their salvation, to the disposal of his providence. Only let us take care, my dear brethren, (and with this single exhortation we conclude,) let us take care, that we do not flatter ourselves into an opinion that we possess this wisdom while we are destitute of it: and let us take care, while we exclaim against the extravagance of those madmen, of whom I just now spoke, that we do not imitate their dangerous examples.

But what is it possible to find, among beings who have the least spark of reason, an individual mad enough to suppose himself wiser than that God who is great in counsel,' or, is there one who dares resist a God, 'mighty in working?' My brethren, one of the most difficult questions, that we meet with in the study of human nature, is, whether some actions in men's lives proceed from intentions in their minds. To aflirm, or to deny, is equally difficult. On the one hand, we can hardly believe that an intelligent creature can revolve intentions in his mind directly opposite to intelligence, and the extravagance of which the least ray of intelligence seems sufficient to discover. On the other, we can hardly think it possible, that this creature should follow a course of life altogether founded on such an intention, if indeed he have it not in his mind. The truth is, a question of this kind may be either affirmed or denied according to the different lights in which it is considered. Put these questions to the most irregular of mankind: Dost thou pretend to oppose God? Hast thou the presumption to attempt to prevail over him by thy superiority of knowledge and power? Put these questions simply apart from the conduct, and ye will hardly meet with one who will not answer No. But examine the conduct, not only of the most irregular men, but even of those who imagine that their behaviour is the most prudent; penetrate those secret thoughts, which they involve in darkness in order to conceal the horror of them from themselves; and ye will soon discover that they, who answered so pertinently to your questions when ye proposed them simply, will actually take the opposite side when ye propose the same questions relatively. But who then, ye will ask me, who are those men, who presumptuously think of overcoming God by their superior knowledge and power?

Who? It is that soldier, who, with a brutal courage, defies danger, affronts death, resolutely marches amidst fires and flames, even though he has taken no care to have an interest in the Lord of hosts, or to commit his soul to his trust.

Who? It is that statesman, who, despising the suggestions of evangelical prudence, pursues stratagems altogether worldly; who makes no scruple of committing what are called state-crimes; who with a disdainful air, affects to pity us, when we affirm, that the most advantageous service that a wise legislator can perform for society, is to render

the Deity propitious to it; that the happiest nations are those whose God is the Lord.' Ps. xxxiii. 12.

Who? It is that philosopher, who makes a parade of I know not what stoical firmness; who conceits himself superior to all the vicissitudes of life; who boasts of his tranquil expectation of death, yea, who affects to desire its approach, for the sake of enjoying the pleasure of insulting his casuist, who has ventu red to foretell that he will be terrified at it.

Who? It is that voluptuary, who opposes to all our exhortations and threatenings, to the most affecting denunciations of calamities from God in this life, and to the most awful descriptions of judgment to come in the next, to all our representations of hell, of an eternity spent in the most execrable company, and in the most excruciating pain; who opposes to all these the buz of amusements, the hurry of company, gaming at home, or diversions

abroad.

Study all these characters, my brethren, lay aside the specious appearances that men use to conceal their turpitude from themselves, and ye will find that, to dare the Deity, to pretend by superior knowledge and strength to resist the wisdom and omnipotence of God, is not so rare a disposition as ye may at first have supposed.

Let us abhor this disposition of mind, my brethren; let us entertain right notions of sin; let us consider him who commits it as a madman, who has taken it into his head that he has more knowledge than God, the fountain of intelligence; more strength than He, beneath whose power all the creatures of the universe are compelled to bow. When we are tempted by sin, let us remember what sin is: let each ask himself, What can I, a miserable man, mean? Do I mean to provoke the Lord to jealousy? Do I pretend to be stronger than he? Can I resist his will? Shall I set briars and thorns against him in battle ? · He will go through them, he will burn them together,' 1 Cor. x. 22. Rom. ix. 19. Isa. xxvii. 5. Let us seek those benefits in a communion with the great God, of which our fanciful passions can only offer the shadows. Let us not pretend to deceive him by the subtilty of our stratagems; but let us endeavour to please him by acknowledging our doubts, our darkness, and our ignorance; the fluctuations of our minds about the government of the state, the management of our families, and above all, the salvation of our souls. Let us not appear in his presence boasting of our natural power; but let us present ourselves before him weak, trembling, and undone. By the greatness of his compassion let us plead with him to pity our meanness and misery. Let our supplies flow from the fountains of his wisdom and power; this is real wisdom; may God inspire us with it. This is substantial happiness; may God impart it to us. Amen. To him be honour and glory for ever.

God am holy.

I ADDRESS to all the faithful, whom the devotion of this day has assembled in this sacred place, the command which Moses by the authority of God addressed to all the congregation of Israel. However venerable this assembly may be, to which I am this day called by Providence to preach, it cannot be more august than that to which the Jewish legislator formerly spoke. It was composed of more than eighteen hundred thousand persons. There were magistrates appointed to exercise justice, and to represent God upon earth. There were priests and Levites, consecrated to the worship of God, and chosen by him to signify his will to the church. There were various ranks and degrees of men proportional to so great a multitude of people. God had given particular laws before, which were adapted to their different ranks, and to their various circumstances. But this is a general law: a law which equally belongs to magistrates, priests, and Levites: a law which must be observed at all times, and in all places. This is the law of holiness; 'Speak unto all the congregation of the children of Israel, and say unto them, Ye shall be holy; for I the Lord your God am holy.'

I repeat it again, my brethren, I address to all the faithful, whom the devotion of this day has assembled in this sacred place, the same precept that God commanded Moses to address to all the congregation of Israel. The law of holiness, which I preach to-day, commands you, our supreme governors. Arbiters of your own laws, ye see no mortal upon earth to whom ye are accountable for your conduct, but there is a God in heaven whose creatures and subjects ye are, and who commands you to be holy. The law of holiness commands you, priests and Levites of the New Testament. The sacred character, with which ye are invested, far from dispensing with your obligation to holiness, enforceth it on you in a more particular manner. law commands you all, my dear hearers, of what order, of what profession, of what rank soever ye be. If ye be a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, a peculiar people, ye ought also to be a holy nation, that ye may show forth the praises of him who hath called you out of darkness into his marvellous light,' 1 Pet. ii. 9. Whatever prerogative Moses had above us, we have the same law to prescribe to you that he had to Israel; and the voice of Heaven says to us now, as it said once to him, Speak to all the congregation of the children of Israel, and say unto them,

This

Ye shall be holy: for I the Lord your God am holy.'

This discourse will have three parts. The term holiness is equivocal, and consequently, the command ye shall be holy, is so. We will endeavour to fix the sense of the term, and to give you a clear and distinct idea of the word holiness: this will be our first point.

Holiness, which in our text is attributed to God, and prescirbed to men, cannot belong to such different beings in the same sense, and in all respects. We will therefore examine in what sense it belongs to God, and in what sense it belongs to men; and we will endeavour to explain in what respects God is holy, and in what respects men ought to be holy this will be our second part.

Although the holiness that is attributed to God, differs in many respects from that which is prescribed to men, yet the first is the ground of the last. The connexion of these must be developed, and the motive enforced, 'ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy' this shall be our third part. And this is the substance of all that we intend to propose.

I. The term holiness is equivocal, and consequently, the command, ye shall be holy, is Let us endeavour to affix a determinate sense to the term, and to give you a clear and distinct idea of the meaning of the word holiness. The original term is one of the most vague words in the Hebrew language. In general, it signifies to prepare, to set apart, to devote. The nature of the subject to which it is applied, and not the force of the term, must direct us to determine its meaning in passages where it occurs. An appointment to offices the most noble, and the most worthy of intelligent beings, and an appointment to offices the most mean and infamous, are alike expressed by this word. The profession of the most august office of the high priesthood, and the abominable profession of a prostitute, are both called holiness in this vague sense.

The poorest languages are those in which words are the most equivocal, and this is the character of the Hebrew language. I cannot think with some, that it is the most ancient language in the world; the contrary opinion, I think, is supported by very sufficient evidence. However, it must be granted, that it has one grand character of antiquity, that is, its imperfection. It seems to have been invented in the first ages of the world, when mankind could express their ideas but imperfectly, and before they had time to render lan

guage determinate, by affixing arbitrary names to the objects of their ideas.*

This remark may at first appear useless, particularly in such a discourse as this, It is, however, of great consequence; and I make it here for the sake of young students in divinity for, as the writers of the holy Scriptures frequently make use of terms, that excite several ideas, the reasons of their choosing such terms will be inquired: and on such reasons as the fancies of students assign, some maxims, and even some doctrines will be grounded. I could mention more mysteries than one, that have been found in Scripture, only because on some occasions it uses equivocal terms. An interpreter of Scripture, should indeed assiduously urge the force of those emphatical expressions which the Holy Spirit sometimes uses to signify, if I may so speak, the ground and substance of the truth; but at the same time, he should avoid searching after the marvellous in other expressions, that are employed only for the sake of accommodating the discourse to the genius of the Hebrew tongue.

The force of the term holiness, then, not being sufficient to determine its meaning, its meaning must be sought elsewhere. We must inquire the object to which he devotes himself, who in our Scriptures is called holy. For, as all those words, ye shall be holy, for I am holy, are equal to these, ye shall be set apart, or ye shall be devoted, for I am set apart, or devoted, it is plain that they cannot be well explained unless the object of the appointment or designation be determined. This object is the matter of our present inquiry, and on the investigation of this depends our knowledge of what we call holiness. Now, this subject is of such a kind, that the weakest Christian may form some idea of it, while the ablest philosophers, and the most profound divines are incapable of treating it with the precision, and of answering all the questions that a desire of a complete explication may produce.

The weakest Christians may form (especially if they be willing to avail themselves of such helps as are at hand) some just notions of what we call holiness. It seems to me, that in this auditory at least, there is not one who is incapable of pursuing the folperson lowing meditation to which I entreat your

attention.

Suppose, in a world entirely remote from you, a society, to which ye have no kind of relation, and to which ye never can have any. Suppose that God had dispensed with an obedience to his laws in favour of this society, had permitted the members of it to live as they thought proper, and had assured them that he would neither inflict any punishment upon them for what we call vice, nor bestow any rewards on an attachment to what we call virtue. Suppose two men in this society, making an opposite use of this independence. The one says to himself, Since I am the arbiter of my own conduct, and the Supreme Being, on whom I depend, has engaged to re

* It is granted by the Rabbins, that the Hebrew words which have distinct imports were differently pronounced by the people; as Sheol, which significs both Saul and the grave. J. S.

quire no account of my actions, I will consult no other rule of conduct than my own inter

est.

Whenever it may be my interest to deny a trust reposed in me, I will do it without reluctance. Whenever my interest may require the destruction of my tenderest and most faithful friend, I myself will become his executioner, and will stab him. Thus reasons one of them.

The other, on the contrary, says, I am free indeed, I am responsible only to myself for my conduct, but, however, I will prescribe to myself some rules of action, which I will inviolably pursue. I will never betray a trust reposed in me, but I will, with the utmost fidelity discharge it, whatever interest I may have to do otherwise. I will carefully preserve the life of my friend, who discovers so much fidelity and love to me, whatever interest I may have in his destruction. We ask those of our hearers who are the least acquainted with meditations of this kind, whether they can prevail with themselves not to make an essential difference between those two members of the supposed society? We ask, whether ye can help feeling a horror at the first, and a veneration for the last of these men? Now this conduct, or the principles of this conduct, for which we cannot help feeling veneration and respect, although the whole passes in a world, and in a society to which we have no relation, and to which we never can have any, these are the principles, I say, to which he is devoted, whom our Scriptures cali holy: these principles are what we call virtue, rectitude, order, or, as the text expresses it, holiness. "Ye shall be holy for I the Lord your God am holy.'

on

Let us proceed a little farther in our meditation, and let us make a supposition of another kind. Ye have all some idea of God. Ye have at least this notion of him, that he is supremely independent, and that none can punish or reward him for the use he makes of his independence. Suppose, as well as ye can without blasphemy, that he should lavish his favours on the faithless depository, whom we just now mentioned, and should withhold them from the other that he should heap benefits upon him who would stab his tenderest and most faithful friend, and expose the other to indigence and misery. Suppose, the contrary, that God should liberally bestow his favours on the faithful depository, and refuse them to the other. I ask those of my hearers who are the least acquainted with a meditation of this kind, whether they can help making an essential difference between these two uses of independence? Can ye help feeling more veneration and respect for the Supreme Being in the latter case than in the former? Now, my brethren, I repeat it again, the laws according to which the Supreme Being acts, are the laws to which the person is appointed, or set apart, who in the holy Scriptures is denominated holy. Conformity to these laws is what we call virtue, rectitude, order, or as the text expresses holiness. In this manner, it seems to me, that the weakest Christian (if he avail him self of such helps as are offered to him) may form an adequate idea of holiness.

it,

However, it is no less certain that the ablest

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philosophers, and the most consummate diVines, find it difficult to speak with precision on this subject, and to answer all the questions that have arisen about it. Perhaps its perspicuity may be one principal cause of this difficulty for it is a rule, of which we inform those to whom we teach the art of reasoning justly, that when an idea is brought to a certain degree of evidence and simplicity, every thing that is added to elucidate, serves only to obscure and perplex it. Has not one part of our difficulties about the nature of right and wrong arisen from the breach of this rule?

From what we have heard, in my opinion, we may infer, that all mankind have a clear and distinct idea of holiness, even though they have no terms to express their ideas of it with justness and precision. It seems to me that every mechanic is able to decide the following questions, although they have occasioned so many disputes in schools. On what is the difference between a just and an unjust action founded; on interest only? or on the will of the Supreme Being only, who hath prescribed such or such a law? For, since we cannot help execrating a man who violates certain laws, though the violation does not at all affect our interest, it is plain, we cannot help acknowledging, when we reflect on our own ideas, that the difference between a just and an unjust action is not founded on interest only. And since we cannot help venerating the Supreme Being more when he follows certain laws than when he violates them, it is plain we cannot help acknowledging that there is a justice independent of the supreme law which has prescribed it.

Should any one require me to give him a clear notion of this justice, this order, or holiness, which is neither founded on the interest of him who obeys it, nor on the authority of the Supreme Being who commands it, this should be my answer.

By justice I understand that fitness, harmony, or proportion, which ought to be between the conduct of an intelligent being, and the circumstances in which he is placed, and the relations that he bears to other beings. For example, there is a relation between a benefactor who bestows, and an indigent person who receives, a benefit; from this relation results a proportion, a harmony, or a fitness between benefit and gratitude, which makes gratitude a virtue. On the contrary, between benefit and ingratitude there is a disproportion, a dissonance, or an incongruity, which makes ingratitude injustice. In like manner, between one man, who is under oppression, and another who has the power of terminating the oppression by punishing the oppressor, there is a certain relation from which results a proportion, a harmony, or a fitness in relieving the oppressed, which makes the relief an act of generosity and justice.

All mankind have a general notion of this proportion, harmony, or fitness. If they are sometimes dubious about their duty, if they sometimes hesitate about the conduct that justice requires of them on certain occasions, it is not because they doubt whether every

action ought to have that which I call proportion, harmony, or fitness; but it is because, in some intricate cases, they do not clearly perceive the relation of a particular action to their general notion of justice. Every man has an idea of equality and inequality of numbers. Every man knows at once to which of these two ideas some plain and simple numbers belong. Every body perceives at once a relation between the number three, and the idea of inequality and every body perceives instantly a relation between the number two and the idea of equality. But should I propose a very complex number to the most expert arithmetician, and ask him to which of the two classes this number belongs, he would require some time to consider, before he could return his answer: not because he had not very clear ideas of equality and inequality, but because he could not at first sight perceive whether the number proposed were equal or unequal. The arithmetician, whom I have supposed, must study to find out the relation: as soon as he discovers it he will readily answer, and tell me whether the number proposed be equal or unequal.

Apply this example to the subject in hand. All mankind, according to our reasoning have a general notion of a fitness, that ought to be between the conduct of an intelligent being and the circumstances in which he is placed, and the relations that he bears to other beings. Always when a man perceives that a particular action has such a fitness, or has it not, he will declare without hesitation that the action is just or unjust. If he hesitate in some cases, it is because he does not perceive the relation of the action in question to this fitness. It belongs to casuists to solve difficulties of this kind. I perceive at once a relation between him who receives a benefit, and him who confers it; and from this relation I conclude, that there is a fitness between gratitude and the circumstances of the receiver: therefore I declare without hesitating, that gratitude is a virtue, and that ingratitude is a vice. But should I be asked whether it were a virtue or a vice to kill a tyrant, I might hesitate because I might not at first perceive what relation there is between the killing of a tyrant, and the fitness that ought to subsist between the conduct of a subject and his relation to a tyrant.

Should any one still urge me to give him clearer ideas of that which I call the proportion, the harmony, or the fitness of an action, I would freely own that I could not answer his inquiry. But, at the same time, I would declare that my inability did not arise from the obscurity of my subject, but from the allsufficiency of its evidence. I would recur to the maxim just now mentioned, that when a subject is placed in a certain degree of evidence and simplicity, every thing that is added to elucidate, serves only to darken and to perplex it.

Should my inquirer still reply that he had no idea of that which I call the proportion, the harmony, or the fitness of an action, I should consider him as a being of a species different from mine, and I should not think of conversing with him. There are some com

mon ideas, some maxims that are taken for granted, even by the most opposite parties: and when those maxims are disputed, and those ideas not admitted, there is an end of conversing and reasoning.

This is a general notion of holiness. But the holiness that is attributed to God, and prescribed to men, in the text, cannot belong in the same sense, and in every respect, to such different beings. We are going to examine then, in the second place, in what sense it agrees to God, and in what sense it agrees

to man.

II. What has been said of holiness in general, will serve to explain in what sense God is holy, and in what sense men ought to be holy. The general principle of holiness is common to God and man. The general principle of holiness, as has been already shown, is a perfect proportion, harmony, or fitness, between the conduct of an intelligent being and his relations to other beings. The holiness of God is that perfect harmony, proportion, or fitness, that subsists between his conduct (if I may be allowed to speak thus of God) and his relations to other beings. The holiness of man consists in the same. But as the circumstances and relations of God differ from those of men, the holiness of God and the holiness of men are of different kinds. And it is the difference of these relations that we must distinguish, if we would give a proper answer to the questions in hand: In what sense, and in what respects, holiness ascribed to God? In what sense, and in what respects, is holiness prescribed to men?

The first question, that is, What relations has God with other beings, is a question so extensive, and so difficult, that all human intelligence united in one mind, could not return a sufficient answer. We have been accustomed to consider our earth as the principal part of the universe, and ourselves as the most considerable beings in nature. Yet our earth is only an atom in the unbounded space, in which it is placed: and we are only a very inconsiderable number in comparison of the infinite multitude and the endless variety of creatures which the Great Supreme has made. There is an infinite number of angels, seraphims, cherubims, thrones, dominions, powers, and other intelligences, of which we have no ideas, and for which we have no names. God has relations to all these beings; and on the nature of those relations depends the nature of that order, justice, or holiness, which he inviolably maintains in respect to them. But let us not lose ourselves in these immense objects. Let us only fix our meditation on God's relations to men, and we shall form sufficient ideas of his holiness.

What relation does God bear to us? God has called us into existence; and there are between us the relations of Creator and creature. But what harmony do we think there ought to be between the conduct of God to us, and the relation that he bears to us of a Creator to creatures? Harmony, or fitness, seems to require that God, having brought creatures into existence, should provide for their support, and, having given them certain faculties, should require an account of the use that is made of them. This is the first idea

It does

that we form of the holiness of God. not appear to us fit, or agreeable to order, that God, after having created intelligent beings, should abandon them to themselves, and not regard either their condition or their conduct. On this principle we ground the doctrine of Providence, and reject the extravagant system of the Epicurians.

What relation does God bear to us? God has given us a revelation. He has proposed some principles to us. Between God and us there are the relations of tutor and pupil. But what fitness do we think there ought to be between the conduct of God and the relation of a tutor to a pupil, that subsists between him and us? It is fit, I think, that a revelation proceeding from God should be conformable to his own ideas; and on this principle we ground the doctrine of the truth, or, as the schools call it, the veracity of God, and maintain with St. Paul, even independently of the authority of St. Paul, that it is impossible for God to lie,' Heb. vi. 18.

What relation does God bear to us? God has made a covenant with us: to certain conditions in that covenant he has annexed certain promises. Between God and us there subsist the relations of two contracting parties. What fitness do we think, there ought to be between the conduct of God and that relation of an ally, which he bears to us? We think that there is a harmony, or a fitness, in his fulfilling the articles of the covenant, and on this principle we ground our expectation of the accomplishment of his promises, and believe that all the promises of God are yea, and amen,' 2 Cor. i. 20.

What relation subsists between God and us? God has given us certain laws. Between God and us there are the relations of a lawgiver and subjects. What harmony, do we think, there ought to be between the conduct of God and the relation of a legislator to a subject! We think, harmony requires that the laws prescribed to us should be proportional to our ability; that nothing should be required of us beyond our natural power, or the supernatural assistances that he affords: and on this principle we reject a cruel system of divinity, more likely to tarnish than to display the glory of the Supreme Being on this principle we say with St. James, If any of you lack wis dom, let him ask of God, that giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not,' Jam. i. 12. on this principle we say with St. Paul, that as many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law and as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law,' Rom. ii. 12. Follow this train of reasoning, my brethren, reflect on the other relations that God bears to mankind; examine, as far as ye are capable of examining, the harmony that subsists between the conduct of God and those relations; and the farther ye proceed in meditations of this kind, the more just and the more enlarged will be your ideas of the holiness of God.

But perhaps some may accuse me of taking that for granted which remains to be proved, and of grounding my whole system of the ho liness of God on a disputed principle, the truth of which I have not yet demonstrated that is, that there does subsist such a perfect har

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