very high degree reprehenfible.

In the

treaty of defenfive alliance between the King of Great Britain and the King of Pruffia, concluded at Berlin on the 13th of August, 1788, are the following ftipulations: The two high contracting parties • shall always act in concert for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity, and in cafe either of them fhould be threa⚫tened with a hoftile attack by any power "whatever, the other fhall employ, with

out delay, his most efficacious good of•fices for preventing hoftilities, for procuring fatisfaction to the injured party, and for effecting an accommodation in a conciliatory manner. But if these good offices should not have the defired effect, in the space of two months, and either ⚫ of the two high contracting parties fhould' be hoftilely attacked, moleftéd, or dif turbed, in "any of his dominions, rights,

"poffeffions, or interefts, or in any manner whatever, by fea or by land, by aný

European power," the other contra& <ing party engages to fuccour his ally, without delay, in order to maintain each • other reciprocally" in the poffeffion of all the dominions, territories, towns, "and places, which belonged to them

before the commencement of fuch hof"tilities." It would, perhaps, not be very eafy to contrive a treaty, that should be better calculated to involve Great Britain in an unneceffary war, than that in which thefe ftipulations are contained. What can Pruffia do for England, that can be any compenfation for the hazard of being embroiled in a war, whenever any of the territories of the king of Pruffia, fo furrounded, and fome of which have been obtained by fuch questionable means, shall be attacked by any foreign power? That a

nation like that of England, fo well able by its own ftrength to defend all its own poffeffions, and fo differently fituated from the kingdom of Pruffia, fhould have patiently and filently acquiefced in fuch a treaty, as that concluded at Berlin in 1788, is truly aftonishing. A clofe connexion with a military and a defpotic monarch, like that of Pruffia, fo circumstanced as to be always in danger of a war, cannot be beneficial to a commercial nation like Great Britain, which has little real occafion to interfere in any of the difputes upon the continent. Indeed, no treaty concluded with Pruffia has ever been beneficial to Great Britain; nor do I believe that any fuch treaty ever will be beneficial.

THE real motive for concluding the Pruffian treaty, befides a view to support. the late measures refpecting Holland, feems to have been an attention to the preferva

tion of the electorate of Hanover; which, if a war fhould take place, may poffibly be attacked; and which a king of Pruffia, if his own dominions are not in too much danger, may have it in his power to defend. The electorate of Hanover has been confidered, in fome degree, as the private pa-, trimony of the King; and, therefore, British ministers have found it beneficial to themselves, and that it tended to keep them in favour, and in power, to pay a particular attention to the real or fuppofed interests of that electorate, in order to gratify the private views or attachments of their royal master.

SOMETHING of this kind was forefeen as probable, before the acceffion of the prefent family; and, therefore, in an act passed in the twelfth year of the reign of king William, entitled, "An act for the farther limitation of the crown, and bet

ter fecuring the rights and liberties of the

fubject," is the following claufe: "That " in case the crown and imperial dignity of "this realm fhall hereafter come to any "perfon, not being a native of the king"dom of England, this nation be not

obliged to engage in any war for the "defence of any dominions or territories "which do not belong to the crown of “England, without the consent of parlia"ment." By the fpirit of this act it was undoubtedly intended, that if the Elector of Hanover fhould fucceed to the throne of England, no treaties fhould be entered into with a view to the fafety of any of the dominions of the King, as Elector of Hanover, which might eventually involve England in an unnecessary war. But notwithstanding this act, treaties have been repeatedly made, fince the acceffion of the

2 Cay's Edition of the Statutes, Vol. II. p. 355.

present