goats; and in the absence of any statement on motion for a new trial, or bill of exceptions, we are not advised whether there was any evidence of its value before the Court. We are satisfied, however, that the value recovered should have been the value of defendant's special or limited property only in the sheep and goats. We discover no other error in the record.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial. I concur: Myrick, J.

OPINION CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT OF REVERSAL.

In concur in the judgment in this case, but not on the grounds stated in the opinion of Justice Sharpstein. I am of opinion that if the defendant was entitled to the return of the property, the judgment as entered was proper. Under such circumstances he had a right to the return of the property (for he was then entitled to the possession of it when the action was commenced), and the value was a substitute for the property. Pico could have evaded the payment of the money by returning the property. If Martinez had collected the money under the judgment, he would have held it as he would have held the property if returned to him-liable to account, when the three years (period mentioned in the contract) expired.

The judgment should be reversed because the findings are not sustained by the evidence. The evidence shows satisfactorily that the defendant failed to comply with his contract. This contract was a continuing one from the time the defendant first received the sheep in August and October, 1877. The contract previously made was only reduced to writing on April 6, 1878, with some modification which does not affect this decision. The defendant, in effect, acknowledges the receipt of 1989 sheep by the contract as reduced to writing on the 6th of April. The contract distinctly refers to 1989 sheep, and makes no reference to 1250, as found by the Court. (See second finding.)

It is stipulated that under no pretext shall the defendant dispose of any head of sheep without the consent of plaintiff. It is established by uncontroverted evidence that the defendant did sell some of the sheep without the consent of the plaintiff, of which he never gave any account to him. Upon the evidence, in my opinion, judgment should have passed for plaintiff.

The article of the contract styled "additional article " allows plaintiff to sell his part of the sheep, or interest, as an

entirety, but not any particular sheep or any number of head of sheep. That this is the meaning is evident from the further provision of such article, that defendant may be allowed to take the part or interest, as an entirety, which belongs to him. He is not allowed to take less than his entire part and dispose of them. This additional article thus does not militate with the views taken in the first portion of this opinion. For the reasons above given, in my opinion, the judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. THORNTON, J.

DEPARTMENT No. 1.

[Filed July 28, 1880.]

No. 1526.

COLUSA COUNTY, APPELLANT,

VS.

J. B. DE JARNATT, RESPONDENT.

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS. Supervisors in allowing a claim act as a quasi judicial body, and their allowance is a conclusive adjudication.

Appeal from the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Colusa County.

Jackson & Hatch, for appellant.

A. L. Hart, for respondent.

By the Court:

The action was brought to restrain defendant, as County Auditor of Colusa County, from issuing a warrant in favor of W. G. Dyas, upon a claim in his favor, which had been allowed against the county for legal services rendered by him, in behalf of the county, in an action to which it was a party. No contest was made against the claim itself. When the Board of Supervisors of the county allowed it, they acted as a quasi judicial body; and their allowance and settlement was an adjudication of the claim, which is conclusive. (Sub. 12, Sec. 4066, P. C.)

There is nothing in the complaint to authorize the interposition of a Court of equity, and we are of opinion that the Court below properly sustained the demurrer to the complaint.

Judgment affirmed.

SHERIFF'S DEED IN ATTACHMENT.

A Sheriff's deed executed in pursuance of

an execution sale under a judgment rendered in an attachment suit, takes effect from the levy of the attachment if the levy is such as to create a lien.

ATTACHMENT LIEN-HOW EFFECTED. Two acts are necessary to create an attachment lien-to-wit, service on the occupant or posting on the premises, and filing in the Recorder's office.

JUDGMENT IN ATTACHMENT SUIT. Although the lien of the attachment is merged in the judgment, the latter does not operate so as to release or obliterate the attachment lien. The attachment lien still exists so as to confer a priority in the lien of the judgment.

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District, Los Angeles County.

J. A. Graves, for respondent.

Glassell, Smith & Smith, for appellants.

MCKEE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court:

The action is brought to enjoin the defendants from selling the land described in the complaint, under an execution issued upon an order of the late District Court of Los Angeles County, whereby the defendant Alexander, Sheriff of the County of Los Angeles, was commanded to proceed and sell all the title and interest which one E. F. De Celis had in the land on the 2d day of January, 1877, and which had been on that day levied on by a writ of attachment issued in an action brought by the defendant Pico against the said De Celis. The plaintiff is in possession of the land, claiming to be the owner of it by judgment, execution sale, and Sheriff's deed in an attachment suit, commenced on the 24th day of December, 1876, by one W. R. Rowland, against the same judgment debtors, and also by a Sheriff's deed made to him as a redemptioner of the property from a sale made to one A. B. Chapman against the same judgment debtor. In the Rowland case an attachment was levied on the 26th day of December, 1876. Judgment was rendered on the 21st of April, 1877, and was docketed on the same day. The property was sold on the 25th day of June, 1877, by an executíon issued on this judgment, which commanded the Sheriff

of the county to satisfy the judgment out of the real property belonging to the defendant on the day when the judgment was docketed, or at any time afterward. The certificate of sale and Sheriff's deed transferred to the plaintiff, as assignee of the purchaser at Sheriff's sale, "all the right, title, interest, and claim which the said judgment debtor, E. F. De Celis, had on the 21st day of April, 1877, or at any time afterward, or now has, in and to the lands" described therein.

The case of Chapman vs. Celis was a judgment rendered by a Justice of the Peace on the 31st of October, 1876. Ä transcript of the judgment was filed November 1, 1876; and by an execution issued thereon, the land in dispute was sold on the 27th of November, 1877. From the purchaser at the sale, the plaintiff, as the successor in interest of Celis, redeemed the land; and on the 8th day of June, 1878, the Sheriff executed and delivered to him as redemptioner a deed of all the right, title, and interest which the "judgment debtor had in the land on the 1st day of November, 1876, or at any time thereafter." Under these conveyances plaintiff was let into possession of the land, and was in possession when this action was brought.

It is contended that the deed made to the plaintiff as a redemptioner was void, and transferred no title; that the proceedings by attachment in the Rowland case were irregular and defective, and created no lien; that the Sheriff's deed conveyed to the plaintiff only the estate which the judgment debtor had in the land on the 21st of April, 1877, and that that was subject to the prior attachment lien of the defendant created by the levy of his attachment on the 2d day of January, 1877.

We think it is clear that a Sheriff's deed executed in pursuance of an execution sale under a judgment rendered in an attachment suit, takes effect from the levy of the attachment if the levy is such as to create a lien. Now in the case in hand the officer who levied the attachment returned that he "duly levied the same on the 26th day of December, 1876, by attaching, according to law, all the right, title, and interest of defendant, E. F. De Celis, in and to the following described real estate," being the land in dispute. In this return there is an absence of the acts done by the officer in making the levy. But the legal presumption is that the officer discharged the duty required of him according to law, and that the levy had been made in compliance with the directions of the writ. (Rowan vs. Lamb, 4 Iowa, 468; Reders vs. Wafford, 4 S and M. 579.) The general rule with regard to the execution of mesne process is that all presumptions are in favor

of the regularities of the acts of the officer, and that a return which simply states that the process was executed is sufficient, prima facie, to show a due and proper execution. (Ritter vs. Scannel, 11 Cal. 247.) But this is a disputable presumption which may be controverted; and the officer himself was called by the defendants as a witness for that purpose. To the question, "State how you levied that attachment?" he answered: "That special case, no more than all the balance of them; I levied the whole of them the same all our cases. ** We levied the attachment by posting a notice on the property, together with a copy of the writ of attachment, and also recorded the same about the same time the attachment was put on the land. ** We posted our notice first, levied our writ, posted it up to show the same was levied, and then filed it in the Recorder's office." In this the officer testifies rather as to what was the usual custom of his office in levying writs of attachment than to the levy of the particular writ in question. Whether the inference from that custom was sufficient to repel the presumption that the officer had followed the statutory order in levying the attachment in question was a matter for the consideration of the Court on the trial of the case; and his decision either way would be a decision upon a conflict of evidence which we would not review.

In Wheaton vs. Neville, 19 Cal. 44, it was decided that two acts were necessary to create an attachment lien-to-wit, service on the occupant or posting on the premises, and filing in the Recorder's office. In Main vs. Tappener, 43 Cal. 206, it was held that both acts must be performed in the order in which they are named in the statute. In both these cases the contests were between attaching creditors and purchasers in good faith, for value, each of whom had obtained his deed before the levy of the attachment was completed. In the one case no copy of the writ of attachment had been filed in the Recorder's office until nearly a month after the purchaser had received his deed. In the other, a copy of the attachment had not been posted on the premises until an hour and a half after the purchaser had paid his purchase money, and received his deed; and in both it was held that the doctrine of relation did not help the purchasers at the Sheriff's sales, because the levies of the attachments were not completed before the deeds were delivered to the vendees of the attaching debtor, and that their intervening rights must prevail over the attachment levies. But here no such question arises. The Court below found that the attachment was levied according to law several days before the levy of the attachment in the defendant's case. It was therefore a