from the more imperfect forms, that some of his finest remarks occur.

True friends, we are told (c. iii. § 6), love one another "on account of what they are in themselves, and not on account of any accidental quality. Such friendship therefore endures so long as each retains his character, and virtue is a lasting thing"-more lasting, as we elsewhere learn, than knowledge itself. True friendship, again, is of slow growth. "The wish for friendship is of rapid growth, but friendship itself is not." For this reason (c. iv. § 3) it is "proof against calumny." Like charity, it hopeth all things, believeth all things. True friends respect one another's rights; they treat one another as ends, not as means only, and are thus secure against wrong. "In other kinds, on the contrary, there is no security against any form of wrong."

True friends are those who are of one mind with one another. But to be of one mind with an other is not merely to agree with his opinions. Such agreement, eg. on a scientific question, does not necessarily lead on to friendship. On the other hand (we might add), mere difference of opinion does not estrange. The kind of agreement and disagreement which is important is that which springs from being of the same or a different mind on "questions of the public advantage, and on all that touches life." Friendships based on agreement of this kind have the promise of permanence just because what is just Carlyle agreed with his friend John Sterling "in everything but opinion."

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and right is something fixed and permanent, and those who seek after it "stand on the same ground."

It is natural that Aristotle should think mainly in these last sections of the friendship of citizens. Comradeship of this kind sprang naturally from the soil of Greek political life, and in some states, eg. in Crete, was a recognized social institution. But he has no intention of limiting the application of the principle. He has already shown us that unity of interest of any kind, even that of casual fellowpassengers, may serve as a bond of friendship. He here adds that [permanent friendships can only exist on the basis of interests which are permanent and important. But he would not confine these to politics. Art, science, religion, education, are examples that will occur to us as fields in which the right kind of unanimity may spring up, and by offering security against the strain that individual differences of taste and habit inevitably put on friendship, give the promise of permanence.

It is moreover natural that Aristotle should think mainly of the friendship of men to one another; to him this was the sole type of equal friendship. The modern ideal of marriage as a lifelong friendship between equals * is a conception altogether foreign to Greek social conditions. Whilst, however, the modern world cherishes this ideal, it cannot be said to have realized the necessity of securing the conditions of

* On Aristotle's view of the friendship between husband and wife the student should consult Ethics, VIII. c. x. § 4; c. xi. § 4; Politics, I. cc. xii. and xiii.

"true friendship" in these permanent alliances. Unanimity," in the sense of agreement as to important questions of conduct and "all that touches life," is far from being generally accepted as the only true foundation of happiness in marriage, And there can be little doubt that it is just the want of some such common interest in a noble end, that makes life in so many cases one long discord.* Where there is no solid interest to serve as a standard, all sense of proportion or of relative value inevitably vanishes. The nervous irritation begotten of trifles becomes a prominent feature, lending colour to the cynic's saying that "small habits in married life produce more misery than vices." While some of the greatest writers have drawn attention to this as the source of many secret tragedies in married life, few have pointed with any clearness to the remedy. To take a single example: Anna Karenina, perhaps the most powerful novel of the kind, shows with an unflinching realism the slow degradation of the alliance founded on sexual passion alone. Yet the same novel gives food for reflection in the apparent acceptance by Count Tolstoi of petty strains and irritations as necessary incidents in the everyday intercourse even of the "happy marriage," and in his evident conviction that mutual interest in children is the sole harmonizer. To accept such an ideal of a lifelong alliance is surely to despair of human

nature.

*See Note H.

§ 6. Egoism and Altruism.

[IX. c. viii.]

con

In no passage, however, is Aristotle more vincing than in his application of the above doctrine to current moral problems. The first he deals with (IX. c. vii.) has comparatively little interest for us, since it has become generally accepted-in theory, at least that it is more blessed to give than to receive.” The philosophical gloss which he puts upon it—"The man who confers a benefit sees his own handiwork in the man who receives it; he therefore loves it more than the work loves its maker "-is chiefly interesting as an illustration of his general doctrine. The second, however, is one that has never ceased to exercise philosophers and practical men alike, viz. the (relation of self-love to love of others) (IX. c. viii.). The answer that is here given amounts to a Criticism of the popular antithesis between self and others, with the view of showing that the self which it is man's duty to love and seek to realize is the self which includes others, and in which therefore the prima facie opposition has disappeared. This cannot be otherwise if, as already proved, the end of man consists in a system of activities which presupposes not merely an aggregate of individuals, but an organized society.

The value of this solution will become apparent if we compare it with that of current Utilitarianism.

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Starting with the popular antithesis, English ethical writers have asked whether virtue consists in regard for self, or regard for others. Various replies have been given in the past. Thus the earlier school led. by Hobbes tended to resolve all conduct into a form of self-regard. The later doctrine of Utilitarianism resolved virtue into regard for others.* More recently Mr. Herbert Spencer's attempt to "conciliate" these two views has met with wide acceptance. The conciliation" amounts to showing that, as a matter of fact, there is a large and ever-widening area of conduct in which a man can only attain what he must needs desire, viz. the greatest pleasure, by taking into account the similar desires of others. It need hardly be pointed out at this stage that this is no real solution of the problem. It is merely a conspicuous case of what the logicians call ignoratio elenchi. That the way to the greatest happiness of individuals interpreted in terms of pleasure lies de facto through consideration of the happiness (in the same sense) of others, is no answer to the question whether the larger life has de jure a claim upon us. This question can only be truly answered when we have come to see that the self which includes others is a truer or more "natural" self than the self which excludes them But this involves just such a criticism of the accepted antithesis as the teaching of Aristotle. supplies. So long as the popular English philosophy refuses this better way, the problem must be for * See Mill's Utilitarianism, c. ii. † Data of Ethics, cc. xi.-xiv.