the latter place, and the commanding influence it was expected to exert in the ultimate designs of Russia, are significantly suggested even by its name, Sevastopol, signifying Augustan, or imperial city.

As the Crimea has been the principal theatre of the present war, the interest of which has chiefly centred at Sevastopol and its neighbourhood, we accompany the present article with an accurate outline map of the entire peninsula, and a section on a much larger scale of Sevastopol, with its harbour and vicinity, enabling the reader to obtain a clear understanding of the operations of the belligerents.

It will be perceived, by a reference to the map, that the Crimea is a peninsula connected with Southern Russia by the isthmus of Perekop. This isthmus is about seventeen miles long and five broad. It is fortified, and the only ingress or egress to the peninsula by land is through an arched gateway in a rampart running from sea to sea. To guard against the inconveniences which might occur from this position passing into the hands of an enemy, the Russians have constructed across the shallows of the Putrid Sea a great military road, which is said to furnish a more available route for the passage of troops from Russia to the Crimea than the road by Perekop itself. Besides these there is a third route, which is sometimes followed from the eastern parts of the Crimea to the continent. A reference to the map will show that a narrow tongue of land, called the Spit of Arabat, runs up from the eastern corner of the Crimea, almost touching the continent at the Strait of Genitchi. It is quite possible for troops marching into the Crimea to cross the strait, and, .pursuing this road by the Spit of Arabat, to enter the Crimea at Fort Arabat, a few miles north of Caffa.

The allied expedition to the Crimea having first taken possession of Eupatoria, where they landed a small garrison and established a depot, finally made their descent at a point designated on the map as the Old Fort, where they disembarked, without opposition, a body of about sixty thousand men, on the morning of September 14, 1854. The disembarkation was completed without accident, and the troops instantly took up the line of march for Sevastopol. The Allies first encountered their enemy on the line of the river Alma, about fifteen miles to the northward of Sevastopol. The banks of this river are lofty and precipitous, and the Russians, availing themselves of its natural advantages, had fortified it in a manner which they deemed impregnable. This strong position was defended by over fifty thousand men, with one hundred pieces of artillery; but the impetuous gallantry of the allied troops achieved apparent The Alma, the Katcha, the Belbek, and the Tchernaya are all small streams, and are nearly everywhere fordable.

impossibilities, and in three hours the position was forced, and the battle of the Alma won, with a loss to the Russians in killed and wounded of eight thousand men, and to the Allies of nearly half that number. Two days after the battle of the Alma the allied troops resumed their march; and on the afternoon of the same day crossed the Katcha, another small river running parallel to the Alma. The passage of neither the Katcha nor the Belbek was opposed by the Russians; and on Sunday, the 24th of September, the Allies took up a position about a mile and a half in advance of the latter stream.

On Monday morning a reconnoissance was made toward Inkermann, with the view of finding a practicable crossing for the army over the Tchernaya, and the marshy ground on its banks; but the officer by whom it was conducted reported that he could only find a causeway over the morass, and a bridge over the river, with a strong force on the opposite side.

Up to this period it had been the intention of the allied commanders to attack Sevastopol on the north side of the harbour. But in consequence of its difficult approach, and the immense labour of bringing up their siege train by the route pursued by the army, it was determined to make the harbour of Balaklava and some of the small bays that indent the coast near Cape Chersonesus, places of rendezvous for the fleet and depots for supplies. In pursuance of this determination, the army followed the route indicated upon the map, by way of Mackenzie's Farm, and arrived, on the 27th of September, at Balaklava. At Mackenzie's Farm, on the route, Field Marshal St. Arnaud issued his last order, in which he took formal leave of his troops, and resigned his command to General Canrobert.

As it is our aim to give a connected account of the events of the war in the fewest possible words, we avoid all attempts to describe the battles which occurred, and also reluctantly omit many interesting anecdotes connected with them.

On the 28th of September, the second and third divisions of the British army moved up to the heights above Sevastopol, where they encamped. The engineers and artillery men proceeded at once to land the siege-guns, and on the 29th some of them had already been dragged up the heights and temporarily placed in a field in the rear of the position occupied by the troops. The French took up their position † near the sea, having selected as their base of operations the three deep bays lying between Cape Chersonesus and Sevastopol, where they had the advantage of disembarking their siege train nearer the scene of action.

Just in the rear of the point marked "English Attack" on the map. † Vide "French Attack," on the map.

The forces of the Allies, when in position, extended from the mouth of the Tchernaya to the sea south of Sevastopol, forming a semi-circle at the distance of about two miles from the enemy's works. The fire from the trenches opened on the morning of the 17th of October, and continued with slight intermissions until the 25th, on which day the British line of communication was attacked by General Liprandi, and the battle of Balaklava was fought, in which, though the Russians were repulsed, the British lost many men, and their cavalry especially were very roughly handled. On the fifth of November a most determined assault was made by the Russians on the right flank of the besiegers. The attack resulted in what is known as the battle of Inkermann, in which the Russians were defeated with the loss of ten thousand men, while the Allies had near four thousand killed and wounded.

The attack and defence were conducted during the winter with equal obstinacy, though the Allies, and particularly the English, suffered exceedingly from the severity of the weather, and the want of necessary supplies. The ordinary routine of siege duty was steadily pursued for nearly twelve months, relieved by occasional sallies and assaults, which had no decisive result, until the last desperate attempt of the Russians to raise the siege by attacking the line of the Tchernaya, speedily followed by the successful assault and capture of the place itself.

The unexpected duration of the siege of Sevastopol has astonished the world, and given rise to many strange speculations, and the promulgation of many marvellous opinions. Russian sympathizers have discerned in it the evidence of Russian superiority in combat, and unparalleled skill in engineering. Many crude opinions, too,

have been hazarded with regard to the mysterious nature of "earthworks," as though these were some Muscovite discovery in the art of military engineering, which would entirely revolutionize the science of attack and defence of fortified places. Quackery is not confined to professors of the healing art. We may, however, safely assume that there are not many secrets in the science of medicine or of war. Wise men in both professions laugh at such pretensions. We venture the opinion that the siege of Sevastopol was protracted, not because of the unparalleled skill of its defenders, much less of new discoveries which they had made in the art of defence, but solely because the besiegers neglected some of the very first principles laid down by the great instructors in the Art of War.

Marshal Vauban, the highest authority on this subject with military men, says, in his "Attaque des Places," "The success of the assailants will depend upon several things." 1. "The investment of the place." 2. "On the amount of force we can bring to the attack. In attacking a fortified place the besieging force should be at least five times as numerous as the garrison." 3. "On the superiority of the besiegers in artillery. *** After the investment, the next step is to subdue the artillery of the place." Now all these alleged necessary conditions of success seem to have been totally disregarded by the Allies. Sevastopol has not been "invested" to this day. From the day the trenches were opened to the hour of its fall, it was open to the north, and in uninterrupted communication with the Russian army in the field. The required superiority in the besieging force was never possessed by the Allies, for, from the most reliable accounts, they have never had, at the most, more than a bare equality of numbers. The old marshal's third condition has been equally disregarded. "To subdue the artillery of the place," is held to be a sine qua non by military men, which, if neglected, can only be atoned for by the sacrifice of men. But if the reports from the Crimea may be relied upon, Sevastopol has constantly been superior to its assailants in both the number and calibre of its guns.

Vauban makes the success of an attack depend on several other things; but those mentioned are sufficient to show that the protracted defence of Sevastopol may be accounted for without assuming any remarkable discoveries in engineering on the part of General Todtleben, or any special virtues in the "earthworks" thrown up under his direction. "Earthworks" are simply ramparts of earth thrown up to furnish an extempore protection when time is wanted to erect more durable defences; and, so far from being novelties, they were doubtless the earliest method resorted to, to strengthen a position threatened by an enemy.

FOURTH SERIES, VOL. VIII. 5