gers, and regarded the mere laws of their coexistence with The completion of the book has been so slow that The bibliography, I regret to say, is quite unsystem- Finally, where one owes to so many, it seems absurd to HARVARD UNIVERSITY, August 1890. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. THE SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY, Mental Manifestations depend on Cerebral Conditions, 1. CHAPTER II. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN, . Reflex, semi-reflex, and voluntary acts, 12. The Frog's nervecentres, 14. General notion of the hemispheres, 20. Their Education-the Meynert scheme, 24. The phrenological contrasted with the physiological conception, 27. The localization of function in the hemispheres, 30. The motor zone, 31. Motor Aphasia, 37. The sight-centre, 41. Mental blindness, 48. The hearing-centre, 52. Sensory Aphasia, 54. Centres for smell and taste, 57. The touch-centre, 58. Man's Consciousness limited to the hemispheres, 65. The restitution of function, 67. Final correction of the Meynert scheme, 72. Conclusions, 78. CHAPTER III. ON SOME GENERAL CONDITIONS OF BRAIN-ACTIVITY, The summation of Stimuli, 82. Reaction-time, 85. Cerebral blood-supply, 97. Cerebral Thermometry, 99. Phosphorus and Thought, 101. HABIT, . CHAPTER IV. Due to plasticity of neural matter, 105. Produces ease of action, 112. Diminishes attention, 115. Concatenated perform. ances, 116. Ethical implications and pedagogic maxims, 120. The theory described, 128. Reasons for it, 188. Reasons against it, 188. PAGE 1 12 81 104 . 128 Evolutionary Psychology demands a Mind-dust, 146. Some alleged proofs that it exists, 150. Refutation of these proofs, 154. Self-compounding of mental facts is inadmissible, 158. Can states of mind be unconscious? 162. Refutation of alleged proofs of unconscious thought, 164. Difficulty of stating the connection between mind and brain, 176. The Soul' is logically the least objectionable hypothesis, 180. Conclusion, 182. PAGE 145 Psychology is a natural Science, 183. Introspection, 185. Experiment, 192. Sources of error, 194. The 'Psychologist's fallacy,' 196. Time relations: lapses of Consciousness-Locke v. Descartes, 200. The unconsciousness' of hysterics not genuine, 202. Minds may split into dissociated parts, 206. Space-relations : the Seat of the Soul, 214. Cognitive relations, 216. The Psychologist's point of view, 218. Two kinds of knowledge, acquaintance and knowledge about, 221. CHAPTER IX. THE STREAM OF THOUGHT, Consciousness tends to the personal form, 225. It is in constant change, 229. It is sensibly continuous, 237. Substantive' and 'transitive' parts of Consciousness, 243. Feelings of relation, 245. Feelings of tendency, 249. The 'fringe of the object, 258. The feeling of rational sequence, 261. Thought possible in any kind of mental material, 265. Thought and language, 267. Consciousness is cognitive, 271. The word Object, 275. Every cognition is due to one integral pulse of thought, 276. Diagrams of Thought's stream, 279. Thought is always selective, 284. 199 224 The Empirical Self or Me, 291. Its constituents, 292. The material self, 292. The Social Self, 293. The Spiritual Self, 296. Difficulty of apprehending Thought as a purely spiritual activity, 291 299. Emotions of Self, 305. Rivalry and conflict of one's different CHAPTER XI. PAGE . 402 ATTENTION, Its neglect by English psychologists, 402. Description of it, 404. To how many things can we attend at once? 405. Wundt's experiments on displacement of date of impressions simultaneously attended to, 410. Personal equation, 413. The varieties of attention, 416. Passive attention, 418. Voluntary attention, 420. Attention's effects on sensation, 425;-on discrimination, 426 ;on recollection, 427;-on reaction-time, 427. The neural process in attention : 1) Accommodation of sense-organ, 434. 2) Preperception, 438. Is voluntary attention a resultant or a force? 447. The effort to attend can be conceived as a resultant, 450. Conclusion, 453. Acquired Inattention, 455. . CONCEPTION, CHAPTER XII. The sense of sameness, 459. ceptions are unchangeable, 464. Conception defined, 481. Con- 473. The conception of the same' is not the same state' of Simul Locke on discrimination, 483. Martineau ditto, 484. |