ence; and that (3) I (or you) am consequently the One and Only Being. There can be no doubt about No. 3, whatever Mr. Pearson may say about inferring 'other' consciousness when associated with a nervous system, for, as we have already pointed out, it is indisputable that the nervous systems of other so-called people are, popularly speaking, objective to me (or you), and therefore, being really nothing but subjective sense-impressions, form part of the world the existence of which it is forbidden by his argument to infer. I (or you) must regard every other man as no more than a senseimpression of my (or your) own, and myself (or yourself) as the creator and only inhabitant of a non-existent sphere where naught is everything and everything is naught. The idea is a little staggering at first, but we shall soon get used to it. It is only that trivial sense-impression we call the gross Philistine who will cry, Karl, thou art beside thyself; much learning hath made thee mad!'

And now, having annihilated the Universe and extinguished Light, it is only natural that

we should congratulate ourselves upon having nothing left to believe in. But we must not be too hasty. The Universe is not everything; there are abstract truths which are independent of material forms, and—more important stillthere are Ourselves. All through our argument we have taken our own existence for granted, and this without the slightest attempt to support the assumption. Nothing could be more unscientific than to build so important a superstructure upon an unproved hypothesis. Do we exist? is the question now before us. Kant says we do. He analyzed self-consciousness, and proved (to his own satisfaction and that or his followers) that the Ego was separable into subject and object—that is, that each individual self could know itself and think about itself. And the great mass of ordinary people (allowing for convenience' sake that they exist) unthinkingly agree with him. Surely, they say, we know that we exist. Of that first and last possession not all the philosophers who ever talked or wrote can possibly deprive us. We require no arguments to prove our own exist

ence, nor can there be any argument adequate to prove the contrary. contrary. And And yet they had better not be too sure; Kant has not said the last word upon the subject. Doubts-grave doubtshave been raised, and it is now asserted that that of which we feel most certain may prove to be the very thing that it is logically impossible to be certain about-indeed, clear and indisputable as our own existence may seem to each of us, reason positively forbids us to believe in it. Mr. Spencer contradicts Kant flatly, and uses more decided language on this point than on either of the others we have been considering. "Unavoidable," he says, "as is this belief” in the Ego, the individual mind, the persistent element of consciousness, "established though it is not only by the consent of mankind at large endorsed by divers philosophers, but by the suicide of the sceptical argument, it is yet a belief admitting of no justification by reason-nay, it is a belief which reason, when pressed for a distinct answer, rejects." This is plain speaking; there is no doubt, no hesitancy, here. And the argument is so brief, so clear, so simple. Let us have it

in the philosopher's own words.

"The mental

act,” he says, “in which self is known, implies, like any other mental act, a perceiving subject and a perceived object. If, then, the object perceived is self, what is the subject that perceives? Or if it is the true self which thinks, what other self can it be that is thought of? Clearly a true cognition of self implies a state in which the knowing and the known are one-in which subject and object are identified, and this is rightly held to be annihilation of both. So that the personality of which each is conscious, and of which the existence is to each a fact beyond all others the most certain, is a thing which cannot be known at all; knowledge of it is forbidden by the very nature of thought."

Kant's

Now, what can be clearer than this? theory of the separability of the Ego is demolished at once. Instead of our being able to know ourselves, respect ourselves, or think about ourselves, we can do nothing of the kind; any such attempt would bring about the speedy annihilation of any Ego so viciously disposed.

Mr. Spencer's reasoning is absolutely conclusive.

First, he tells us that there is a mental act in which self is known.

Second, he tells us that this knowledge of self implies a state in which the knowing self and the known self are annihilated.

Third, he tells us that self-knowledge is therefore impossible.

It is only the grovelling person who clings to a Belief in Something that is likely to see any contradiction between the first and third members of this argument. Mr. Spencer knows what he is about. Evidently, even if we do exist, it is impossible for us to know it; and this is really tantamount to not existing at all. We are shadows, nothings, or, at the very best, dreams, though who the dreamer is in whose consciousness we figure of course we cannot tell, and no doubt the existence of such a dreamer is in itself unthinkable. Nothing could be more encouraging. There is not, because there cannot be, any Universe, any Light, any Self, or, what amounts to the same thing,