the Cabinet who has a commanding influence over the others, or any distinct following in the House or country. And thus it is that Lord Salisbury's personal views are of such overwhelming importance, not only for his country but for Europe in general. With his removal opinion would oscillate violently; its control would drop from the nerveless grasp of a hand that could waste months if not years in penning such a work as the "Foundations of Belief," or from the mind that could not rule the House of Commons with the biggest majority that House has ever known within its walls. But, perhaps, the main danger in this matter lurks in the fact that the opposition are equally feeble, equally unwilling or unable, to form a foreign policy. Neither Lord Kimberley nor Sir William Harcourt have had the manliness to state what they would do were they in power. It is the old story. They shelter themselves behind the pitiful excuse that they are not called on to supply a policy; that we must wait to see what they would do, whilst adroitly suggesting that they would do wonders. But this is the old confidence trick again-political thimble-rigging-the same dull shroud with useless bones showing underneath, the same sound and fury covering a world of drivel. But the remedy for this state of affairs is in the hands of the people, and the salvation of the empire would be that at the next election a distinctly national party should arise, national in the sense of England for the British Empire, England for India, Canada, South Africa, Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand-some four hundred million people-instead of England Abdul Hamid the assassin, for En for 1 It would be more just to say dilettevole, for the untry owes much to his delightful culture. break in India not impossible. Anyhow it is an open question. gland dancing attendance on Messieurs thorities consider a Mahommedan outNelidoff and Cambon at Constantinople, equipping Flying Squadrons if Monsieur Hanotaux appears angry over Egypt or if Mr. Olney plucks her by the beard. Then perhaps the infatuated folly of trying to be every one's friend at once; the hopelessness of our attitude on the Eastern question, bewildering alike to ourselves and every one else; the waste of our fighting force, split into innumerable small parties, may dawn on the mind of some thoroughgoing Englishman who may by accident also be a statesman. The time is not far distant when our Foreign Policy will become the paramount question of the day. It is not rightnay, it is ridiculous-that the direction of what involves the lives of millions and the treasure of the empire should be confided to a cell in an admittedly weak man's brain who, but for the accident of birth, would surely have remained obscure. Let other nations groan under an autocracy if they like. Let William II. issue imperial edictsfor he can do it-with the bayonet; let the person who happens to be pro tem. the "adviser" of the czar march battalions over half the globe. But surely we in England should not be dumb before a policy which is nothing if not shifty and perilous. And let us turn for a moment to a concrete aspect of the matter. Do we ever reflect how completely between the devil and the deep sea is our position in Egypt? If we go to war with Russia to keep her out of Constantinople, we must garrison Egypt to prevent the French trying to turn us out. That means at least sixty or seventy thousand British troops, unless we detach a British fleet sufficient to crush the combined French and Russian fleets in the Mediterranean. If Russia attacks the Turk and we do not help him, but try to retain our hold on Egypt, we must send an army sufficient to destroy the not inconsiderable Egyptian Army which we ourselves have created with so much care and with such conspicuous success. In the latter eventuality very many high au But what is not an open question is that a permanently friendly Russia as our neighbor in Asia would render this matter of far less importance, whilst a hostile Russia must mean an increase of our Indian garrison by another sixty or seventy thousand men.1 But it is quite unnecessary to pile up the sum of the responsibilities of the British Empire; Ireland with thirty thousand troops for garrison during profound peace, Malta, Gibraltar, all our colonies, and all our coaling stations, every one insufficiently protected. Are all the military members of the House of Commons wrong in saying how miserably inadequate is our army? All this is within the reasoning power of any one, and is the common knowledge of every one responsible. But we are told that were England to withdraw from the concert the whole thing would go out of tune. That is the business of those who elect to remain in it. It cannot matter to us if they smash all their instruments, nor can we prevent them doing so if they are so inclined. If the German jews-harp gets down the throat of the French horn, or the Russian trombone breaks the back of the Austrian fiddle, it is their affair, and there is no special indication vouchsafed us that it is our duty to interfere. No one but a fool mixes in a street row, and certainly no Englishman of sense would risk his money, much less his skin, to keep Abdul Hamid on his throne. The cacophony of the concert is chiefly because England is always out of tune, always playing air of her own. The position of the other powers is too serious and the consequences too tremendous to allow of any such vagaries on their part. Europe would get on perfectly well without us, precisely as it does without American interference, but the vanity and ambition of our public men keep us within this network of difficulties. an 1 A recent military memorandum puts it at one hundred and seventy thousand. |