pleasure, the second with its effects. Aristotle's theory on these subjects is best understood in connexion with the stage that the analysis of pleasure had reached in the theories current in his time.

It is difficult for us to attach any meaning to a theory that identified pleasure with a "movement or "process" (X. c. iii. § 4); but it was a distinct achievement in the earlier thinkers to have got beyond the crude materialism of ordinary thought. A movement or process is at least an attribute of concrete things, not a concrete thing or substance itself.* The account, moreover, seemed to agree well enough with the more obvious pleasures, such as those that arise from satisfying mental and bodily wants. From the definition of pleasure as a “process of becoming" (yéveσis) it was only a step to the theory that all pleasures are the effect of replenishment (iii. § 6), and to conceive of its essential condition as an antecedent pain or want.

Plato represents a great step in advance of these earlier attempts at analysis.† (1) He rejects the view that pleasure is necessarily preceded by pain. There are "unmixed" pleasures, such as those of knowledge, beauty of form and colour, sound and smell.‡ (2) He anticipates many of the distinctions we find in Aristotle, eg. that between pleasures which, as preceded

* If modern hedonists had clearly recognized this they would have been saved much confusion. Bentham speaks of happiness or pleasure as divisible into "lots."

† His theory is most fully worked out in the Philebus.

‡ Philebus, 51 A.

by pain, are illusory inasmuch as they merely restore the function to its normal state, and those pleasures which accompany the active discharge of function and are pleasant in themselves. Especially he distinguishes the pleasures of the wise as the only true and unalloyed pleasures from all others as a mere shadow of pleasure. (3) Though accepting verbally the account of pleasure as a process of becoming, and congratulating its authors (perhaps the Cyrenaics),† he lays no stress upon it and seems throughout to be conscious of its inadequacy.

The ground was thus prepared for Aristotle's doctrine. Like Plato he rejects the earlier theories of "movement" and "replenishment," and on similar grounds (X. c. iii. §7). Like Plato also he distinguishes pleasures that are preceded by pain and want as only accidentally pleasant (VII. c. xii. § 2; c. xiv. § 4), from those that accompany the active discharge of function; the pleasures of the good man "as pleasures in the truest sense," from those of the bad man as only pleasant "in a secondary and partial sense" (X. c. iii. § 8). The advance which he makes consists in discarding the old terminology and fixing upon unimpeded activity, whether of body or of soul, whether preceded by actual obstruction or proceeding from a state which lacks nothing of the fulness of its nature, as the essential condition of pleasure (X. c. iv. § 5; cp. VII. c. xii. § 3).

* Rep. 583 B. "A sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise is quite true and pure-all others are a shadow only." + Philebus, 53 and 54; cp. Rep. IX. 583 E.

§ 4. Modern Criticism of Aristotle's Formula.

Reserving, meantime, the question of the significance of the above distinction between true and false pleasures, we may try to bring this well-known definition of pleasure into touch with modern thought by noticing one or two of the objections that have been brought against it by modern critics. The theory itself is restated by Sir William Hamilton in his Lectures on Metaphysics in the form: "Pleasure is the concomitant in every case where powers and objects are in themselves perfect, and between which there subsists a suitable relation." In another passage he expands this into the proposition: "Pleasure is a reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power of whose energy we are conscious. Pain is a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power."† Against the theory as so stated, J. S. Mill ‡ brings two objections: (1) The formula, however suggestive when applied to pleasure connected with activities of body and mind, fails when applied to pains and pleasures in which the mind and body are passive, as in most of the organic and a large portion of the emotional. (2) It implies the fallacy of circle in definition, seeing that there is "no criterion of imperfect or perfect action except that it produces pain or pleasure." Professor Stewart, who quotes this criticism, seems to accept it as sound, while defending * Vol. ii. p. 452 foll.

† Ibid. p. 440.

563.

Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, pp. 537 and

Aristotle's formula against it on the ground that it is directed to the practical purpose of showing the relation of pleasure to happiness, not to giving a psychological account of the nature of pleasure. As Aristotle's view of the relation of pleasure to happiness is expressly founded on an attempt "to make the true nature of Pleasure plainer," this is hardly satisfactory. There is, however, as a matter of fact, no need to have recourse to any such apology. The theory is untouched by Mill's criticisms.

1. With regard to the particular organic sensation which Mill mentions, viz. sweetness, it is of course true that Aristotle failed to anticipate the suggestions of modern physiology in the analysis of the conditions of the pleasure that normally accompanies it. On such a subject any ancient theorist (and Mill himself must here be reckoned among the ancients) could only have the vaguest presentiment of the truth. The advantage which Aristotle's formula has over others is that it is at any rate quite consistent with the modern physiological theory which represents organic pleasure as the accompaniment of increased excitability of sensory and motor areas, whether of the periphery or of the cerebral cortex. * Whether this theory can be substantiated with respect to the pleasures of taste must be left to physiologists to determine, but it implies a somewhat narrow view of the scope of scientific hypothesis if, in the absence of a more satisfactory formula (and Mill himself suggests no other),

* Külpe, Outlines of Psychology, Eng. tr., pp. 246, 270 foll.

we may not hold to one that covers at least a large portion of the phenomena.

With regard to pleasurable and painful emotions, Aristotle's theory is necessarily as defective from the side of psychology as his account of organic pleasures and pains is from the side of physiology. But here also it is rather an extension than a total rejection of the hint he gives that is required. According to the view stated above, pleasure is the accompaniment of the unimpeded action of organ or faculty in touch with its object. In formulating this definition, Aristotle clearly has in view such natural capacities as sense perception. But his theory is equally applicable to those acquired faculties which modern psychology treats of under the head of "appercipient masses." An important class of such faculties are what we know as our "sentiments," consisting of residua of ideas, feelings, motor impulses, etc., experienced in connexion with a particular object or group of objects, e.g. family, friends, country, etc. Any "mass" so formed stands to its object as the so-called natural faculties do to theirs. Like them it may be latent; or again, it may be called into active operation by the presence of the object in thought or reality. So understood, there is no difficulty in bringing "emotional pleasure" under the Aristotelian formula. Let the sentiment be affection for a friend. The presence of the friend is in that case the stimulus under which the system or faculty acts. It calls forth all the pleasant associations of past intercourse—the old jokes, the common friends, the whole golden age of