430 GREEN v. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD. Opinion of the Court. 441 regation program to effectuate conversion of a stateimposed dual system to a unitary, nonracial system there might be no objection to allowing such a device to prove itself in operation. On the other hand, if there are reasonably available other ways, such for illustration as zoning, promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system, "freedom of choice" must be held unacceptable. The New Kent School Board's "freedom-of-choice" plan cannot be accepted as a sufficient step to “effectuate a transition" to a unitary system. In three years of operation not a single white child has chosen to attend Watkins school and although 115 Negro children enrolled in New Kent school in 1967 (up from 35 in 1965 and 111 in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in the system still attend the all-Negro Watkins school. In other words, the school system remains a dual system. Rather than further the dismantling of the dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children and their parents classmates notwithstanding conscientious efforts by many teachers and principals to prevent such misconduct; "(c) During the past school year, in some areas of the South public officials improperly influenced Negro families to keep their children in Negro schools and excluded Negro children attending formerly all-white schools from official functions; (d) Poverty deters many Negro families in the South from choosing formerly all-white schools. Some Negro parents are embarrassed to permit their children to attend such schools without suitable clothing. In some districts special fees are assessed for courses which are available only in the white schools; "(e) Improvements in facilities and equipment... have been instituted in all-Negro schools in some school districts in a manner that tends to discourage Negroes from selecting white schools." Southern School Desegregation, 1966-1967, at 88 (1967). See id.. at 45-69; Survey of School Desegregation in the Southern and Border States 1965-1966, at 30-44, 51-52 (U. S. Comm'n on Civil Rights 1966). 442 OCTOBER TERM, 1967. Opinion of the Court. 391 U.S. with a responsibility which Brown II placed squarely on the School Board. The Board must be required to formulate a new plan and, in light of other courses which appear open to the Board, such as zoning, fashion steps which promise realistically to convert promptly to a system without a "white" school and a "Negro" school, but just schools. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated insofar as it affirmed the District Court and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 6"In view of the situation found in New Kent County, where there is no residential segregation, the elimination of the dual school system and the establishment of a 'unitary, non-racial system' could be readily achieved with a minimum of administrative difficulty by· means of geographic zoning-simply by assigning students living in the eastern half of the county to the New Kent School and those living in the western half of the county to the Watkins School. Although a geographical formula is not universally appropriate, it is evident that here the Board, by separately busing Negro children across the entire county to the 'Negro' school, and the white children to the 'white' school, is deliberately maintaining a segregated system which would vanish with non-racial geographic zoning. The conditions in this county present a classical case for this expedient." Bowman v. County School Board, supra, n. 3, at 332 (concurring opinion). Petitioners have also suggested that the Board could consolidate the two schools, one site (e. g., Watkins) serving grades 1-7 and the other (e. g., New Kent) serving grades 8-12, this being the grade division respondent makes between elementary and secondary levels. Petitioners contend this would result in a more efficient system by eliminating costly duplication in this relatively small district while at the same time achieving immediate dismantling of the dual system. These are two suggestions the District Court should take into account upon remand, along with any other proposed alternatives and in light of considerations respecting other aspects of the school system such as the matter of faculty and staff desegregation remanded to the court by the Court of Appeals. 30-623 O 74 24 NOTE: Where it is deemed desirable, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. LC 2701 A SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus SWANN ET AL. v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS No. 281. Argued October 12, 1970-Decided April 20, 1971* The Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system, which includes the city of Charlotte, North Carolina, had more than 84,000 students in 107 schools in the 1968-1969 school year. Approximately 29% (24,000) of the pupils were Negro, about 14,000 of whom attended 21 schools that were at least 99% Negro. This resulted from a desegregation plan approved by the District Court in 1965, at the commencement of this litigation. In 1968 petitioner Swann moved for further relief based on Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, which required school boards to "come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work . . . now . . . until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely removed." The District Court ordered the school board in April 1969 to provide a plan for faculty and student desegregation. Finding the board's submission unsatisfactory, the District Court appointed an expert to submit a desegregation plan. In February 1970, the expert and the board presented plans, and the court adopted the board's plan, as modified, for the junior and senior high schools, and the expert's proposed plan for the elementary schools. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order as to faculty desegregation and the secondary school plans, but vacated the order respecting elementary schools, fearing that the provisions for pairing and grouping of elementary schools would unreasonably burden the pupils and the board. The case was remanded to the District Court for reconsideration and submission of further plans. This Court granted certiorari and di *Together with No. 349, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education et al. v. Swann et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Reproduced by the Congressional Research I II SWANN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION Syllabus rected reinstatement of the District Court's order pending further proceedings in that court. On remand the District Court received two new plans, and ordered the board to adopt a plan, or the expert's plan would remain in effect. After the board "acquiesced" in the expert's plan, the District Court directed that it remain in effect. Held: 1. Today's objective is to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation that was held violative of equal protection guarantees by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, in 1954. Pp. 10-11. 2. In default by the school authorities of their affirmative obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, the district courts have broad power to fashion remedies that will assure unitary school systems. Pp. 11-12. 3. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not restrict or withdraw from the federal courts their historic equitable remedial powers. The proviso in 42 U. S. C. § 2000c-6 was designed simply to foreclose any interpretation of the Act as expanding the existing powers of the federal courts to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Pp. 12-13. 4. Policy and practice with regard to faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities are among the most important indicia of a segregated system, and the first remedial responsibility of school authorities is to eliminate invidious racial distinctions in those respects. Normal administrative practice should then produce schools of like quality, facilities, and staffs. P. 14. 5. The Constitution does not prohibit district courts from using their equity power to order assignment of teachers to achieve a particular degree of faculty desegregation. United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U. S. 225, was properly followed by the lower courts in this case. Pp. 14-16. 6. In devising remedies to eliminate legally imposed segregation, local authorities and district courts must see to it that future school construction and abandonment are not used and do not serve to perpetuate or re-establish a dual system. Pp. 16-17. 7. Four problem areas exist on the issue of student assignment: (1) Racial quotas. The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school in the community must always reflect the racial composition of the system as a whole; here the District Court's very limited use of the racial ratio not as an inflexible requirement, but as a starting point SWANN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION Syllabus in shaping a remedy-was within its equitable discretion. 18-21. (2) One-race schools. While the existence of a small num of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools does not in itself den a system that still practices segregation by law, the court sho scrutinize such schools and require the school authorities to sati the court that the racial composition does not result from pres or past discriminatory action on their part. Pp. 21-22. An optional majority-to-minority transfer provision has lo been recognized as a useful part of a desegregation plan, and be effective such arrangement must provide the transferring st dent free transportation and available space in the school to whi he desires to move. P. 22. (3) Attendance zones. The remedial altering of attendan zones is not, as an interim corrective measure, beyond the remedi powers of a district court. A student assignment plan is no acceptable merely because it appears to be neutral, for such plan may fail to counteract the continuing effects of past scho segregation. The pairing and grouping of noncontiguous zones a permissible tool; judicial steps going beyond contiguous zone should be examined in light of the objectives to be sought. N rigid rules can be laid down to govern conditions in differen localities. Pp. 23-25. (4) Transportation. The District Court's conclusion that assignment of children to the school nearest their home serving their grade would not effectively dismantle the dual school system is supported by the record, and the remedial technique of requiring bus transportation as a tool of school desegregation was within that court's power to provide equitable relief. An objection to transportation of students may have validity when the time or distance of travel is so great as to risk either the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process; limits on travel time will vary with many factors, but probably with none more than the age of the students. Pp. 25–27. 8. Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies once a unitary system has been achieved. Pp. 27-28. 431 F. 2d 138, affirmed as to those parts in which it affirmed the District Court's judgment. The District Court's order of August 7, 1970, is also affirmed. BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. |