REMINISCENCES OF MEN AND THINGS. BY ONE WHO HAS A GOOD MEMORY. LOUIS PHILIPPE, KING OF THE FRENCH. From Fraser's Magazine. procession was such as to give great cause for uneasiness and anxiety. I shall never forget the preparations in Paris for that march of the mob. Every description of vehicle, both public and private, was seized by the common people. No permission was asked, no vested interests were regarded; possession was not merely "nine points of the law," but the whole of the law, with those who resolved to repair to Rambouillet, in order to drive from the shores of France the descendants of St. Louis. I remember I was amongst the victims, for whilst proceeding across the Place Louis Seize my cabriolet was rounded by twenty armed ruffians, but they politely directed me to descend. I remonstrated. It was as useless as to preach order "Il faut sur THE cannon had ceased to roar; the still bleeding victims of revolutionary fury had been collected together in the hospitals; the dead had been hastily interred in large but shallow graves, dug near the Louvre, the Marché des Innocens, and the Champs de Mars; the tocsin no longer rang its heartsickening sounds in the ears of the Parisian population; the soldiers bivouacked in the public streets and places of the metropolis; boys and girls recounted some of the marvels and peace to the roaring billows. of valor and some of the deeds of peril and descendre," was the only reply that reached courage they themselves, or their comrades, me. "Your name?" asked an inspector, or had accomplished; a provisional government chief of the rebels. I replied by stating it. had installed itself at the Hôtel de Ville; the " Your address, age, profession, or occupapaving-stones still stood in shapeless heaps, tion?" I was also asked, and my replies were and, dignified with the name of " barricades," as laconic as the questions which were prowere the favorite lounging spots of the pounded. "Your cabriolet and horse shall “Flaneurs" of Paris; the warehouses were be returned to you within eight days," said yet closed, the manufactories were still de- the chief, and three fellows, each armed with serted, the public schools and colleges were a gun and a sword, jumped into the vehicle, as empty as a new-made tomb; the palaces and left me disgusted and perplexed. What were yet open to the heavy and unceremonious mattered this to them? They struck up the tread of the populace; the public buildings first stanza of the "Marseillaise" as they were guarded by self-armed, self-elected, rattled off in double quick time up the Avecivic forces; and Lafayette was hesitating, nue de Neuilly, whilst I tried to hum my old both with regard to his own position, and favorite consoler of Begone, dull care!" with relation to that of the Orleans' family, The night on which that expedition took when suddenly a voice was heard everywhere, place was one of intense anxiety at Paris. proceeding from every quarter, though utter- The Royalists of the old dynasty firmly being different tones, and that one voice said, lieved that King Charles X., the Duke and “WE MUST HAVE A KING!" It may be asked, Duchess d'Angoulême, the Duchess of Berry, from whom did that voice proceed? My and the Duke de Bordeaux, would be masanswer is, From nearly every one. I was an sacred; but what could they do to prevent eye-witness of all that passed; I mixed with it? They contrived, indeed, to forewarn his all ranks and classes. No event of the majesty, and they urged him to escape. The slightest importance escaped my observation royalists of the new school, or, in plain and inquiries. I saw the peers, the deputies, terms, such men as Guizot, Perier, Athalin, and even the marshals, the generals, and the Bugeaud, and Lefebvre, dreaded the Ramofficers of all grades and degrees, who knew bouillet movement because they feared that not on the field of battle what fear meant, their country might be once more disgraced now trembling with anxiety and apprehension by revolutionary murders. The men who at the probable consequences of the victory conducted the enterprise, and were responsiof the populace, and all proclaiming in the ble for its success, were not without uneasimost decisive manner, though fluctuating be- ness, lest they should not be able to keep tween hope and fear, that they must have a within bounds "the madness of the people," king! while such men as Dubourg would have rejoiced once more to have wreaked their vengeance against the Bourbons by the perpetration of great crimes. The terrible journey of the whole of the Paris rabble to Rambouillet alarmed every man in the country who had a home to love, a wife to cherish, or property to preserve. In such a state of excitement and frenzy, There were multitudes who had not forgotten the eldest branch had not a moment to lose ; the butcheries enacted during the first revo- but those who desired to see the Revolution lution, and the character of the Rambouillet of 1830 free from the atrocities of 1793, VOL. IV. No. I. * 2 were not less pressing for a revolution; and pression of a great, of a national want? My as they dreaded the word " Republic" infi- answer is this. 1st, The Parisians had acnitely more than they did that of "empire," they joined in the general cry to which I have already referred, viz., "We must, we will, have a king." 66 quired much of property, and enjoyed much of ease under the Restoration, and they believed that any other form of government would, at least, put that property in peril. I remember when the Duc de Ragusa re- This was a primary consideration with them. treated from the interior of Paris on the 29th 2d, The Parisians were convinced that if the of July, with his discomfited and dejected republican form of government should be troops, I approached him in the Champs adopted, there would be re-enacted scenes of Elysées, and respectfully inquired, "M. le violence and bloodshed. And 3d, The PaMaréchal, is all finished, then, that your risians were satisfied that the establishment troops retire?" "No, sir," replied the vete- of any other than a monarchical form of ran, we shall bombard Paris to-morrow." government in France would lead to a geneThe duke had said this during the whole line ral European war, for which that country was of his march, and the news, or the threat, wholly unprepared. It was not that the Paspread like wildfire. The few hours which risians were averse to war; it was not that succeeded that report were gloomy and they were satisfied with the boundaries to trembling ones, indeed, to the Parisians; but which France was limited by the treaties of not so gloomy as those during which uncer- Vienna; it was not that they had ceased to tainty prevailed on the one great question of sigh for the Rhine, for Savoy, or for the Alps. "Who should be king?" I have said in my Oh! no; but they knew that the Restoration "Reminiscences of Lafayette" that the old had been a period of such ease, peace, and general had it not in his power, as some have repose, that France was not in a condition, ignorantly thought, to create either a repub- speaking both navally and militarily, to go to lic or an empire, or to continue a constitu- war. Undoubtedly, Lafayette took great tional monarchy in France. The shouts of pains to cause it to be believed that France "Vive la liberte!" were invariably mingled with those of "Vive la Charte !" and if the Parisians had not perceived in the then Duke of Orleans the very man of all others raised up to fill a vacant throne, and save France from anarchy and woe, they would have desired even the monarchy of the eldest branch, and have submitted to the ordinances of Charles X. had Marmont carried his threat of bombardment into execution. There was an universal horror, both felt and expressed, at the mere mention of " republic!" I say this from no party feeling, nor as the result of any personal prejudice or antipathy, but it is a fact, that Lafayette, with all his popularity with the masses, with all the aid of the schools, with all his influence with the "Jeunesse," and with all his then omnipotence in regard to the National Guards, could not have successfully opposed the general fixed determination of "We must have a king." could place a million of soldiers on the frontiers in a few weeks, or months; but the attempt at deception did not succeed, and, therefore, the first cry was, "A king and peace.' I am anxious to establish this proposition, and I will add this truth at the commencement of this third and last part of my "Reminiscences" of Louis Philippe, because the whole of the policy of his majesty, viz., that of peace, and the recognition of existing treaties, was based upon it. When, then, I proceed to examine the public and notorious, as well as the secret and less known measures of the head of the new dynasty, I shall refer to this fact of the non-preparedness of France for war, and of the existence of a general, if not universal impression, that war would be ruinous, since the king acted on that impression, entertaining it likewise hiinself. France, then, at the end of July, 1830, had Now why was this? Was it that the made a revolution, had driven away the eldest French were attached, as a nation, to their branch of the house of Bourbon, had proold race of kings? Certainly not! Was it claimed the necessity for peace, and had dethat they believed that a constitutional mon-manded a king. I shall, probably, be told archy was most favorable to the development and enjoyment of rational liberty? By no means. Was it that they were not really in earnest in making their revolution of three days, and that, indeed, they already regretted their resistance? No, I cannot say that. Why was it, then, that this cry of "We must have a king" seemed to be the general ex that so far from France desiring peace, the moving and agitating portion of the nation wished for war! But of how small a number did that agitating portion consist? Harebrained students, reckless proletaires, wandering St. Simonians, the members of secret societies, clubbists, phalansterians; these, these were the component parts of the war faction. But, on the other side, what was to be seen? The whole, or nearly so, of the National Guards of France arming themselves to preserve peace both at home and abroad; the public funds always declining the moment any event appeared likely to lead to war; the middling and upper classes protesting, almost to a man, against war; and none encouraging it but the factions I have referred to, except, indeed, the Legitimists, who wished for a foreign invasion in order to secure the triumph of the eldest branch of the house of Bourbon. Iremember to have been much struck in the earlier period of the existence of the new French dynasty at a soirée 1 passed at the house of M. Mauguin, the deputy, with the extraordinary similarity of views on the question of "war or peace" which existed between the republican and the legitimist chiefs. At this soirée men of all parties were present, provided they were opposed to the government. All joined in calling that government cowardly, mean, and traitorous, exclusively because it would not make war against Europe for abstract principles. I ventured to ask, if Europe should be engaged in that warfare, what was the result proposed to be attained? "The overthrow of that which exists," was the reply. "We shall wholly differ as to the government which ought to succeed that which now oppresses and irritates, disgraces and dishonors us; but we all concur in the duty of overthrowing the government of Louis Philippe." This was the language of a deputy who has since greatly distinguished himself in the revolutionary party, and who is still an able member of the lower house. But at this same soirée at M. Mauguin's the agents of the then King of Holland, the defenders of the cause of Don Miguel, and the most sincere and devoted friends of the ex-French dynasty, were likewise present, and all made use of similar language to that which I have just cited. The war party, in all cases, had no idea of improving the physical, social, moral, or political condition of France, but desired war as the certain means of overthrowing Louis Philippe, who, on his part, was resolved to keep faith with Europe, to maintain the then existing pacific relations, and to fulfil the conditions imposed on the French people and government, by the treaties of Vienna. The war party was not a large one numerically; but it made up for its deficiency in this respect by its violence, audacity, combination, and perseverance. This party accused the Restoration of having neglected the interests of France, because that country was not in a position, after fifteen years of peace, to resist, by land and by sea, the com bined forces of Europe. How truly absurd was this! The men who brought forward the accusation had been, during the period of which I am speaking, the foremost to require the reduction of the army and the navy, the diminution of the standing expenses of the country, and the suppression of a vast number of posts and offices connected with the defence of the empire. When, therefore, the Revolution of July 1830 arrived, and when the leaders of the war party perceived that they were unable to convince the country that France was in a position to defend herself against foreign aggression, these same preachers of economy, these parers down of salaries, offices, and forces, turned round upon the Restoration, and accused it, forsooth, of being anti-national! Yet what could be more absurd than this reproach? During fifteen years of comparative peace, the governments of Louis XVIII. and of Charles X. had wisely sought to maintain a just proportion between the exigencies of the state and the numbers of land and sea forces. In other words, the army and navy were placed on a peace footing, and so strong were the convictions of both the monarchs and their advisers that revolution at home was impossible, and that war abroad was not probable, that even though the events of Spain, Greece, and Algiers, required occasionally extra levies and additional supplies, still the ordinary military and naval forces for the fifteen years of Bourbon government, from 1815 to 1830, were very moderate, though amply sufficient. If the Restoration had maintained large armies and navies, it would have been accused of extravagance; yet, because it pursued a different line of conduct, it was said to be anti-national! "La France est un soldat!" exclaimed the eloquent and poetic Chateaubriand, and he knew how to strike a popular chord, which was sure of vibrating when he said this. But Chateaubriand knew quite well that France could not have gone to war against Europe with the forces which she possessed in 1830, and he knew that when the demagogues of that period called for war they had no other desire than confusion and overthrow. I have thus endeavored to show that the Restoration could not be justly blamed for the small number of forces prepared to enter the field of conflict when the events of 1830 once more brought the war party into notice and importance. The Restoration sought to maintain peace, whilst the Revolution was said to be made, "to tear into atoms the treaties of Vienna!" I know it has been said that the government of Charles X., and especially the Prince de Polignac, had enter tained projects hostile to the peace of Belgium, under the sway of the ever-to-be-admired and regretted ex-king of the Pays-bas; and I know it has been declared by the war faction that papers were found by the first minister of foreign affairs, after the Restoration of July 1830, in the cartoons of the French foreign office, which proved that the court and royal family of France had cherished serious thoughts of annexing Belgium to the former country by means of encouraging a revolution against the Protestant King of Holland. That the De Guiches, the Martainvilles, the Peyronnets, the De Polignacs, and the ultra-papist party in France, viewed with horror the fact of a Protestant monarch reigning in Belgium I do not, for a moment, question; and that they would secretly have encouraged any Romanist movement for his overthrow I am prepared to admit, but that Louis XVIII., Charles X., or even the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême, were parties to any secret organization of such a movement, I most unhesitatingly deny. I repeat, then, that the government of the Restoration was essentially orderly and pacific; that it did not, therefore, require an immense standing army; that to have maintained such an army would have been senseless, considering the character of the policy of the government; and, finally, that it did not entertain any plans, or desire the triumph of any system in Europe which would have required much larger forces to support, or carry into execution. cannon were heard to roar in Paris, at the Château of St. Cloud, the fact did not create much anxiety, and certainly no alarm. When, on the Thursday of the Revolution week, the Duke d'Angoulême broke the sword of the Duke de Ragusa, in a fit of passion and disappointment, it was because he was so wholly unprepared for such a result as defeat, as to be for the moment convinced that the cause of the king had been betrayed. From that moment Charles X. and the Duke and Duchess d'Angouléme became frantic with fear, and the acts of abdication were signed at Rambouillet, under apprehensions the most painful, and in states of mind and agitation almost impossible to describe. From that moment, to save their lives from the fury of revolutionary mobs was the one great object they pursued; and the three commissioners appointed by the provisional government to secure the safe retreat of the royal family, were received by the king with respect, even though De Schonen and Odillon Barrot were peculiarly obnoxious both to his principles and policy. The positive bodily fear and mental agitation of Charles X., and of the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême prevented them, therefore, from taking any steps to secure to the Duke of Bourdeaux the throne of France. But what was the situation of the Duchess of Berry? Why did she not rush from the palace of St. Cloud, and, taking the young Duke of Bordeaux in her hand, present him This, then, was the state of men, parties, to the troops and the people, and exclaim, and principles, and this the condition of" Behold your king?" Did she want nerve France, of her army and navy, when one general voice declared, "We must have a king!" But who was the king to be selected? Justice and right pointed to the Duke of Bordeaux. His grandfather and his uncle had abdicated. Their acts of abdication could not be disputed; but they could not abdicate for Henry V., and his hereditary rights undoubtedly existed. How was it, then, that those rights were kept in the back-ground, were only asserted and developed by Berryer, De Conny, and De Chateaubriand, and were allowed to be set at nought without any very serious or determined resistance? This is the next question to which I shall address myself as intimately connected with the reign of Louis Philippe. In the first place, Charles X. and the Duke and Duchess d'Angoulême were physically afraid of the Revolution. They had been induced to believe that the ordinances of July 1830 would lead to nothing more than an insurrection, more or less serious, but to an insurrection which would be suppressed without much difficulty or any great loss of life. When, then, the and courage for such an undertaking? Certainly not! Her romantic history in La Vendée, where she performed such prodigies of valor, would at once give the lie to such a supposition, could it ever have been for a moment indulged. There were two reasons, or rather three, why such a line of conduct was not pursued by Madame la Duchesse. The first was, that she lacked at that critical moment, energetic and decided advisers. Second, King Charles X. would scarcely allow the young Duke of Bordeaux to leave his side. And third, the Duchess of Berry was very inaccurately informed as to the real state of affairs, both before and after the fatal ordinances of her father and monarch. The Count de Menars had undoubtedly informed the duchess as to the state of Paris, up to Tuesday evening, and on Wednesday morning she communicated to Charles X. all her uneasiness and anxiety. The monarch was imperturbable, and assured the duchess there was no reason for any apprehension respecting the result. Even the arrival of a young artist at the palace, charged to take the por 66 the populace, to have faced the yet 'vengeful and but partially avenged Parisians, would have required much nerve, vigor, and presence and strength of mind. But it is precisely because the Duchess of Berry was one of a million, and because her maternal love and energy were of the first order, that therefore I advert to this subject. No real great effort was made for the son of the duchess, until it was "too late ;" and he was neither to be seen nor heard of at a moment when all was critical and important. It is not impossible that the duke himself may be visiting England when these pages shall appear, and that they may come under his notice. To him I say, Prince, your cause was neglected when there was time to save it. It is now too late." Who, then, was to be king? That some one was essential, cannot be better proved, than by the following fact: that at the bureaux of the republican journal, Le National, it was first decided to put forward the name of the Duke of Orleans. I always feel that this fact is the most unanswerable argument to those who, even to this day, maintain that a republican form of government could have been established in France, and that Lafayette had a crown to dispose of, which he could have placed on his own head, as chief of the republic, had he felt so disposed to gratify his ambition. I shall never forget the look of satisfaction, of hope, of joy, with which the proposal of electing the Duke of Orleans, was received by the middling classes of Paris. When those classes heard, on the Thursday evening that the troops of the king had been defeated, that Marmont had been driven back by the Faubourgians, and that the Carmagnole and ça-Ira had been sung in the streets, as well as the Marseillaise, they were depressed beyond measure. They saw nothing before them but anarchy, confusion, war, republicanism, and the triumph of de trait of the king, and who gave a graphic and fearful account of the scenes he had witnessed, did not move that prince, who, after having listened with attention to the recital, said, Ce n'est rien, tout cela finira ce soir; ce n'est presque rien. Tenez, mon cher, ce que vous avez de mieux à faire c'est de commencer mon portrait." And then Charles X. sat down before the artist, and his features did not evince the slightest change. Not so the painter he could not proceed. The king perceived it. "Eh bien!" said the monarch, with unruffled composure, ce sera pour la semaine prochaine." When the artist withdrew, the Duchess of Berry gave herself up to an agony of grief, and Charles X. and the Duke d'Angoulême both sought to console her. That was the moment in which she stood in need of wise, firm, and courageous advisers. But there were none who stepped forward; and the cause of her son was lost. I know very well that there are some persons, still accurately informed with regard to the events of 1830, who maintain that had the Duchess of Berry acted as I have suggested she should have done, she would have been made a prisoner, and that her son would have been shot. I do not believe this. The moment for such a line of conduct as that I have described, would have been on the Thursday afternoon, as soon as the forces of the king had retired to the Bois de Boulogne, and when the Duke de Ragusa repaired to St. Cloud. The whole city was at that time in a state of indescribable apprehension. No government had been organized; the fear of a bombardment was very general; new barricades had been everywhere thrown up; it was not believed by any one that the conflict had terminated; the heights of Montmartre were looked to with the most fearful anticipations. The Hôtel de Ville was the spot to which report after report was brought of the arrival of fresh troops from distant gar-mocracy. But when it was known in the risons, and of the determination of Charles capital that even the chiefs of the republican X. to bombard Paris the next day; and these party had found out that "they must have a reports soon became known to the whole king," so resolved were the middling and population. That, then, was the moment upper classes to have one, that they had acwhen, if the heroic Duchess of Berry had ap- quiesced in the proposal to proclaim, in the peared, without escort, without soldiers or first instance, the Duke of Orleans "lieuguards, in the midst of the people, and had tenant-general of the kingdom," than the deexclaimed, "Charles X. and the Duke d'An- pression of the public mind vanished, the goulême have abdicated; the ordinances of gloomy forebodings of those who possessed Sunday last are withdrawn; the Chambers are to meet immediately; Casimir Perier is prime minister; and now, BEHOLD YOUR KING -Henry V.!" I feel not the smallest doubt that her mission would have been crowned with abundant success, and that all other hopes and combinations would have been at once abandoned, I admit that to have met property disappeared, shops were opened, manufactories no longer remained with closed doors, the working classes assumed an attitude of respect and dependence, and the lungs of the mighty population once more respired with health and energy. It will be expected, of course, that I should say something of the chances of the Duke de |