than the fireplace, a discharge or draft-opening faced with a similar pigeon-hole partition, though of greater capacity than the gratings of the fireplace. A cross draft is thus produced, subjecting the ores, as is said, to a greater heat than if the draft were vertical, and the fumes passed out at or near the top of the furnace.

Another feature of the improvements consists in the gradual contraction in width of the furnace towards the bottom with an incline, which conveys the refuse ore to a floor from which it can be readily removed by hand or machinery.

A third feature of the improvements consists in having a small door at the upper end of the furnace, through which the ore is passed into the chamber; and if the chamber is kept filled, the ore will constantly settle towards the bottom, and as it passes between the fireplace and draft-opening be thoroughly roasted, and the vapors carried off through the draft-opening and down a vertical pipe into the

condenser.

The specifications also describe an alleged improvement in the condenser; but as this improvement was not pressed on the argument, it need not be further noticed.

The claims made upon these improvements, omitting the one in relation to the condenser, are:

1. Placing the fireplace and draft-opening on opposite sides of the body of the furnace, so as to draw the heat through the passing ore, substantially as described.

2. Contracting the chamber at the bottom of the furnace in combination with one or more inclined planes, substantially as described.

3. An automatically feeding furnace in which the ore is carried by the superincumbent weight in position to be acted upon by the heat, substantially as described.

The second patent of the complainants is for an improvement in the furnace, by substituting for the pigeon-hole partitions a series of vertical arches, each lower arch receding from the one above, so that the angle would be greater than the slope at which the ore would lie, thus preventing the filling up of the passages. With the pigeon-hole partitions, the finer portions of the ore would gradually work into the holes and fill them up. The receding arches obviate this difficulty. This second patent also embraces a new device for feeding the fire with the brush used for fuel; but as no infringement of this invention is alleged, it need not be further referred to.

The second claim mentioned, relating to the contraction of the furnace at the bottom in combination with inclined

planes, was not pressed on the argument. It was substantially conceded that it could not be sustained. The case of the complainants must rest, therefore, upon the claim for the cross draft with the pigeon-hole partitions, or the receding arches, and the claim for an automatically feeding furnace in which the ore is constantly carried by the superincumbent weight into a position to be acted upon by the heat.

There is no auto

This last claim cannot be sustained. matically feeding furnace in the case. The furnace described is fed by hand at the top of the ore-chamber, and no contrivance is shown for feeding it in any other way. The claim does not correspond with or cover the specifications; and in such cases the patentees are confined to what is expressed in their claim. (Merrill vs. Yeomans, 4 Otto, 568.)

But, assuming that the claim could be extended so as to cover a continuously working furnace, the position of the patentees with reference to it would not be improved. The mode of operation by which ore is constantly subjected to heat was not discovered or invented by them. It had been used in limekilns for many years before their patent was issued, and before their attention had been directed to furnaces for quicksilver-bearing ores. They only applied what was well known and used in other furnaces to a quicksilver furnace.

There is also evidence in this case-not presented, as I am informed, in the Great Western Mining case of the existence and use at various places in Europe of continuously working quicksilver furnaces anterior to the complainants' invention. Professor Church, a gentleman shown to be extensively acquainted with furnaces for roasting and smelting ores, testifies to having seen several of them in operation there. It may be and probably is true, that the complainants were the first persons in this country to put into operation a continuously working quicksilver furnace; but they are not the originators of the idea of a furnace of that kind.

As to the first claim-for the cross draft with the pigeonhole partitions, or receding arches, it is sufficient to say that the defendants are not using those devices, and have not used them, or what can be regarded as an equivalent for them. They are not, therefore, infringers. The fireplace in their furnace has no pigeon-hole partition, and is near the bottom of the furnace. They have no cross draft, but use a vertical draft such as is employed in all other furnaces where an outlet is desired for the fumes of the subject consumed or heated.

This case has been heard upon evidence more extended than that presented in the case of the Great Western Mining Company, and much new. information as to quicksiver and other furnaces previously used has been furnished..

The case has been prepared and presented by counsel on both sides with a fullness and learning worthy of all admiration. It will not probably rest here, but find its way to the Supreme Court of the United States, where all errors of mine will be corrected.

The improvements of the complainants, in my judgment, have not been infringed by the defendant. A decree must therefore be entered dismissing the bill with costs; and it is so ordered.

October 12, 1880.

RICHARD F. KNOX AND JOSEPH OSBORN,

COMPLAINANTS,

VS.

THE NEW IDRIA MINING COMPANY, DEFENDANT.

NEW IDRIA QUICKSILVER FURNACES. The New Idria Mining Company's furnaces are not an infringement of Knox & Osborn's patents.

Wheaton & Scrivner, for complainants.
McAllister & Bergin, for defendant.

FIELD, J.:

This case is in its essential features similar to that of Knox & Osborn vs. The Quicksilver Mining Company. The use by the defendant of a pigeon-hole partition on one side of the furnace, between the ore-chamber and fire-chamber, does not affect the conclusions reached. The defendant has no pigeon-hole partition between the ore-chamber and vaporoutlet, and no equivalent for such pigeon-hole partition. The fireplace in the defendant's furnace is on a level with the bottom of the ore-chamber; while in the complainants' furnace it is some twelve feet above the bottom of the orechamber. The relative position of the fireplace and the vapor-outlet in the defendant's furnace is not such as to create a cross draft, which is the main feature of the complainants' furnace. The draft in the defendant's furnace is a vertical draft.

A decree of dismissal, with costs, must be entered in this case; and it is so ordered.

October 12, 1880.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

[Filed June 14, 1880.]

WILLIAMSPORT GAS COMPANY vs. PINKERTON.

LAW OF COUPONS-PRESENTATION AND DEMAND. There is no obligation on the holder of a coupon bond or coupon to present the same and demand payment within a reasonable time. He is not like the holder of a check or bill of exchange.

PER CURIAM:

The corporation which issues a coupon bond is in the position of the maker of a promissory note, not of the drawer of a check or bill of exchange. There is no obligation on the holder to present and demand it within a reasonable time. The same rule applies to the coupons as to the bond. In fact, he may hold on to the coupons just as long as he can hold on to the bond without requiring payment. The coupon is nothing but an acknowledgement of interest due, and is but an incident of the principal. It is attached to the bond. and may be detached from it for the convenience of the holder. The possession by the corporation is evidence of its payment. The banking house at which it was made payable were the agents of the corporation, and the holder could not lose in any event by their insolvency.

Judgment affirmed.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

[Filed October, 1880.]

CARLI vs. RHENER.

ACTS OF OFFICERS DE FACTO. A person claiming and having color of title to an office by election or appointment, and in possession thereof, exercising its functions and duties, is the officer de facto; and his acts as to the public and parties interested in them are valid, and cannot be questioned, notwithstanding another person may be the officer de jure.

BERRY, J.:

Norgood was and acted as the Judge of the Municipal Court of Stillwater for the two years prior to April 7, 1880. On that day Smith, who had been duly elected as his successor, took the requisite oath of office at five minutes after 11 A. M.; and we may as well assume, what we understand to

be the fact (though it does not appear as it ought to), that he immediately filed such oath in the office of the City Clerk, as by law required, so that he was duly qualified. Norgood, between the hours of 11 and 12 of the same day, and after Smith had qualified, signed findings of law and fact in the case at bar, closing the same with a direction for judgment accordingly.

It appears, though we do not perceive that this is important, that he (Norgood) had arrived at a determination of the case before Smith qualified; but such (his determination) had not been reduced to writing. At the time of signing the findings and direction he had not been made aware that Smith had qualified. The Clerk of the Municipal Court, upon the filing of the findings and direction, on the next day entered judgment accordingly. There is nothing to show that Smith, in fact, took possession of the office for which he had qualified, by exercising any of its functions or duties, until after the findings and direction had been signed and handed to the attorney for the successful party to be filed with the Clerk. Upon this state of facts, we are of opinion that the judgment was valid.

Norgood came into office under an election or appointment (it does not appear which), the regularity or validity of which are not questioned. Under color of this election or appointment he was exercising the duties of the office at the time of signing the findings and direction spoken of. Inasmuch as Smith had qualified, he was de jure the Judge, and Norgood's de jure was, under the statute, at an end. (Gen. St. 1878, c. 64, § 133.) But, as it in no way appears that Smith had taken possession of the office by exercising any of its duties or functions, Norgood, who was exercising its duties under color spoken of, continued and was in possession of it. His case is therefore that of an officer de facto a person having and claiming color of title to an office by election or appointment, and in the exercise of its functions and duties that is to say, in possession of it. The acts of such an officer are valid as respects the public and persons interested therein, and as to them cannot be questioned. (Brown vs. Lunt, 37 Me. 423; State vs. Brown, 12 Minn. 538; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wend. 231; People vs. Peabody, 6 Abb. Pr. 228; Id. 296; People vs. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; Plymouth vs. Painter, 17 Conn. 585; In re Boyle, 9 Wis. 265.)

That one person in the possession of an office may be the officer de facto, while some other person is the officer de jure, is of course admitted, though it is said that there cannot be an officer de jure and an officer de facto both in possession of