ON THE SPOTSYLVANIA BATTLE-FIELD. thick with dead and wounded men, among whom the relief corps was at work. The earth, which was soft from the heavy rains After the battle was over and firing had we had been having before and during the nearly ceased, Raw lins and I went out to ride over the field. We went first to the salient which Hancock had attacked in the morning. The two armies had struggled for hours for this point, and the loss had been so terrific that the place has always been known since as the Bloody Angle." The ground around the salient had been trampled and cut in the struggle until it was almost impassable for one on horseback; so Rawlins and I dismounted, and climbed up the bank, over the outer line of the rude breastworks. Within we saw a fence over which earth evidently had been banked, but which now was bare and GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, COMMANDER OF THE CONFEDER ATE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA FROM JUNE 1, 1862, TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR. BORN, 1807; DIED, 1870. battle, had been trampled by the fighting of the thousands of men until it was soft like thin hasty pudding. Beyond the fence against which we leaned lay a great pool of this mud, its surface as smooth as that of a pond. As we stood there looking silently down at it, of a sudden the leg of a man was lifted up from the pool, and the mud. dripped off his boot. It was SO unexpected, so horrible, that for a moment we were stunned. Then we pulled ourselves together and called to some soldiers near by to rescue the owner of the leg. They pulled him out with but little trouble, and discovered that he was not dead, only wounded. He was taken to the hospital, where he got well, I believe. The first news which passed through the ranks the morning after the battle of Spotsylvania was that Lee had abandoned his position during the night. Though our army was greatly fatigued from the enormous efforts of the day before, the news of Lee's departure inspired the men with fresh energy, and everybody was eager to be in pursuit. Our skirmishers soon found the enemy along the whole GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT HANCOCK, COMMANDER OF THE SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, IN 1864. BORN, 1824; DIED, 1886. line, however, and the conclusion was that south. We were concentrated to the last their retrograde movement had been made to correct their position after the loss of the key-points taken from them the day before, and that they were still with us, in a new line as strong as the old one. Of course, we could not determine this point without a battle, and nothing was done that day to provoke one. It was necessary to rest the men. The two armies were then lying in a semicircle, the Federal left well around to the degree, and, so far as we could tell, Lee's forces were equally compact. On the 15th, 16th, and 17th, we lay in about the same position. This inactivity was caused by the weather: a pouring rain had begun on the 11th, and had continued until the morning of the 16th; the mud was so deep that any offensive operation, however successful, could not be followed up. There was nothing to do but lie still and wait for better weather and drier roads. While waiting for the rain to stop, we had time to consider the field returns of losses which were handed in. The army had left winter quarters at Culpeper Court House on May 4th, and on May 16th the total of killed, wounded, and missing in the Army of the Potomac and the Ninth Corps amounted to a little over 33,000 men. The missing alone numbered 4,900, but some of these were in fact killed or wounded. When Grant looked over the returns, he expressed great regret at the loss of so many men. Meade, who was with him, remarked, I remember, "Well, General, we can't do these little tricks without losses." OUT-MANOEUVRING LEE. By the afternoon of May 17th, the weather was splendid, and the roads were rapidly becoming dry, even where the mud was worst. Grant determined to engage Lee, and orders for a decisive movement of the army were issued, to be executed during the night. The attempt was a failure. Lee was not to be ousted; and Grant, convinced of it, issued orders for another movement, which he had had in contemplation for several days, but which he did not wish to try till after a last attempt to get the enemy out of his stronghold. This was nothing less than to slip away from Lee and march on to Richmond again. The new movement was begun on the night of the 20th. We had anticipated that Lee, discovering our plans, would try to stop our advance, or at least attack our rear; but he did nothing of the kind. The army was withdrawn absolutely without interruption, and by the morning of the 22d the whole force was south of the Mattapony River. We were now in a fine, clear country, good to move and fight in, and the advance of the 22d was most successful. The operations of the next day were much embarrassed by our ignorance of the road and the entire incorrectness of our maps. Nevertheless, by one o'clock in the afternoon, our right wing reached the North Anna. The rest of the army was soon up, and concerted effort was making to cross the stream, which was soon effected. But now, for the first time, Lee blocked our southward march. By the morning of the 25th, Grant was sure that Lee was before him and strongly intrenched. He soon determined on a new move. This was to withdraw his whole army as quickly as possible, and, before Lee discovered his intention, to move it southeast, across the Pamunkey, and perhaps on across the Chickahominy and the James. The orders for the new move were received with the best spirits by the army, in spite of the fact that the men were much jaded. Indeed, one of the most important results of the campaign thus far was the entire change which had taken place in the feelings of the armies. The Confederates had lost all confidence, and were already morally defeated. Our army had learned to believe that it was sure of ultimate victory. Even our officers had ceased to regard Lee as an invincible military genius. On the part of the enemy this change was evinced, not only by their not attacking, even when circumstances seemed to invite it, but by the unanimous statements of prisoners taken from them. I never saw more discouraged men than some of those we captured in our efforts to get across the North Anna. Lee had deceived them, they said, and they declared that his army would never fight again except behind breastworks. The morning after we began to move from our position on the North Anna, I was so confident that I wrote Mr. Stanton: "Rely upon it, the end is near as well as sure." It was on the night of the 26th that our army was withdrawn from the North Anna. By midnight of the 28th, the troops were all across the Pamunkey and occupying a new position of great strength. The movement had been executed with admirable celerity, and officers and men were in high spirits. The question now was, Where is Lee? By the 30th, we discovered that he was close at hand and strongly intrenched. General Grant wanted to fight, but he declared he would not run his head against heavy works, and so on that day he began to push his lines ahead. This southward move drew Les out of his breastworks, but we did not succeed in bringing on a battle. There was fighting, to be sure, and we suffered heavy losses; but before we were ready for a general engagement, Lee was again concentrated and intrenched on our front. The battle Grant sought did not come until June 3d-that of Cold Harbor. Then, by his order, an early morning attack was made on Lee's line. From half-past four in the morning until half-past one in the afternoon, the struggle to break the rebel line continued, with fearful loss to our army. When convinced that success was impossible, Grant ordered the movement suspended, and the army settled back into position. Again it was evident that Lee was not to be driven from his position. While we lay at Cold Harbor, as when we And again a flank movement was decided had been at Spotsylvania, the principal topic upon, this time south of the James River. of conversation was the losses of the army. But this movement was much more difficult The discussion has never ceased. There are than those from Spotsylvania and the North still many persons who bitterly accuse Grant Anna, and Grant would not move until his pre- of butchery in this campaign. As a matter parations were complete. The result was that of fact, Grant lost fewer men in his sucwe lay for nine days where we had fought. cessful effort to take Richmond and end the During this time the opposing lines were war than his predecessors lost in making very close together, and on our side the the same attempt and failing. An official troops made regular siege approaches to the table showing the aggregate of the losses rebel works. The days passed quietly, with sustained by the armies of McDowell, Mcno fighting except an occasional rattle of Clellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, Meade, musketry and now and then a cannon shot. Butler, and Ord, in the effort to capture the There was frequently a scare on the line, Confederate capital, is here published. for the enemy was so near that in the dark shows exactly what Richmond cost us from our men often thought he was coming out to May 24, 1861, when McDowell crossed the attack; but it never amounted to anything. Potomac into Virginia, to Lee's surrender at As a rule, everything was quiet except the Appomattox; and it proves that Grant in picket firing, which could not be prevented eleven months secured the prize with less loss when the men were so close together. The than his predecessors suffered in failing only time when this ceased was during the to win it after a truces to bury the dead. years.* COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF THE LOSSES struggle of three Sustained in action by the Army of Northeastern Virginia, the Army of the Potomac, and the Army of Virginia, under command of Generals McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade, from May 24, 1861, to May 4, 1864, and the Army of the Potomac (Meade) and the Army of the James (Butler and Ord), constituting the armies operating against Richmond under General Grant, from May 5, 1864, to April 9, 1865: *This is the first complete table ever published of the losses of the armies named; but the comparison was first suggested in the New York "Sun" and other newspapers, some years ago, by Leslie J. Perry, of the War Records Commission.- EDITOR. TROUBLE WITH NEWSPAPER CORRESPONDENTS. The second: HON. C. A. DANA, KINGSTON, GEORGIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR. While we were encamped at Cold Harbor, General Meade was very much disturbed by a letter published in a Cincinnati paper saying that, after the battle of the Wilderness, he counseled retreat, a course which would have destroyed the nation, but which Grant prohibited. This was entirely untrue. Meade had not shown any weakness since moving from Culpeper, nor once intimated doubt as to the successful issue of the campaign. Nor had he intimated that any other plan or line would be more likely to win. The correspondent who was responsible was with us, and Meade ordered that, as a punishment, he should be paraded through the lines and MAJOR-GENERAL A. P. HOVEY, afterward expelled from the army. This was done on June 8th, the correspondent being led through the army on horseback by the provost-marshal guard. On his back and breast were tacked placards inscribed, "Libeler of the Press." If indiscreet newspaper men publish information too near the truth, counteract its effect by publishing other paragraphs calculated to mislead the enemy, such as "Sherman's army has been much reinforced, especially in the cavalry, and he will soon move several columns in circuit, so as to catch Hood's army; "Sherman's destination is not Charleston, but Selma, where he will meet an army from the Gulf,” etc. It was not often, considering the conditions, that correspondents got into trouble in the army. As a rule they were discreet. Besides this case of Meade, I remember now only one other in which I was actively interested; that was a few months later, after I had returned to the Department. Mr. Stanton was annoyed by a telegram which had been published about Sherman's movements, and ordered me to send it to the General, so that we might know how much truth there was in it. I wired him as follows: WAR DEPARTMENT, November 9, 1864. MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN, KINGSTON, GEORGIA. 99 66 W. T. SHERMAN, So I telegraphed to Indianapolis, to General A. P. Hovey, who was stationed there: WAR DEPARTMENT, November 10, 1864. INDIANAPOLIS. In compliance with the request of Major-General Sherman, the Secretary of War directs that you ascertain what persons furnished the information respecting Sherman's alleged movement, published in the Indianapolis "Journal" of the 8th inst. You will arrest them and send them under guard to such point in the Depart ment of the Cumberland as Major-General Thomas may prefer, where they will be employed in hard labor upon the fortifications until General Sherman shall otherwise order. General Hovey never found the man, however. MOVING SOUTH OF THE JAMES. By the morning of the 12th of June, Grant was ready for his last flank movement of the campaign. Our army at that time, including Sheridan's cavalry, consisted of approximately 115,000 fighting men. The plan for moving this great body was as fol Following, copied from evening papers, is sent for lows: The Eighteenth Corps was to move to your information : White House without baggage or artillery, The The Fifth Corps having prepared the way, Sherman sent back two characteristic de- the whole army left the lines about Cold spatches. The first ran: HON. C. A. DANA. KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 10, 1864. Despatch of 9th read. Can't you send to Indianapolis and catch that fool, and have him sent to me to work on the forts? All well. W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. Harbor on schedule time, just as soon after nightfall on the 12th as its movements would be concealed from the observation of the enemy. It was in drawing orders for such complicated movements as these, along different roads and by different crossings, that the ability of General Humphreys, the chief of staff, was displayed. Everything went |