There was no error in admitting the depositions of Arthur Adams and J. T. Gilliam. In the course of the trial counsel for defendant asked of a witness (Wood) the following question: "Well, don't you know if there had been no ditch there all those times that plaintiff's land was flooded, that the waters would have overflowed from the end of Lander's slough down that depression?" Counsel for defendant also asked of a witness under examination (Powell) the following question: "I will ask you to state whether or not it is a fact that if defendant's ditch was not there in that locality, the waters would flow out of the Kaweah in high water times, and go down and flow through that swag across plaintiff's land?" To this question the plaintiff's counsel objected on the ground that they were irrelevant and immaterial. The Court sustained the objections and defendant excepted. Admitting that the Court erred in sustaining the objections to these questions, the questions were subsequently substantially answered by the witnesses, respectively, and their testimony relating to the subject-matter of the questions was before the jury; therefore, the defendant was not injured by the ruling. We find no substantial error in the record. ment is affirmed. We concur: Sharpstein, J., Myrick, J. DEPARTMENT No. 1. [Filed December 27, 1880.] W. C. SHELDON ET AL., APPELLANTS, The judg AMENDMENT OF RECORD-MAKING DATE OF JUDGMENT CONFORM TO FACT. Where the record of a judgment was amended by changing the date from September 1, 1877, to July 11, 1878, so as to conform to the fact: Held, a proper correction. Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Sacramento County. The judgment in this case appeared from the record, as originally entered, to have been entered on September 1, 1877. A motion was made to change the date to July, 11, 1878, so as to make it conform to the truth. The motion also embraced the change of other dates. It was granted, and plaintiffs appealed and urged that there was nothing in the record to show any error in the dates, and that parol evidence could not be admitted to show error in the record. H. O. Beatty, A. C. Freeman, John T. Cary and John S. Armstrong, for appellants. A. P. Catlin, for respondents. By the Court: This is an appeal from an order of the Court below allowing its records to be amended so as to make them "speak the truth." It satisfactorily appears from the evidence that the records were erroneous in certain particulars, and those errors were corrected by the Court on motion of the respondents. In our opinion the Court acted properly, and within its authority, in directing the corrections to be made. (Rousset vs. Boyle, 845 Cal. 64; McLeran vs. McNamara, August 13, 1880.) Order affirmed. DEPARTMENT No. 1. [Filed December 27, 1880.] L. HIRSHFIELD, APPELLANT. VS. CENTRAL PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, RESPONDENT. COMMON CARRIERS-LIABILITY FOR GOODS STORED AFTER CARRIAGE COMPLETED. Where a railroad company carried goods to their destination and there stored them in its warehouse, until such time as the consignee. who had notice of their arrival, might take them away; and shortly afterwards, the warehouse with the goods was destroyed by fire, without any fault or negligence on the part of the company: Held, that as soon as the goods had been stored, the railroad company was no longer responsible for them as a common carrier; but became responsible only as a warehouseman, and was, therefore, not responsible for their loss. CIVIL CODE, SECTION 2120, AS AMENDED IN 1874. Under Section 2120 of the Civil Code, as originally enacted, a common carrier was responsible as such for goods carried by him until they were delivered, provided they were called for in reasonable time; but in 1874 this section was amended so as to limit the responsibility, after the goods reached their destination, and were stored to await the consignee's order, to that of a mere warehouseman. Appeal from the District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, Kern County. Stetson & Houghton, for appellant. Robert Robinson and A. W. Blair, for respondent. This action was brought to recover the value of certain goods sent by the plaintiff from San Francisco to Sumner, in Kern County. The findings show that the cars of the defendant containing the goods arrived at the town of Sumner, the place of destination, about 10 o'clock A. M., of the sixth day of May, 1875; that about an hour afterwards the agent of plaintiff was at Sumner and was informed and knew that the goods had arrived there, paid the freight thereon and receipted for the goods, and was told that they would be unloaded from the cars and ready for delivery sometime during the afternoon of that day; that about 2 P. M., of said day the teamster of plaintiff called for the goods, but they were not then unloaded. He was informed by the agent of the defendant that the goods would be unloaded and ready for delivery as soon as they could be reached in the regular process of unloading the cars, and thereupon, and before the goods were unloaded, the teamster left Sumnerhe not remaining there more than twenty minutes altogether. The cars were unloaded with all reasonable dispatch, and the plaintiff's goods were unloaded and ready for delivery at or before half-past 2 P. M. of the same day. After the goods were unloaded they were safely placed by the defendant in its warehouse, subject to delivery to the plaintiff at any time when called for. On the night of said sixth day of May the warehouse, with all its contents, including the plaintiff's goods, was accidentally, and without any fault or negligence on the part of defendant, destroyed by fire. The question, therefore, on which the case turns, is whether the responsibility of defendant, when the goods were destroyed, was that of a common carrier or warehouseIf the former, it is liable for the loss sustained by the plaintiff; if the latter, it is not liable. man. The question is answered by Section 2120 of the Civil Code as amended in 1874. That section declares: "If, for any reason, a carrier does not deliver freight to the consignee or his agent personally, he must give notice to the consignee of its arrival, and keep the same in safety, upon his responsibility as a warehouseman, until the consignee has had a reasonable time to remove it. If the place of residence or business of the consignee be unknown to the carrier, he may give the notice by letter dropped in the nearest postoffice.' According to the section as originally enacted, the defendant's responsibility would be that of a common carrier, and therefore liable for the plaintiff's loss; but in 1874 the Legislature saw fit to change the rule and reduce the responsibility, under the circumstances stated in the section, to that of a warehouseman. In this case the agent of the plaintiff had notice of the arrival of the goods at the place of destination, paid the freight and receipted for them. The defendant used proper diligence in unloading them, and when unloaded safely, placed them in its warehouse, subject to delivery to the plaintiff at any time when called for. For the subsequent loss under the circumstances stated, the defendant was not responsible. (Sections 2120, 2119 and 1852, Civil Code.) Judgment and order affirmed. We concur: McKinstry, J., McKee, J. DEPARTMENT No. 1. [Filed December 27, 1880.] No. 7271. THE CARPENTERIA SCHOOLHOUSE DISTRICT OF SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, RESPONDENT, VS. RUSSELL HEATH, APPELLANT. DEDICATION OF LAND TO SCHOOL DISTRICT FOR SCHOOL PURPOSES MAY BE BY PAROL. A person may dedicate land to a school district for school purposes by acts showing an intent so to dedicate it, without executing a deed; and it is unnecessary, to render such dedication valid, that the trustees of the district should formally accept it by vote. ACTIONS BY SCHOOL DISTRICTS-CAPACITY TO SUE. Under Section 1575 of the Political Code an action by a school district is properly brought in the name of the district (designating it). Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, Santa Barbara County. Charles J. Huse, for appellant. W. C. Stratton, for respondent. Ross, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: This actio was brought to quiet title to a piece of land which the plaintiff claims was dedicated by the defendant for school purposes. From evidence which was substantially conflicting, the Court below found as the facts of the case, "that on or about January 1, 1868, defendant dedicated to public use, for school purposes, and particularly for the use of plaintiff, the parcel of land described in the amended complaint; that defendant often declared at and about said time to the trustees of plaintiff and to other persons, that he gave said land to plaintiff for school purposes, that plaintiff accepted said dedication, and in consequence thereof erected its school building upon land immediately adjoining the land dedicated by defendant, plaintiff's trustees intending the latter as and for the play ground of the scholars attending the school; that said building.would not have been so erected at that place but for such dedication by defendant, and so defendant knew at the time; that about said date defendant removed his fence theretofore inclosing said parcel of land so as to exclude said land from his enclosure, and leave it open to the use of plaintiff; that thereupon plaintiff, by its trustees, went into the possession of said land, and has occupied it for school purposes ever since; that soon after defendant himself became one of the trustees of plaintiff, and as such trustee graded and improved said land so that the same could be used for school purposes; and the cost thereof was paid out of the funds of said school district, with the knowledge and consent, and upon the order of defendant; that the dedication aforesaid was not made in writing; but was made by the acts and declarations of defendant;" and upon these facts the Court below entered judgment estopping defendant from claiming the land so long as the same should be used for school purposes. The statement already made disposes of the objections to the findings, under the well-established rule that we will not interfere with the findings of fact when based upon evidence which is substantially conflicting. The only other point made by appellant is that "the trustees must act in the mode prescribed by the Statute creating the corporation, and as no vote of their district enabling them to take the land in dispute is alleged to have been had, they were not empowered to receive a dedication of this land, if it had been tendered to them;" and this, it is claimed, by reason of Section 26 of the Act of April 6, 1863, which was in force at the time the dedication in question was made, and which is as follows: "The District Board of School Trustees shall constitute a body corporate, and shall be entrusted with the care and custody of all school property within such district, and they shall have power to con |