condition, completes the contract. (25 Cyc. 718.) To hold that an insurance policy is not in effect until the date of its delivery, contrary to its own terms, and where there is no agreement of that kind, would throw every case of insurance into doubt and uncertainty by leaving the term to depend upon oral testimony. It would unsettle the contracts of the parties, and it is neither the practice nor the function of courts to make contracts for parties different from those which they have made for themselves. The averments of the declaration are to be construed against the pleader, and it must be held that the policy was in force when the application was approved, the insurance paid and the policy signed and issued at the office of the company.

Much reliance is placed by counsel on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in McMaster v. New York Life Ins. Co. 183 U. S. 25, to sustain the argument that the insurance commenced on July 17, 1904. In that case McMaster made an application for insurance at Sioux City, Iowa, and the application was dated December 12, 1893. By express agreement McMaster was to pay the first year's premium upon the delivery to him of the policies, and the contract was not to take effect until they were delivered. The application said nothing about when the policies should be dated, but after it was signed the agent, for his own purposes, without the knowledge or assent of McMaster, interlined, "Please date policy same as application," and McMaster never knew that these words had been written in the application. The application was forwarded to the company and policies v December 18, 1893, and they were del ber 26, 1893. McMaster did not exami asked the agent if they were as represe sured him for thirteen months, and bein he paid the agent the first annual pren although dated December 18 and in

' dated

bound by its terms. Tibbetts v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. 65 N. E. Rep. (Ind.) 1033.

The policy provided that notice that each and every payment of premium was due was given and accepted by the delivery and acceptance of the policy, and any further notice which might be required by any statute was thereby expressly waived. Under this agreement no notice was required, and it is not contended that notice was necessary unless the statute of New York became a part of the contract. If no notice was required and there was default in payment, the defendant was not required to declare a forfeiture but could set it up by way of defense when sued on the policy. Schimp v. Cedar Rapids Ins. Co. 124 Ill. 354; United States Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, 159 id. 476; 19 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, (2d ed.) 47.

It is contended that notice stating the amount of the premium, the place where it was to be paid and the person to whom it was payable was necessary because of the statement in the application that it was made subject to the charter of the company and the laws of the State of New York. The question was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 179 U. S. 262. In that case the insurance company delivered to Alexander Cohen, in Montana, a life insurance policy, and the application stated that it was subject to the charter of the company and the laws of New York, and the policy contained the same provision waiving the notice required by any statute as the policy in this case. It had been supposed by some courts that the New York statute limited or affected in some way the charter powers of insurance companies incorporated there, but in that case the court held that the obvious purpose of the statute was to reach business transacted in New York; that it did not change any insurance company charter, but prescribed only the proper rule for business transacted within that State. The court did not doubt that a contract executed elsewhere

might by its terms incorporate the law of New York, but held that a preliminary application would not control a stipulation in the policy when issued and that the rights of the parties were measured by the terms of the policy. The conclusion was, that insurance business transacted in other States was not subject to the provisions of the New York statute of 1877 requiring notice as a condition of the forfeiture of the policy for non-payment of the premium, and that the provision in the application was not sufficient to make the policy subject to the requirement for notice. The statute at that time did not limit the giving of notice to cases where there was a post-office address in that State, as it now does.

In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U. S. 551, the facts were that George D. Hill, of Seattle, Washington, signed an application to the insurance company for a policy, and the company accepted the application, issued the policy and forwarded it to the appellant at Seattle, who delivered it to Hill. The policy recited an agreement to pay the amount. of the insurance to the beneficiary at the home office in the city of New York and each premium was to be due and payable at the home office, but, as in this case, it would be accepted elsewhere when duly made in exchange for the company's receipt signed by the president or secretary. The policy also contained the same provision as the one here involved as to the waiver of notice required by any statute. The application provided that the contract, when made, should be held and construed, at all times and places, to have been made in the city of New York. The court said that previous decisions in kindred cases had established these propositions: First, that the State of Washington was the place of the contract; second, the statutory provision of the State of New York in reference to forfeitures had no extra-territorial effect, and did not, of itself, apply to contracts made outside of the State; third, that parties

bility of the sureties upon such bond shall only cease after the treasurer has delivered to his successor, who has duly qualified by giving bond, all moneys, books, papers, securities and property which has come into his hands or control, as such treasurer, from the date of his bond. In Swift v. Trustees of Schools, 189 Ill. 584, on page 588, this court said: "The law is well settled in this State that a township treasurer, by virtue of the statute, is an insurer of the funds coming to his possession; that to exonerate himself upon his bond he must show that he has paid out or disposed of the funds in his hands in pursuance to law, or that he has been prevented from so doing by the act of God or the public enemy."

The rule in this State is, that when the term of an officer is fixed for a specified period of time by the statute, and it is provided he shall hold the office until his successor is appointed or elected and qualified, the mere expiration of the period of time fixed for the duration of the office will not operate to vacate the office, or to impair the powers of the officer to perform the duties of the office, or to release his bondsman for the defalcations of his principal during the period of time that may intervene between the expiration of the period of time specifically fixed in the statute and the appointment and qualification of his successor. People v. Beach, 77 Ill. 52; People v. Supervisor, 100 id. 332.

Third-It is finally contended that there is no competent evidence in this record upon which to base the judgment rendered in this case. It appears that during the time that McIntyre was township treasurer he kept the books and made the reports required of him, as such treasurer, by law. Those books and reports were introduced in evidence, and showed that at the time of his death, after allowing him certain credits about which there was no controversy, there remained in his hands, unaccounted for, the amount of the judgment rendered against the defendants, as sureties, upon his official bond. Said books and reports were competent