out of a wife's separate estate of promissory notes and bills of exchange made and accepted by the husband and wife jointly, or by the wife alone during the coverture; (2) also of the bills of her tradesmen and solicitors, (o) and of debts due for rent of houses taken by her on lease. (p) A married woman may also be placed upon the list of contributories to a company in respect of her separate estate; for if a married woman, having separate property, enters into a pecuniary engagement, whether by ordering goods or otherwise, which (if she were a feme sole) would constitute her a debtor, and in entering into such an engagement she purports to contract, not for her husband but for herself, and on the credit of her separate estate, and it was so intended by her, and so understood by the person with whom she is contracting, that constitutes an obligation for which the person with whom she contracts has the right to make her separate estate liable, and the question whether the obligation was contracted in the manner mentioned must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. (9) If it appears that a bond or promissory note, or any security for money, or any acknowledgment of a debt has been obtained from a married woman by any undue influence on the part of the husband, the court would then decline to interfere to charge her separate estate; but the exercise of such undue influence must be clearly established to repel the prima facie liability. (r) The rule that a feme covert is to be considered a feme sole as to her separate property, does not (~) Bullpin v. Clarke, 17 Ves. 365. Stuart v. Kirkwall, 3 Mad. 387. (0) Murray v. Barlee, 4 Sim. 82. (p) Gaston v. Frankum, 13 Jur. 39. (9) Re Leeds Banking Co., ex parte Matthewman L. R., 3 Eq. 781; 36 L. (r) Fieid v. Sowle, 4 Russ. 112. extend to transactions between herself and her hus band. (s)1 177. Proof of marriage. If parties have lived together as man and wife, and are commonly reputed to be married, this suffices to enable third parties to charge them with the duties and responsibilities that result from such a relationship; (t) and if it be proved that they have actually gone through the marriage ceremony, but that they afterwards separated, there is sufficient evidence of their standing towards each other in the relationship of man and wife, unless a divorce can be proved. No contract entered into by a married woman with a person who knows her to be married, otherwise than by deed acknowledged, or by some act in court in which she is put at arm's length from her husband, can bind her real estate, even although she has for a long time led the other party to believe that she will abide by such contract, and he has, on the faith of such belief, irrevocably abandoned valuable rights. (2) A feme sole trader may, by the custom of London, be sued in the courts of the city of London upon contracts made by her in the course of her trade. (x) 178. Release of the husband from liability upon the wife's contracts after adultery.-Those who furnish the wife with the means of subsistence after a separation by reason of the wife's adultery have no claim against the husband in respect thereof, whether they had notice of the adultery or not, at the time they furnished their goods; for the implied authority of a wife, who is not living with her husband, to bind her husband by her contracts for necessaries, is put an end to by her adultery. (y) The previous adultery and misconduct of the husband form no excuse, in point of law, for the adultery of the wife. (z) But if a condonation takes place, (a) and the husband receives the wife back again, all her original rights are restored; and the husband cannot then refuse to support and maintain her, unless he can prove the commission of a fresh and subsequent act of adultery. (b) And if the husband connives at the adultery of the wife, and continues to reside with her, or permits her to remain under his roof in charge of his children, he cannot refuse to maintain her. (c) If, however, during the husband's absence abroad, the wife places herself and her husband's children under the protection of a man with whom she resides and carries on an adulterous intercourse, without the knowledge of the husband, the husband is not responsible for things furnished to the children by the wife's order, if he has supplied her with money adequate for the maintenance of the children. (d) 179. Desertion of the husband by the wife. If the wife leaves the husband without just cause, she cannot procure subsistence elsewhere, at his expense. If she has returned to a sense of duty, after a short absence, the husband would be bound to receive her back; and if he refused to do so, his liability for necessaries (1) Cooper v. Lloyd, 6 C. B., N. S. 524. (2) Govier v. Hancock, 6 T. R. 603. And see Needham v. Bremner, L. R., 1 C. P. 583; 35 L. J., C. P. 313. (a) Keats v. Keats, 28 L. J., P. & M. 78. (b) Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41. (c) Norton v. Fazan, 1 B. & P. 227 Robison v. Gosnold, 6 Mod. 172. (d) Atkyns v. Pearce, 2 C. B. N. S. 163 'See Quincy v. Quincy, 10 N. H. 272; Hall v. Hall, 4 Id 'See Rennick v. Ficklin, 3 B. Mon. 166. supplied to her would be revived from the time of such refusal. But if she has deserted her husband for a lengthened period, he is not bound to receive her back or maintain her; "for, if it were so, wives might leave their husbands' bed in the pride of their youth, and return in their useless old age." (e) If tradesmen, therefore, part with their goods to a wife living separate from her husband, and then seek to charge the husband with the payment of them, the burden of proving that the separation took place under such circumstances as will entitle them to recover the price from the latter, falls upon their shoulders. (f) "The mischief," observes Abbot, C. J., "of allowing the ordering of goods by a married woman, living apart from her husband, to be prima facie evidence, so as to charge him for them, would be incalculable." (g) 180. Desertion of the wife by the husband.—If the husband separates from his wife, and leaves her destitute, without being able to prove that she has forfeited her marriage rights by adultery, the law gives her a right to support herself upon the credit, and at the expense, of her husband; and any tradesman who, at her request, supplies her with necessaries suitable to her station in life, in contemplation of law, supplies them to the husband himself, and may recover the amount as a debt due to him from the latter. (h) And the wife may also pledge the husband's credit for necessaries for the maintenance of their children of tender years, living with her against his will, by the order of the court. (i) A person who advances, to a deserted wife, money to enable her to supply herself with neces (e) Manby v. Scott, 1 Lev. 5. (f) Clifford v. Laton, 3 C. & P. 16. Edwards v. Towels, 6 Sc. N. R. dt. (g) Mainway v. Leslie, 1 M. &. M. (h) Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41. Bolton v. Prentice, 2 Str. 1214. (i) Bazeley v. Forster, L. R., 3° Q. B. 559; 37 L. J., C. B. 237. saries, has an equitable claim against the husband for so much of the money as is actually applied, by the wife, in paying for necessaries; (k) but if the wife has separate income of her own, adequate to her support, the husband is not, then, bound to maintain her; (7) and if the husband offers to receive her back, and support her, and the wife refuses to return, her authority to support herself at his expense is at an end. (m) The authority, given by law, to a destitute wife to pledge the credit of her husband for her support, is not revoked by the husband becoming insane. (n) But the authority of a wife to pledge her husband's credit, is no greater in the case of a lunatic than where the husband is sane; and, therefore, if she has an income adequate to maintain her in her station in life, she cannot pledge the lunatic husband's credit. (0) The law does not, of course, sanction a wife in running into extravagance. "It makes her the husband's agent to order such things as are reasonable and necessary for herself; but it gives her no liberty to pledge his credit for anything beyond what is reasonably necessary." (p)1 Where a wife, being violently turned out of doors and threatened by her husband, employed an attorney to exhibit articles of the peace against him, it was held that the husband was responsible for the payment of (k) Jenner v. Morris, 3 De G., F. & f. 45; 30 L. J., Ch. 361. Deare. Soulton, L. R., 9 Eq. 151. And see Johnson v. Manning, 12 Ir. C. L. Rep. 148. (4) Liddlow v. Wilmot, 2 Stark. 86. Johnston v. Sumner, 3 H. & N. 266; 27 L. J., Ex. 341. (m) Flannagan v. Bishop Wear. mouth, 8 Ell. & Bl. 455. (n) Read v. Legard, 6 Exch. 642. (0) Richardson v. Du Bois, L. R., 5 Q. B. 51; 39 L. J. Q. B. 69. (p) Emmett v. Norton, 8 C. & P 510. 'As to the authority of the wife to effect insurances in the absence of the husband from home, see O'Connor v. Hart iord, &c. Ins. Co. 31 Wis. 160. |