FAILURES OF TRUST COMPANIES. Statistics regarding failures and suspensions of trust companies are not obtainable prior to the year 1893, that being the year in which such reports were begun by the Bradstreet Company. The accompanying tables, furnished to the writer through the courtesy of Frank Greene, Managing Editor of "Bradstreet's", show the number of suspensions reported, and the estimated assets and liabilities involved therein for the years 1893-1907 inclusive. As to the number of failures, the table shows that during the fifteen years there were 1,723 suspensions, of which the National banks contributed 341, the State banks 524, the savings banks 158, the private banks 631 and the "loan and trust companies" 69. It thus appears that the average number of suspensions per annum for the different classes of institutions was as follows: It will be seen from this that the number of trust companies suspended was small in comparison with the number of other banks suspended. It is also of course true that there were not so many trust companies in operation as there were of the other classes of banks. According to the best figures obtainable, the average number of the different classes of institutions that were doing business during the fifteen years covered by the table was about as follows:-National banks, 4,487; State banks, 5,376; Savings banks, 1,084; Loan and trust companies, 750. On this basis, the percentage of failures (or the ratio of the number of companies failing to the number of companies in business), was about as follows: From these figures, it appears that the proportionate number of trust company suspensions was less than that of any class of financial institutions except the National banks. Regarding the losses involved in the failures, the showing of the trust companies is, on the face of the figures, not so good, the losses assigned to them exceeding those of the other institutions, except the private banks. The figures represent, however, not the ultimate losses, but the best estimates of the probable results obtainable at the time. An examination of the figures for the year 1907, which account for 62 per centum of the entire estimated liabilities for the fifteen years, shows that they give a greatly exaggerated idea of the actual losses involved. Of the 17 trust companies reported suspended in 1907, at this date (November, 1908) about one-half have re-opened for business, while several cthers are being liquidated without loss to depositors. These include the larger companies which suspended, with one exception. As to the figures involved, three companies,--the Knickerbocker Trust Company of New York, the Union Trust Company of Providence and the California Safe Deposit and Trust Company of San Francisco,-account for considerably over $100,000,000 of the $118,000.000 liabilities shown in the table, and the first two of these have long since resumed business and are to-day prospering, no loss to depositors having resulted. One competent authority estimates the actual losses due to failures of trust companies during the year following the panic of 1907 at about five and one-half million dollars, of which eighty per centum was due to the failure of one company, the California Safe Deposit and Trust Company. New York having been the storm center of the panic of 1907, it is significant that on August 10, 1908, the Superintendent of Banking of the State of New York, Clark Williams, reported "So far as the records of this Department are concerned, we know of no case of a failure of a trust company resulting in loss to the depositors.' So far as the safety of trust funds is concerned, the statement made some years ago at a meeting of the Trust Company Section of the American Bankers' Association, that not a dollar of trust funds has ever been lost through a trust company, has never been disputed, so far as the writer knows. Especial interest attaches to the record of trust companies during and since the panic of 1907, because it was the first severe strain that has been undergone by these institutions since their great development began. On the whole, the record must be pronounced very satisfactory. Although subjected to a strain that was unprecedented, their record compares favorably with that of other classes of financial institutions. The failures which occurred were in no sense ascribable to any inherent weakness in the trust company as an institution; but are accounted for in some cases by the dishonesty of officials and by undue laxity of the State laws under which they operated, and in others by pressure of circumstances which could not be overcome by any kind of banking institution. The same causes brought about the downfall of other financial institutions, including National banks, and State banks in States having the best laws for their regulation and control. The panic of 1907 did, however, emphasize the necessity of careful and intelligent State regulation and control of trust companies, as well as of the other banking institutions. The statement on the next page gives the aggregates of the principal items in trust company reports from 1975 to 1908. This table contains * Trust Companies Magazine, August, 1908, p. 495. 1887. 58 16,269.993 $36.544.018 120 46.606,390 175,033,893 1889.. 120 53.349,045 193,610.054 1890. 149 260 1897. 251 1898. .246 1899. 260 $178.148 $7,400,348 36.428.878 28.787.717 data from which a careful study may be made of various items of management as developed during the last quarter century. In the following table will be found figures dealing with a few of the important subjects. Principal Items of Resources and Liabilities of Trust Companies, 1875-1908. Cash and Deposits and due from Year, due to banks. banks. 1875.. 1876.. 1877.. Reserve. Proportion of cash to total deposits. P.c. P.c. $85,147,012 $10,856,621 12.8 10.6 87,969,758 8,671,619 9.9 3.4 84,549,038 10,826,606 12.8 3.3 1878.. 73,658,004 8,399,209 11.4 3.9 1879.. 76,013,662 8,727,670 11.5 3.6 1880.. 90,158,637 7,536,459 8.4 3.7 1881.. 111,905,527 12,454,392 11.1 3.9 1882.. 144,988,775 11,492,036 7.9 2.4 1883.. 165,645,521 13,431,867 8.1 2.3 1884.. 189,507,810 21,030,441 11.1 2.4 1885.. 188,615,186 33,499,518 17.7 5.3 1886.. 214,255,658 35,804,622 16.7 9.1 1887.. 245,797,608 35,617,727 14.5 6.8 1888.. 259,925,079 39,580,220 15.2 7.6 1889.. 302,626,471 50,320,566 16.6 8.3 1890.. 339,319,740 53,168,165 15.7 5.9 1891.. 357,540,852 56,430,480 15.8 4.6 1892.. 415,431,461 77,575,370 18.7 5.4 1893.. 488,934,555 75,568,610 15.4 4.5 1894.. 478,055,823 125,010,202 26.1 7.2 1895.. 553,756,721 128,482,531 23.2 6.5 1896.. 592,617,492 108,314,257 18.3 4.9 1897.. 576,598,940 118,139,249 20.5 5.1 1898.. 665,488,712 118,317,178 17.8 3.4 1899.. 837,510,725 154,868,308 18.5 2.9 1900.. 1,031,735,272 219,448,611 21.3 2.9 1901.. 1,278,849,880 217,207,097 17.0 2.0 1902.. 1,537,476,616 264,819,327 17.2 2.2 1903.. 1,711,485,439 304,409,977 17.7 3.0 1904. 1,775,499,356 442,876,289 24.9 3.6 1905.. 2,164.645,572 393,880,801 18.2 3.1 1906.. 2,162,228,621 369,199,366 17. 3.7 1907.. 2,229,495,792 368,738.970 16.6 4.9 1908.. 2,029,978,992 515,850,773 25.4 6.1 59,303,327 36,741,697 8.616,954 3,166,960 61,171,877 34,841,086 9.194.570 3,494,061 74,675,537 37,654,325 10,245.051 4.229,889 101,906,566 33,057,627 11,175,663 5,049,809 132,054,203 42,813,068 14,212,161 6,093,307 140,022,358 47,760,410 15,601,710 6,245,370 158,018,009 51,250,942 19,810.611 6,853,477 141,542,649 55,126,600 19.203,984 6,209,742 156,828,458 71,802,374 24,520,701 6,626,538 196,096,830 72,927,742 27,193,319 5,502,166 250,700,648 72,578,913 35.951,687 3,197,112 291,450,367 76,725,017 38,783,114 3,677,237 327,882,540 95,707,496 46,828,003 3,381,217 356,876,320 93,973,321 55,503,845 3,138,177 385,273,548 106,206,778 61,768,148 3,572,886 462,729,597 128,824,901 70,771,477 3,187,125 374,421,713 142,224,151 75,303,366 3.148,156 433,386,461 177,086,555 84,801,698 3,334,971 462,000,949 201,164,551 84,313,612 3,289,547 445,629,725 201,128,020 89,025.267 3,361,409 539,162,445 193,977,752 97,643,666 3,831,147 599,031,033 266,086,873 105,616,167 4,121,254 727,952,137 325,841,086 148,389,339 4,586,760 939,768,891 396,222,854 168,284,468 4,835,274 1,192,488,311 447,580,690 225,524,514 4,755,911 1,303,237,200 579.459,699 314,496,334 4,328,727 1,147,605,557 667,511,015 329,789,576 4,068,868 1,549,286,662 787,918,435 363,515,702 4,196,159 1,609,467,839 760,285,420 395,373,620 3,988,181 1,601,364,237 785.999,670 397,865,026 3,868.286 1,379,481,474 775,875,271 416,039,899 3,403,376 RESERVES OF TRUST COMPANIES. Of special interest, in view of the recent agitation of the question in New York and elsewhere, is the subject of trust company reserves. The third column of the table gives the reserve carried by the companies each year, the figures representing the proportions of the amounts in the second column to those of the same years in the first column. From 1875 to 1884 inclusive the per cent. of reserve never exceeded 12.8, the lowest reserve reported being in 1882, when it was only 7.9 per cent. After 1884 the reserve reported was materially higher, never going lower than 14.5 per cent. (the figure for 1887), and reaching its maximum with 26.1 per cent. in 1894. The average reserve for the thirty-four years was about 16.2 per cent. The criticisms against the trust companies as to reserve have, however, been directed more especially towards the amount of actual cash carried in the vaults of the companies. In the fourth column of the table are given the percentages of such cash reserves for the several years (including as cash the amount reported for cash items) the figures representing the proportion of cash and cash items to total deposits. For the thirty-four years the average of such cash reserve has been a little over 4.6 per cent. It was highest in 1875, with 10.6 per cent., 1886 being next, with 9.1 per cent. The lowest percentage was in 1901-2 per cent. From 1876 to 1884 inclusive it ranged from 2.3 per cent. to 9.9 per cent. From 1885 to 1897 it was somewhat higher, averaging about 6.2 per cent. Since 1897 it has averaged 3.4 per cent. INCREASE IN SURPLUS AND UNDIVIDED PROFITS. A noticeable thing has been the tendency to increase in the surplus and undivided profits as compared with the capital. This has been due in part to the accumulation of earnings, and in part to the tendency in organizing new companies to have a large surplus paid in at the start. Most of the States that have any legislation on the subject require the accumulation of a surplus fund until it reaches a certain percentage of the capital stock; but the accumulation has gone far ahead of any legal requirements. Chart C shows the relative growth of these two items, the CHART C. showing growth of capital and of anrplas and undivided Capital Surplus and Undivided Profits |