a convenient and comparatively nonburdensome means of revenue. They were well known in Roman jurisprudence (1 Gibbon's Rome, 133), and were imposed upon all successions, except those to the nearest relatives and to the poor. The practice has long been resorted to in European countries, and was introduced in England in the last century, and was enlarged from time to time till 1853, when it was extended to all successions to real property, chattels real, and a vast variety of personal property and rights.

In this country they were imposed by Congress, by acts of June 30, 1864, and July 13, 1866, which were repealed in 1870. They were held by the supreme court of the United States to impose an excise tax or duty, and, as such, not in violation of the constitution of the United States: Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall. 331.

The policy of taxing collateral inheritances was adopted in Pennsylvania in 1826, and has been adhered to ever since. In 499 that state the statute has been constantly recognized as valid by its supreme court: Strode v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. St. 181; Orcutt's Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 179; Bittinger's Estate, 129 Pa. St. 338.

In Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, New York, and several other states, laws imposing succession taxes have been enacted, and are now in force, that of Virginia dating back to 1844, of Delaware to 1869, Maryland to 1864; the others of more recent date. In Maryland the act was attacked as in violation of the declaration of rights, in the constitution of 1864, which declared "that the levying of taxes by the poll is grievous and oppressive, and ought to be prohibited; that paupers ought not to be assessed for the support of the government, but every other person in the state, or person holding property therein, ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes for the support of government, according to his actual worth in real or personal property; yet fines, duties, or taxes may properly and justly be imposed or laid, with a political view, for the good government and benefit of the community." But the court of appeals held the statute to be constitutional. Robinson, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "We have not the slightest doubt as to the constitutionality of the law. . . . . The restrictions imposed by it [the constitution] upon the legislative power, as to the objects of taxation, are explicitly declared. Poll taxes are denounced as grievous and oppressive, paupers are exempted from assess

ment, and all other persons are required to pay their propor tion of public taxes, according to the value of their property. Arbitrary taxes on property without regard to value are expressly prohibited, and all measures for the collection and imposition of taxes upon property are required to conform to this general principle of equality. Whilst thus providing for a uniform mode of taxation on property it was not the pur. pose of the framers of the constitution to prohibit any other species of taxation, but to leave the legislature the power to impose such other taxes as the necessities of the governinent might require": Tyson v. State, 28 Md. 586; State v. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 294.

500 In Virginia the supreme court held the same doctrine in Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Gratt. 430; 73 Am. Dec. 367. In that case the court said: "The right to take property by devise or descent is the creature of the law, and secured and protected by its authority. The legislature might, if it saw proper, restrict the succession to a decedent's estate, either by devise or descent, to a particular class of his kindred, say to his lineal descendants and ascendants, and it might impose terms and conditions upon which collateral relatives may be permitted to take it; or it may to-morrow, if it please, absolutely repeal the statute of wills and that of descents and distributions, and declare that, upon the death of a party, his property shall be applied to the payment of his debts, and the residue appropriated to public uses."

The statute of New York, chapter 483 of the laws of 1885, contains substantially the same provisions, and nearly the same exemptions, as the first section of chapter 146 of the laws of 1893 of our state. It does not differ in principle from ours. The question of the constitutionality of this act came before the New York court of appeals, in Matter of McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306, 58 Am. Rep. 502, and that court said: "We entertain no doubt that such a tax can be constitutionally imposed. The power of the legislature over the subject of taxation, except as limited by constitutional restrictions, is unbounded. It is for that body, in the exercise of its discretion, to select objects of taxation. It may impose all the taxes upon land, or all upon personal property, or all upon houses or upon incomes." A like statute in New Hampshire was held by the supreme court of that state to be in violation of that state's constitution, which empowered the legislature to assess and lay taxes, but expressly limited that grant of

power to "proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes upon all the inhabitants and residents within the said state, and upon the estates within the same." And by section 12 of the bill of rights, that every member of the community "is bound to contribute his share to the expense" of the state: Curry v. Spencer, 61 N. H. 624; 60 Am. Rep. 337.

We are not aware that the question has been decided in any other state where similar statutes exist. These decisions of 301 the courts, being based upon constitutions containing provisions, in some cases unlike, and in others like, but not the same, as our constitution, have a lessened weight as authority here. In Virginia the constitution required taxes to be equal and uniform. In Maryland the constitutional provision required every person holding property to contribute his proportion of public taxes, according to his actual worth in real or personal property. But whatever may be the particular language of the several state constitutions all the cases assume that the constitution, either in terms or by necessary implication, requires taxation of property to be equal and uniform, and in all of them, except the New Hampshire case, succession taxes are regarded as special taxes or duties, or, more exactly, excises, not falling within the regular and ordinary annual taxation of property, contemplated and provided for and guarded by constitutional provisions and limitations.

The statute under consideration provides a subject and mode of taxation not heretofore resorted to in this state. The act provides sufficient opportunity to parties interested to be heard, and have their rights protected, and cannot be deemed to conflict with article 1, section 6, of the constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property or privileges, but by judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land; nor with section 21 of the same article, which prohibits the taking of private property for public uses without just compensation. Perhaps the latter provision is limited to the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and does not extend to the subject of taxation. The word "compensation" seems to imply a money or other valuable consideration, as distinguished from the protection of life and property afforded by the state as a return for the tax contributions of its citizens.

Does the act conflict with the constitutional provision which requires all taxes assessed upon real and personal estate to be apportioned and assessed equally, according to the just value thereof? The first constitution of Maine provided that

"while the public expenses shall be assessed on polls and estate a general valuation shall be taken at least once in ten years": 502 Art. 9, sec. 7. Section 8, immediately following, was, "All taxes upon real estate, assessed by authority of this state, shall be apportioned and assessed equally, according to the just value thereof." These provisions remained unchanged until 1875, when, by an amendment, the words "and personal" were inserted after the word "real" in the eighth section. Prior to this amendment there was no express constitutional requirement that taxes on personal property should be uniform; but it was left to the legislature to determine the subjects, mode, and rate of taxation of personal property, in its discretion, and without limitation or restriction, unless such exercise of power should degenerate into such arbitrary, oppressive, and unreasonable exactions, as to be subversive of the principles of the constitution and the rights of the people: Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 616, 617.

The two sections, 7 and 8, as they now stand, must be construed together, to determine their scope and extent. Section 7 provides that, so long as the public expenses shall be assessed on polls and estates, to equalize the burden as nearly as practicable, a general valuation shall be taken as often as every ten years. By its terms it necessarily implies a periodical and regularly recurring assessment of predetermined amounts, proportioned to the entire estates within the taxed district, to meet continuing and regularly recurring expenses; while section 8, manifestly referring to the same class of general taxes, provides for an equal apportionment and assessment according to value. It is clear that these sections contemplate only the general, constantly recurring assessment upon the same property, and do not include occasional, exceptional, and special subjects and modes of taxation. The constant practice, hitherto unobjected to, of imposing a duty, or exacting a fee, for the right to exercise certain vocations, not illegal in themselves, but made so by statute for the purpose of deriving a revenue therefrom, such as that required of itin. erant vendors, retail liquors dealers, while a license law existed, innholders, auctioneers, insurance brokers, etc., notwithstanding all the real and personal property of such persons, was assessed in common with the property of all others 503 in the state in the general and recurring assessments, conclusively shows that many subjects of taxation have constantly been regarded as not falling within the prohibition of sections 7 and

8 of the constitution. The tax imposed upon the franchises of railroads and other corporations, upon a basis which did not result in equal taxation according to value and proportion, has been held by this court as not in violation of the constitution, but within the legitimate province of the legislature: State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 73 Me. 527; State v. Maine Central R. R. Co., 74 Me. 382. So, also, the extensive exemptions of property from all taxation, such as the property of literary, benevolent, and charitable intsitutions, acquiesced in for many years, without objection, afford a practical construction of sections 7 and 8, that they do not require an absolute equality; but that the legislature may, in its discretion, exempt from taxation classes of property within the terms of these sections, although the effect is to increase the rate upon other assessable property, and may select classes of subjects from which duties and excises may be required, not, however, degenerating into arbitrary and oppressive burdens. The duties exacted by the state from justices of the peace, and other officers, and attorneys before admission to the bar, have never been regarded as a violation of the constitutional provisions in regard to taxation; but as excise taxes, rightfully levied: Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 617619; Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 256.

It is evident, therefore, that these constitutional requirements do not include every species of taxation, but all special cases like those referred to are by implication excepted.

The tax provided for in the statute under consideration is clearly an excise tax: Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall. 346. The whole tenor and scope of the act is one of excise, and not a tax upon property, as that term is used in the constitution. It is not laid according to any rule of proportion, but is laid upon the interests specified in the act, without any reference to the whole amount required to be raised for public purposes, or to the whole amount of property in the state liable to be assessed for public purposes. It is true that the act contains some language 504 indicating a tax upon property; but it should be construed according to its essential principle, object, and effect. Substance, and not form or phrase, is the important thing. All exactions of money by the government are taxes; but they are not all levied by assessment upon values. The latter class refers to the burdens recurring periodically, which are assessed upon valuations of property, made at stated intervals. Danforth, J., in delivering the opin